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ABSTRACT 
 
AIMS: To investigate self-discrepancies in stroke survivors and explore associations 
between discrepancies and distress, drawing on Higgins’s (1987) Self-Discrepancy Theory. 
More specifically, investigate if stroke survivors reported a change in their sense of self 
following stroke, if this change was related to their reported anxiety and depression, and if 
this relationship was mediated by their perceived self-esteem. Also, to explore if 
discrepancies between survivors’ post-stroke self and their ideal and ought self, 
respectively, were associated with depression and anxiety, respectively. 
 
METHOD: A retrospective cross-sectional design was employed. The participants were 67 
first-time community-living stroke survivors, with a mean age of 61.6 years and a mean time 
since stroke of 5.6 years. The measures included the Head Injury Semantic Differential for 
assessing pre-stroke (retrospectively), post-stroke, ideal and ought selves; the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale; the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; the Stroke-Specific 
Quality of Life Questionnaire (adapted); and the Barthel Index.  
 
RESULTS: Stroke survivors perceived themselves significantly more negatively than prior 
to their stroke. The discrepancy between pre and post-stroke selves was positively 
associated with affective distress and negatively associated with self-esteem and quality of 
life, respectively. The discrepancy between post-stroke self and ideal self, and the 
discrepancy between post-stroke self and ought self were also positively associated with 
affective distress. However, these relationships were undifferentiated, as the former was 
not only related to depression but also to anxiety, and the latter was not only related to 
anxiety but also to depression. Survivors’ perceived self-esteem was a mediator in the 
relationship between the pre and post-stroke selves discrepancy and affective distress. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: This was the first study to show a perceived change in identity in a large 
sample of stroke survivors, and it contributed to our understanding of how psychological 
factors may be involved in emotional adjustment after stroke. This highlighted the 
importance of considering such changes in informing neurorehabilitation; the clinical 
implications were discussed. It was also the first study to provide support, albeit partial for 
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory in a stroke population. The strengths and limitations 
of the study were considered and ideas for future research were proposed.
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY  
While stroke represents the focus of this study, stroke is a form of acquired brain 
injury (ABI) and thus it will be considered in this context. The wider evidence from 
ABI research, particularly from traumatic brain injury (TBI), will be drawn on as 
relevant, in order to complement the evidence from stroke research, particularly 
when this is lacking; and thus enhance understanding of the issues presented. This 
is based on the argument that regardless of the cause, e.g. stroke or TBI, the 
resulting neurological damage leads to similar difficulties across physical, cognitive, 
behavioural, emotional and social functioning (Lezak et al., 2004).  
Stroke is a sudden, life changing event, confronting survivors with a wide range of 
impairments, and it is associated with decreased quality of life (Bays, 2001a). 
Emotional problems, such as anxiety (Campbell Burton et al., 2013) and depression 
(Ayerbe et al., 2013), are a common occurrence following stroke. They are not only 
distressing, but they can interfere with adjustment (Mukherjee, 2006) and 
rehabilitation (Gillen et al., 2001). These emotional difficulties can be explained by 
neurological factors and also by psychosocial factors, considering the adjustment 
required following such a major life event, which involves coming to terms with 
multiple losses. 
The concept of identity change or loss following ABI has been receiving increasing 
attention in the literature, with support coming mainly from qualitative studies (Segal, 
2010; Yeates et al., 2008). Furthermore, changes in self-concept have also been 
associated with emotional problems after ABI (Cantor et al., 2005; Carroll & Coetzer, 
2011). This has been explained by Cantor et al. (2005) using Higgins’ (1987) self-
discrepancy theory which related affective distress to discrepancies between 
different aspects of self. This model may be useful in understanding emotional 
disorders after ABI as partly due to a change in survivors’ sense of self, between pre 
and post-injury, with important implications for psychosocial neurorehabilitation. 
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A systematic review of the studies that investigated survivors’ perceived difference in 
their identity following ABI was carried out. This highlighted a growing area of 
research, however, with only very few studies involving stroke survivors and 
quantitative studies using modest samples, thus emphasising the need for further 
research.  
Consequently, the main aim in this study was to investigate, using a larger sample, if 
stroke survivors perceive themselves as different following stroke, and to explore the 
relationship between this perceived difference and their reported affective distress.  
 
1.2 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Firstly, an overview of ABI / stroke and their consequences will be provided, focusing 
on their associated emotional problems and how these have been explained. The 
impact of ABI / stroke on identity will then be considered; the terminology will be 
explained and relevant accounts of identity change following ABI / stroke will be 
outlined using a biopsychosocial framework (Yeates et al., 2008). This will be 
followed by a brief account of how self-esteem is affected by ABI / stroke. Higgins’ 
(1987) Self-discrepancy theory will then be introduced, as a means of explaining 
affective distress in relation to discrepancies between different aspects of self. This 
will be followed by a systematic review of the studies that investigated changes in 
the sense of self following ABI / stroke. Finally, the rationale, aims and hypotheses of 
this study will be outlined. 
 
1.3 ACQUIRED BRAIN INJURY AND STROKE 
1.3.1 Overview  
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines acquired brain injury as “damage to 
the brain, which occurs after birth and is not related to a congenital or a degenerative 
disease. These impairments may be temporary or permanent and cause partial or 
functional disability or psychosocial maladjustment” (WHO, 1996 cited by Powell 
River Brain Injury Society, 2014). Stroke is a form of ABI defined by a sudden death 
of brain cells caused by the interruption of the blood supply to the brain (WHO, 
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2001). There are two main sub-types of stroke (Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 
2012): an ischemic stroke is characterised by a blockage in the blood supply to the 
brain, and this accounts for 69 % of all strokes; a haemorrhagic stroke is caused by 
a major blood vessel that ruptures and bleeds into the brain, and this accounts for 
approximately 13% of all strokes (Wolfe et al. 2002). 
In the UK, there are approximately 152,000 strokes every year, with one in five 
strokes being fatal, and there are approximately 1.1 million stroke survivors living in 
Britain (Townsend et al., 2012). Furthermore, approximately 25% of strokes occur in 
people aged under 65 years (Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 2012a). 
In what follows, the aim is to provide an outline of the general consequences of 
stroke, with a focus on the emotional problems experienced after ABI / stroke. More 
specifically, the incidence, impact and etiology of post-stroke anxiety and depression 
will be considered.  
1.3.2 Consequences of ABI / Stroke  
Acquired brain injury is a major cause of disability and is highly idiosyncratic. The 
consequences of the neurological damage resulting from ABI are well documented 
and include a range of difficulties across physical, cognitive, behavioural, emotional, 
and social functioning. The symptoms range in severity depending on the extent and 
location of injury, age, premorbid personality, and individual social circumstances 
(e.g. family support, access to rehabilitation services, etc.) (Lezak et al., 2004).  
In stroke, the most prominent effects are motor and sensory deficits, aphasia and 
visual field problems (Bogousslavsky & Caplan, 2001). The individuals may also 
experience a broad range of higher cognitive deficits (Lezak et al., 2004) and 
impaired social functioning (Sjogren,1981). Stroke is the main cause of severe 
disability in the UK (Adamson et al., 2004). This is understood both in terms of loss 
of ability to carry out activities of daily living, required for being independent at home, 
and reduced participation in wider roles (work, leisure, socialising) (Lincoln et al., 
2012). More than half of all stroke survivors are left dependent on others for 
everyday activities (Intercollegiate Stroke Working Party, 2012). 
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1.3.2.1 Emotional problems after ABI / stroke  
Stroke can be an extremely challenging and frightening event, involving a sudden 
transition from being able-bodied to disabled, confronting survivors with a wide range 
of physical, psychological, social and sexual impairments (Delmar et al., 2005; 
Hjelmblink & Holmstrom, 2006; Teasell et al., 2011). It is a life-changing condition, 
associated with decreased quality of life, even in the case of little visible functional 
impairment (Carlsson et al., 2003; Edwards et al., 2006; Muus et al., 2010) and 
successful rehabilitation (Hopman & Verner, 2003; Kim  et al., 1999; Seacrest & 
Thomas, 1999). Within six months of discharge from inpatient rehabilitation, over half 
of stroke survivors report reduced participation in meaningful activities (Mayo et al., 
2009; Rittman et al., 2007; Roth & Lovell, 2007) and many report increased isolation, 
with 25% housebound (Belanger et al., 1988; Mayo et al., 2009; Rittman et al., 
2007), or in contact only with immediate family members (Green & King, 2009; 
Hommel et al., 2009; Hopman & Verner, 2003).  
Consequently, given the life changes and the sense of loss they often experience, it 
is not surprising that, generally, ABI survivors are typically at heightened risk of 
developing emotional disorders (Williams & Evans, 2003). Moreover, these seem to 
be irrespective of the level of severity of brain injury (Lishman, 1987), and can be 
present at various stages of recovery (Wright & Telford, 1996).  
Depression is the most widely reported mood disturbance following ABI, although 
anxiety is also common (Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Williams, 2003). On average, 
anxiety and depression rates after stroke are about 33%, but some studies report 
over 70% (Altieri et al., 2011; Hackett et al., 2009; Salter et al., 2010).  
1.3.2.1.1 Incidence of depression and anxiety after stroke 
Post-stroke depression rates are high (Brodaty et al., 2007). At any one time, 
depression is present in approximately one third of community-living stroke survivors 
(Hackett et al., 2005), and around 55% of survivors experience depression at some 
stage after stroke, as shown by a 15 year longitudinal study (Ayerbe et al., 2013). 
Relatives of stroke survivors reported depression associated with stroke as most 
prominent during the acute stage of recovery, but this may become more widespread 
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and more severe over time, significantly affecting the quality of life after stroke 
(House, 1996). 
Although less researched, anxiety is almost as prevalent as depression, and it 
seems to become more evident and persists a few months after the stroke event 
(Bergersen et al., 2010; Campbell Burton et al., 2013). A systematic review and 
meta-analysis of observational studies showed anxiety affects about 20% of stroke 
survivors (Campbell Burton et al., 2013). The comorbidity between anxiety and 
depression, which is well established in the general population (Kessler et al., 2003), 
was also shown in stroke; 42 out of 87 of stroke survivors reported experiencing both 
anxiety and depression 2 to 5 years after discharge from a specialised rehabilitation 
hospital (Bergensen et al., 2010). 
1.3.2.1.2 Impact of post-stroke depression and anxiety  
Emotional problems are not only distressing, but are also frequently debilitating, 
affecting people’s cognitive abilities and adjustment (Mukherjee, 2006), being 
associated with poorer functional and social outcomes (Herrmann et al., 1998; 
Pohjasvaara et al., 2001) and lower quality of life (Bays, 2001).  
Post-stroke depression impacts negatively on rehabilitation, as people with 
depression show poorer engagement with rehabilitation treatment (Gillen et al., 
2001), increased outpatient visits post-discharge (Jia et al., 2006), increased rate of 
rehospitalisation (Ghose et al., 2005) and greater risk of institutionalisation (Kotila et 
al., 1999). Additionally, anxiety was found to be associated with reduced social 
contact, delayed recovery (Astrom, 1996) in activities of daily living and handicap 
(Sturm et al., 2004). 
However, Hadidi et al. (2009) criticised many studies for the lack of control for 
cofounding variables. Furthermore, the direction of relationship is unclear. For 
instance, there is strong evidence that various cognitive difficulties are associated 
with depression (Mohanty & Heller, 2002) and with anxiety (Barker-Collo, 2007). 
However, while stroke survivors who are depressed show impaired cognition 
compared to those who are not depressed (Verdelho et al., 2004), those with 
cognitive impairment are more likely to develop depression (Nys et al., 2006). 
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1.3.2.1.3 Etiology of affective disorders after stroke 
There is a poor understanding of the factors that trigger and maintain affective 
disorders after ABI. The etiology is likely to be complex and determined by a 
combination of factors, including neurologically based changes to cognitive and 
emotional brain systems, pre-injury factors, psychological adjustment issues and the 
nature of social and family support (Gracey & Ownsworth, 2012).  
Moldover et al.’s (2004) ways of conceptualising the etiology of affective disorders, 
particularly depression, in TBI could also apply to stroke. Thus, depression can be a 
secondary or neurologically mediated reaction to the brain injury, most common in 
the first few months and best predicted by the severity of injury and premorbid 
functioning. Or, a primary affective disorder that typically develops at least six 
months post-injury, along with the realisation of the limitations resulting from the 
injury. The latter may be associated with adjustment difficulties, including developing 
a new identity based on the cognitive, physical and psychosocial changes implicated 
by the brain injury (Cantor et al., 2005). 
1.3.2.1.3.1 Organic etiologies 
Neuropathology, for instance damage to areas of the brain that regulate emotions, 
has been hypothesised as a cause of affective disorders. Post-stroke depression has 
been typically explained by neurophysiological (e.g. depletion of intra-cerebral 
neurotransmitters, Gainotti et al., 2001) and anatomical factors (e.g. location of 
lesion, such as left prefrontal, Lezak et al., 2004; Nitschke & Heller, 2005; Robinson 
et al., 1983). Further evidence from traumatic brain injury linked depression to neural 
damage (Jorge et al., 1993; Prigatano & Summers, 1997); especially acute onset 
depression was linked to left anterior cerebral involvement (Jorge et al., 1993). 
However, reviews of studies of post-stroke depression being related to lesion 
location showed no support for this hypothesis (Carson et al., 2000). Additionally, 
anxiety does not appear to be consistently related to size or location of lesion either 
(Bond et al., 1998; Kim et al., 2003).  
Furthermore, Fleminger et al. (2003) argued that if brain damage were primarily 
responsible for post-TBI depression then there would be some differences in 
presentation. Interestingly, the presentation of post-stroke depression was found to 
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be very similar to that of depression where there was no other physical illness 
(Cumming et al., 2010) and equally, depression in head-injured and non-head 
injured individuals (Aloia et al., 1995).  
1.3.2.1.3.2 Psychosocial factors 
While biological factors, such as discussed above, may contribute to the occurrence 
of depression after stroke, they are not exclusively responsible. 
Premorbid depression or psychiatric illness, dysphasia, functional impairments, living 
alone, and social isolation have consistently been associated with depression after 
stroke (Ouimet et al., 2001), as well as divorce, pre-stroke alcohol consumption 
(Burvill et al., 1997), activities of daily living impairment (Landreville et al., 2009) and 
locus of control (Thomas & Lincoln, 2006).  
Affective distress post-stroke may also be a normal reaction to a major life event and 
its negative consequences, such as physical and cognitive impairments, reduced or 
lost ability to work, difficulties with social interactions, discrimination, isolation 
(Mukherjee et al., 2006). For ABI survivors, life, as previously known to the 
individual, is lost (Haynes, 1994) and they have to come to terms with tangible 
losses such as physical health and employment, as well as a perceived loss of 
control over their life (Tasker, 2003). Therefore, vulnerability to depression in stroke 
might be related to the recognition of losses (Fleminger et al., 2003).  
Other psychological factors have been demonstrated to be involved in adjustment 
after ABI, and may also be relevant in stroke. Depressed compared with non-
depressed TBI survivors reported increased psychological symptoms related more to 
changes in self-concept (e.g. confidence and self-deprecation)  than to somatic 
markers (Jorge et al., 1993). Also, self-esteem, which is found to be associated with 
depression, is not only reported as low by TBI survivors, (Anson & Ponsford, 2006), 
but also appeared as significantly reduced in comparison to retrospectively reported 
pre-injury levels (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008). 
1.3.3 Summary 
Stroke is a life changing event, and survivors are left with a range of disabilities, 
physical and psychological, which impact negatively on the survivors’ quality of life. 
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Anxiety and depression are common emotional consequences after stroke, and can 
interfere with adjustment and rehabilitation.  
However, the etiology of emotional problems post-stroke is unclear. This seems to 
be complex, partly explained by the neurological changes to emotional brain 
systems, and also, by issues related to psychological adjustment to a major life 
event that involves coming to terms with multiple losses, resulting from the cognitive, 
physical and psychosocial changes implicated by the brain injury.  
Amongst other psychological factors, changes in self-concept and self-esteem have 
also been associated with emotional problems after ABI, generally highlighting a 
growing area in the literature, which is the concept of identity change or loss 
following ABI. This is going to be the focus of the next section. 
 
1.4 ABI / STROKE AND IDENTITY  
1.4.1 Overview  
As pointed out by Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000), although different forms of ABI (e.g. 
stroke compared to TBI) have slightly different consequences, it can be argued that 
sense of self is equally likely to be affected due to the sudden changes experienced 
by survivors in their relationships with their bodies, their family and their community. 
Indeed, damage to the frontal lobes is common in TBI and is also present following 
stroke (Mattson & Levin, 1990); this is associated with executive difficulties including 
self-regulation of emotion and behaviour (Lezak et al., 2004) that can also affect the 
way survivors think about themselves (Gracey, Brentall et al., 2009, cited in Gracey 
& Onsworth, 2012). Therefore, the evidence of change in identity following ABI, 
which comes mostly from TBI, is considered to have relevance for stroke survivors 
as well, and will be presented alongside evidence from stroke studies.  
Life-changing events render people’s sense of self fluid (Howard, 2000). Moreover, 
sudden chronic illness is viewed as disrupting one’s predictable life course and so 
impacting on their identity by producing a biographical disruption (Williams, 2000). 
Indeed, ABI engenders complex psychological processes with implications for one’s 
9 
 
identity and it has been described as a disruption to one’s sense of self (Moldover et 
al., 2004; Muenchberger et al., 2008).  
Identity loss following ABI is a growing area in the literature and indeed a commonly 
reported experience after stroke, due to loss of functional abilities and roles (Ellis-Hill 
et al., 2000; Salter et al., 2008; Seacrest & Thomas, 1999), manifested as loss of 
control, uncertainty about the future and social isolation (Haslam et al., 2008; Salter 
et al., 2008; Teasell et al., 2011). 
Loss of identity seems to be a crucial aspect of concern for both ABI survivors (Ben-
Yishay, 2008) and their families (Landau & Hissett, 2008). Tyerman and Humphrey 
(1984) were first to report a significant negative discrepancy between pre and post-
injury ratings of self-concept. Now, there is growing evidence that ABI survivors 
experience a profound change in their current view of themselves compared to pre-
injury (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Myles, 2004; Nochi, 1997; Wright & Telford, 1996), 
leading to two images of the self: ‘who I am now’ and ‘who I was before injury’ 
(Cantor et al., 2005). 
Similarly, stroke survivors face major psychological and existential challenges to 
their sense of self (Ellis-Hill, 2000), reporting a ‘loss of me’, and feeling distanced 
from their new selves, consequently experiencing their own personhood as strange 
and unfamiliar (Murray & Harrison, 2004). Moreover, the post-injury views of oneself 
tend to be more negative; two years on, stroke survivors saw themselves as less 
active, satisfied, independent or interested, less in control and capable than pre-
stroke, and this seems unrelated solely to the severity of the physical symptoms 
(Ellis-Hill & Horn,  2000). Unsurprisingly, a discrepancy in self-esteem, pre and post-
injury, self-esteem being negatively affected after injury, has also been shown in ABI 
survivors (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008), including stroke survivors (Keppel & Crowe, 
2010). Consequently, self-discrepancy leads to discomfort and requires grieving for 
the lost identity and working towards constructing a new identity (Moldover et al., 
2004), which can be a struggle (Morris, 2004).  
The aim in this section is to clarify how identity after ABI has been conceptualised, 
before providing a brief account of the impact of identity change on survivors and 
those around them. It will then move on to explore the knowledge base pertaining to 
how brain injury impacts on identity of adult survivors, using a biopsychosocial 
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framework. Finally, the emerging concept of identity continuity and reconstruction 
following identity disruption caused by ABI will be discussed.  
1.4.2 What is Meant by Identity Change Following ABI 
Sense of self or identity has broadly been defined as a construct describing the 
individuality of a person (Paterson & Stewart, 2002), and plays a central role in how 
individuals understand themselves and communicate (Muenchberger et al., 2008). It 
refers to one’s internal representation of self, including a representation of self within 
its social environment (Whitbourne et al., 2002). Identity can usefully be seen as a 
synthesis between personal identity and social identity, as one’s social roles and 
group memberships contribute to forming and maintaining a sense of self (Gracey & 
Onsworth, 2012).  
Yeates et al. (2008) describe “personality” or identity change after ABI as a shift or 
discontinuity in who the survivor is as a person after the injury compared to who they 
were before. This is seen as a “subjective discontinuity in their felt, embodied or 
social experience of who they are” (p.567), and also an observed change by those 
around, professionals and family alike (e.g. Weddell & Leggett, 2006). As noted by 
Segal (2010), depending on the theoretical views on the “self”, different terms such 
as “personality”, “self-concept”, “self-narratives”, and “identity” are used in the 
literature to describe altered personhood following ABI.  
As Yeates et al. (2008) point out, traditionally, this change has been predominantly 
explained by the biologically-deterministic account of brain–mind alteration. This is 
derived from individualist conceptualisations of personality (Eysenck, 1967 cited in 
Yeates et al., 2008), which assume a direct link between neurological change and 
changes in personhood. Personality traits are seen as biologically-determined and 
located in the brain, unique to the individual, and fairly stable in the absence of 
nonpathological conditions (McCrae & Costa, 1996). Consequently, specific cortical 
damage is expected to directly alter personality. 
However, evidence from social neuroscientists, psychologists and psychosocial 
theorists challenge this view, arguing for a range of direct and indirect factors, 
subjective and inter-subjective, that may contribute to the ABI survivors’ experience 
of personality change. Personhood is viewed as heterogeneous and informed by the 
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wider social context (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979 cited in Yeates et al., 2008). Identity thus appears as interactive, 
developed through social interactions and discourse, and so is fragmented, relative, 
fluid, and always changing (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006 cited in Wolfenden & Grace, 
2012).This leads to new ways of hypothesising personality change after ABI, beyond 
biological determinism and drawing on psychological and psychosocial explanations, 
therefore offering a more complex and integrative understanding of this topic. 
1.4.3 Impact of Identity Change 
Changed conceptions of self (before and after injury) have been shown to be highly 
distressing, being associated with mental health concerns (e.g. depression, anxiety), 
which can impact on successful rehabilitation (Cantor et al., 2005), and moreover, 
can be experienced even despite achievements in significant rehabilitation goals 
(e.g. work, financial security, mobility) (Cloute et al., 2008). Also, ABI survivors’ 
ability to cope with changes in identity was found to predict anxiety levels (Dewar & 
Gracey, 2007).  
Disruptions to identity have also been shown to be associated with increased 
difficulties in forming and maintaining social networks (Hoofinen et al., 2003; 
Engberg & Teasdale, 2004), while maintenance of one’s social identity is predictive 
of well-being following ABI (Haslam et al., 2008). Unsurprisingly, there is an 
associated lack of positive sense of future and poor quality of life (Cloute et al., 
2008);  conversely, the development of positive self-identity seems to predict higher 
levels of quality of life post-injury (Vickery et al., 2005).   
1.4.3.1 Impact of perceived change on others 
Those around ABI survivors also observe an obvious change in “something” about 
them (Yeates et al., 2008). Personality change defined by significant others is also 
related to clinical outcomes. Cross-sectional and longitudinal outcome studies 
showed relatives’ ratings of personality change post ABI to better predict their 
burden or stress than cognitive or physical changes (Brooks et al., 1987; Oddy et al., 
1978; Weddell & Leggett, 2006). 
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1.4.4 How Brain Injury Impacts on Identity of Adult Survivors  
Previously, Yeates et al. (2008) used a biopsychosocial framework to investigate 
identity change following ABI. This was later adopted by Segal (2010) in his review 
on the same topic, and will also be employed here as it seems a useful way of 
incorporating the diverse perspectives on the matter, which were highlighted above. 
This section is based on the work of Yeates et al. (2008) and Segal (2010); while the 
focus will be on stroke, the wider ABI literature will be drawn on to enhance 
understanding.   
1.4.4.1 Biological accounts  
Damage to specific prefrontal cortical areas has been associated with lack of social 
insight, altered emotional processing, disinhibition and euphoria, which are 
challenging to sustaining social relationships (Mathiesen & Weinryb, 2004; Namiki et 
al., 2008).  
Moreover, particular cortical areas seem linked to socio-affective processes, such as 
aligning to another’s experience and connecting (Segal, 2010). For instance, in a 
dyadic encounter, inferior parietal and anterior cingulated networks seem to be 
involved in the complex processes of predicting the other’s intentions, aligning to 
their subjective experience, and influencing their subjectivity and behaviour (Yeates 
et al., 2008). 
Damage to frontal lobes and the limbic system seems to affect one’s perceptions of 
their internal emotional experiences (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Park et al., 2001) and 
their experiencing and expressing empathy (Lezak et al., 2004).  
Personality change has also been linked to memory impairment. While in retrograde 
amnesia, the loss of an autobiographical memory can disrupt the person’s narratives 
about themselves, anterograde amnesia can prevent the construction of new 
narratives (Yeates et al., 2008). Indeed, ABI survivors who experienced gaps in short 
or long-term memory found it difficult maintain a coherent and continuous narrative 
of their experience Nochi (1998).  
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1.4.4.2 Psychological accounts 
Segal (2010) noted that there is a wealth of literature on psychological models of 
change following ABI, with several terms, such as changes in ego, self-concept, self-
schemas, and self-constructs, being used to describe this. However, all acknowledge 
that a change in the subjective processing of information about oneself directs how 
the self is experienced (Yeates et al., 2008).  
1.4.4.2.1 Cognitive-behavioural approaches  
1.4.4.2.1.1 An interacting cognitive subsystems account  
As noted by Segal (2010), Ylvisaker and Feeney’s (2000) provided one of the first 
cognitive accounts of self-concept changes after ABI, albeit supported only by 
anecdotal evidence and case studies. Based on an interacting cognitive subsystems 
approach, they proposed that people construct schematic mental models of the self 
through cognitive processes that are based on the association of recurring 
experiences and their accompanying emotions and behaviours. Changes in self-
concept are seen to occur when novel constructions of models of the self are 
generated automatically by stimuli that are associated with negative emotional states 
and socially adverse behaviours. Consequently, the biological changes caused by 
brain injury lead to altered self-coding, which can account for changes in self-
conception.  
1.4.4.2.1.2 A relational frame theory account  
Myles (2004) expanded Ylvisaker and Feeney’s (2000) investigation of the “self”, by 
proposing Relational Frame Theory (RFT) (e.g. Hayes, 1994 cited in Myles, 2004), a 
modern behavioural approach to language and cognition, as a framework for 
understanding the loss of sense of self after brain injury.  
According to RFT, language and cognition facilitate humans to readily derive 
arbitrary relations between events (e.g. Hayes, 1994 cited in Myles, 2004). From a 
RFT perspective, there are three distinct senses of self (Myles, 2004): 
The conceptualised self is seen as the network of relations between one’s 
behaviours and a range of verbal categorical concepts repeatedly applied to these.   
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This is similar to Ylvisaker and Feeney’s (2000) description of the “self-concept”, as 
mental representations of “self” are seen as constructed based on the relationship 
between one’s experiences and their interpretations, resulting in a cohesive self-
conception (Segal, 2010). 
Self as ongoing process of verbal knowing (self-awareness) refers to one’s private 
subjective experiences comprising of thoughts, emotions, and memories.  
Self as the context for verbal knowing develops in early childhood together with an 
own sense of perspective, distinguished from others’. It refers to the stable viewpoint 
from which one experiences the world, independent of the nature of the content of 
their ongoing flow of subjective experience. 
The conceptualised self is seen as dominating over the other two selves, as 
normally, people identify with their psychological content rather than the context from 
which this is experienced.  
Myles (2004) argued that ABI involves a “crisis of the conceptualised self” (p. 494), 
which leads to “loss of self”. This is seen as a verbal and relation process where the 
survivor is consciously aware of inconsistencies between post-injury functioning and 
pre-injury conceptualised self, which makes them experience themselves as “not the 
same”. If the pre-injury self-concept is positively evaluated, changes in functioning 
that are inconsistent with it are likely to lead to negative evaluations, both of those 
changes and of the resulting new self-concept. This could then lead to emotional 
distress and denial (Myles, 2004). 
Although only anecdotal evidence and case studies from clinical practice were used 
to support Myles’ (2004) claim, he provided a theoretical basis for changes in self-
concept following ABI (Segal, 2010). 
Myles’ (2004) claims are consistent with Cantor et al.’s (2005) adaptation of Higgins’ 
(1987) self-discrepancy theory, which proposes that emotional distress following loss 
of self is due to tensions between pre-injury and post-injury conceptions of self.  
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1.4.4.2.2 Constructivist approaches 
1.4.4.2.2.1 A personal construct psychology account 
In a qualitative study with 32 ABI survivors, Gracey et al. (2008) employed a 
personal construct psychology (PCP) approach (Kelly, 1955, cited in Gracey et al., 
2008), concerned with meaning making processes as central to experiences of 
personhood, to understand how survivors make sense of, or construe, themselves 
post-injury.  
According to PCP, through repeated interaction with the world we derive 
dichotomous constructs (e.g. love - hate) that we then apply to new experiences in 
order to make sense of them. Similarly to the previous accounts, people make sense 
of themselves through mental interpretations of their experiences, but with emphasis 
on contrasts between concepts as crucial in the meaning making process (Segal, 
2010). 
In their study, Gracey et al. (2008) elicited bipolar constructs through systematic 
comparison of pre-injury, current and ideal selves. Most constructs fell into the theme 
“experience of self in the world”, followed by “basic skills” (cognitive, sensory, 
physical, social) and “experience of self in relation to self”. Survivors seemed to 
make sense of themselves in terms of personal meanings and feelings associated 
with social and practical activity, such as belonging, capability, the extent to which 
activities “reinforce who I am”, or how activities make someone “feel part of things”.  
1.4.4.2.2.2 A phenomenological account 
In a phenomenological qualitative study with TBI survivors, Muenchberger et al. 
(2008) highlighted the profound disruptions to “self” following injury and provided a 
broader conceptual understanding of the reconstruction of self, seen as a cyclical 
and ongoing process. Like Gracey et al.’s (2008) study this was also about individual 
meaning and the changes in self-construction over time (Segal, 2010).  
According to Muenchberger et al. (2008), following injury the self goes through a 
dynamic process of identity transition, characterised by fluctuations between inter-
dependent phases of contraction and expansion of self and tentative equilibrium. 
These interactions are seen as cyclical and continuous. 
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Contraction of self seemed the result of the self being under internal and external 
pressures to conform to a desired state, with limited scope for individualisation, 
creativity or opportunity for developing self-confidence. Identity contraction involved 
experiencing a severed sense of personal history, a focus on daily functioning, 
reliance on others and a sense of being different to before the injury. 
Expansion of self was characterised by feelings of being given a second chance at 
life, thus the focus was on redefining life goals in the pursuit of a different life role. 
This was accompanied by a greater sense of perspective in coping with the injury, 
better acceptance of change, interdependence and working towards goals. 
A state of tentative equilibrium seemed to accompany the oscillation between 
contraction and expansion of the sense of self. This was explained by the concept of 
liminality, used previously in cancer and chronic illness research to understand 
identity reformation (Little et al., 1998; Forss et al., 2004, as cited in Muenchberger 
et al., 2008), which refers to a state of being in ‘limbo’ and suspension between 
former and future states, similar to the void state described by Nochi (1997) below. 
This was characterised by self-doubt and a sense of fragile progression, an uneasy 
sense of past, present and future and tensions relating to compliance and need for 
control. 
1.4.4.3 Psychosocial accounts 
From a social constructionist perspective, identity is seen as inter-subjective and 
relational, co-constructed through language, knowledge, processes of interpretation; 
the self-concept is seen within the realm of social discourse (Gergen,1985 cited in 
Segal, 2010). Consequently, all accounts of a self are better understood within the 
relationships and wider culture in which one is embedded. 
Indeed, there is increasing recognition of the multiplicity of factors involved in 
constituting the self, with a growing literature exploring the role of language, social 
meanings and discourses in understanding changes to personhood post-injury. In 
what follows an overview of the relevant work in this area is presented.   
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1.4.4.3.1 A narrative account  
For social scientists, self is defined by the meaning that the individual and others 
attach to it (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Mead, 1934, cited in Hinojosa et al., 2008), being 
constructed through the stories that people tell about themselves (Kelly & Dickinson, 
1997). This is reflected in Ellis-Hill et al.’s (2007) Life Thread Model of acquired 
disability, based on stroke; identity and sense of self are seen as the combination of 
the many life threads or stories of oneself, memories and future plans, that constitute 
one’s life-story (McAdams, 1990, cited in Ellis-Hill et al., 2007). These threads or 
stories establish a sense of coherence and stability, creating continuity between past 
and future, which is seen as essential for well-being (Ellis-Hill et al., 2007). While 
self-definitions do change, as new resources for self-construction emerge or as 
familiar ones are no longer available (Charmaz, 1991, as cited in Hinojosa et al., 
2008), this happens slowly, allowing individuals to incorporate the new narratives 
(McAdams 1993, as cited in Hinojosa et al., 2008). However, in the case of illness or 
disability, changes may be too rapid to be incorporated efficiently, which can cause a 
disruption of self (Charmaz, 2002).  
Furthermore, Hinojosa et al. (2008) argue that in the context of illness, the body, 
which is an important resource for self-construction (Gubrium & Holstein 2003; 
Shilling, 2003, as cited in Hinojosa et al., 2008), requires reinterpretation. Thus, 
stroke can be seen to disrupt one’s self-construction by changing one’s taken-for-
granted experience of the body (Hinojosa et al., 2008). Indeed, the related 
impairments were shown to affect young stroke survivors perception of their body, 
forcing them to review their self-concept (Kaplan & Cerullo, 1986, cited in Keppel & 
Crowe, 2010). Consequently, constructing identities in the same way as pre illness is 
difficult (Charmaz, 1995) as previous ways of understanding oneself and one’s 
position in the world are challenged, and rendered no longer relevant; thus new 
explanatory frameworks are needed (Bury, 1982).  
Examining the self-narratives of ABI survivors, Nochi (1997, 1998, 2000) revealed 
their reliance on the broader social contextual dimension. Initially, Nochi (1997) 
identified a “void” in many survivors’ self-narratives as a result of problems recalling 
their accidents and parts of their recovery, which interferes with self-understanding 
and leads to “a real crisis of the self” (p. 18). Nochi (1998) later identified three 
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aspects of “loss of self” following ABI, two of which, loss of self in relation to pre-to-
post-injury comparison and discontinuity of identity through lost or disrupted 
memories, support the work mentioned earlier. The third, loss of self in the eyes of 
others, emphasises the importance of other people’s views concerning identity 
change. Indeed, relations were found between perceived personality change and 
emotional disorder in carers of stroke survivors (Stone et al., 2004). Finally, Nochi 
(2000) concluded that the reconstruction of coherent self-narratives is facilitated 
through social interaction, through reorganizing interpersonal relationships and 
environments to support newly developing and preferred self-narratives. 
1.4.4.3.2 A social identity account 
Drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which emphasises the 
importance of social continuity in maintaining well-being, Haslam et al.’s (2008) 
quantitative study showed that maintaining group membership predicted well-being 
after a stroke, possibly by increasing the likelihood of coping with and adjusting to 
change. This highlighted the importance of preserving social identity in 
neuropsychological rehabilitation, alongside personal identity. Furthermore, 
qualitative accounts of stroke survivors revealed that family, social and community 
resources can enhance participation in personally meaningful activities, through 
social positioning and respectful social relationships (Anderson & Whitfield, 2013). 
This emphasises the important role social relationships play in helping survivors 
maintain or regain a position in society and so develop a positive post-stroke identity 
despite impairments. 
1.4.4.3.3 A social discursive account 
Using discourse analysis, a social constructionist methodology, Cloute et al. (2008) 
showed how identity following TBI is co-constructed through the language and 
interactions from dominant medical services. The medical discourse influenced how 
survivors understood themselves, for instance, as sick, passive and dependent, with 
little scope for alternative constructions.  
In another discourse analytic study, Guise et al. (2010) showed that young stroke 
survivors have to negotiate their identities and attend to related interpersonal issues 
when accounting for change in self after having acquired a ‘damaged’ identity due to 
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the stroke. While minimising the negative aspects of stroke and mitigating its 
implications on their identity, participants were sensitive to how these accounts were 
perceived by their carers (i.e. not inappropriately positive), who could criticise and 
challenge them, and offer potentially negative reformulations of these. This 
suggested some difficulty in maintaining a positive sense of self on the part of the 
stroke survivors, particularly in the presence of their carers who can play a role in 
maintaining damaged identities, thus further emphasising how identity-constructions 
can be influenced in interactions with others. 
To summarise, an overview of the diverse epistemological understandings of the 
impact of ABI on one’s sense of self or identity has been provided; this incorporated 
the biological, psychological and social domains involved in the experience of 
identity change following ABI. A shift in the way this challenge to identity is 
conceptualised has been noted, from a psychosocial perspective, which is going to 
be discussed in the next section. 
1.4.5 From Identity Disruption Toward Identity Reconstruction and Continuity 
Identity continuity after brain injury (Gracey et al., 2008; Haslam et al.,2008; Hinojosa 
et al., 2008) is emerging as a key concept, which normalises disruption and 
emphasises re-construction and desire to achieve continuity, rather than solely 
focusing on loss and adjustment to loss (Wolfenden & Grace, 2012). Nochi (2000) 
showed that ABI survivors are not just ‘accepting’ their injuries with their life 
implications, rather they revise their self-narratives. Furthermore, in a small 
qualitative study, Wolfenden & Grace (2012) showed that, while managing 
biographical disruption, young, higher functioning stroke survivors actively pursued 
identity re-establishment, for which resumption of life roles and responsibilities were 
important.  
Hinojosa et al. (2008) argue that constructing continuity is possible because self is 
multifaceted (Mead, 1934 cited in Hinojosa et al., 2008) and can be defined in 
various ways (Markus & Wurf 1987), with many selves being possible, depending on 
the context and the resources for self-construction used (Giddens, 1991, cited in 
Hinojosa et al., 2008). Thus, if a favoured identity is threatened by illness one way of 
constructing continuity would be by focusing on identities that remain unaffected 
(Hinojosa et al., 2008). This was showed in a study with female stroke survivors 
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(Kvigne et al., 2004), where although some identities (e.g. being an employee) were 
compromised, other valued self-constructions (e.g. mother, grandmother, housewife) 
were preserved, thus facilitating some continuity of the familiar pre-illness self. Later, 
in a study of narratives of 122 stroke survivors at one month post-stroke, some 
managed the stroke through their use of discursive resources that remained 
personally accessible following stroke, such as expectations for aging and religious 
beliefs, thus enabling them to construct stories of self-continuity (Hinojosa et al., 
2008). 
Consequently, identity re-construction post-stroke, and indeed any acquired disability 
involving a sudden and dramatic life change, is seen as a magnification of normal 
processes rather than an abnormal process (Ellis-Hill et al., 2007). Re-establishing 
identity presupposes retaining and restoring some life threads while replacing others. 
However, Ellis-Hill et al. (2007) also emphasise the role of others in facilitating this 
process, in terms of endorsing a positive view of self, and viewing acquired disability 
as a time of transition rather than simply of loss. 
1.4.6 Summary 
ABI / stroke can impact on people’s sense of who they are, changing how they see 
themselves, as it seems to cause a discontinuity in who the person is. This can be 
distressing for both survivors themselves and those around them, and has been 
explained in various ways.  
Traditionally, identity change following stroke would be explained by a biological 
account, derived from individualist conceptualisations of personality such as 
Eysenck’s (1967), whereby specific cortical damage is expected to directly alter 
personality. Conversely, psychological and psychosocial accounts argue for a wide 
range of factors, subjective and inter-subjective, contributing to the stroke survivor’s 
experience of change in personhood, which is seen as heterogeneous and 
embedded in and informed by the wider social context. 
Most accounts of stroke’s impact on the survivor’s identity imply a biographical 
disruption, much like in any sudden chronic illness. However, the concept of identity 
continuity has been emerging recently, to normalise biographical disruption and 
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emphasise re-construction of identity, which is facilitated by the view of self as 
multifaceted, allowing for some aspects of the self to be preserved. 
If people’s view of themselves changes after stroke, especially if the change is 
negative, it would follow that their self-esteem would be affected. Self-esteem will be 
considered in the next section. 
 
1.5 SELF-ESTEEM 
Self-esteem or a global judgement of self-worth refers to a personal evaluation of the 
self, positive or negative, representing a reflection of how people experience 
themselves (Rosenberg, 1965; 1979). As noted by Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) self-
esteem has been used interchangeably with self-concept (Guindon, 2002; Strein, 
1993). While the latter refers to how one views and experiences themselves (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), the former is the emotional valence of this view; self-concept refers to 
what one thinks about themselves while self-esteem to how one feels about 
themselves (Brown, 1998). However, as pointed out by Cooper-Evans et al. (2008), 
both have been associated with similar clinical outcomes, and are considered to be 
strongly related in both general and ABI populations (Kravetz et al., 1995; Man et al., 
2003; Vickery et al., 2005). 
Self-esteem was shown to be relatively stable during adulthood except at times of 
acute crisis (Trezesniewski et al., 2003). Indeed, as people’s views of themselves 
change following ABI (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Wright 
& Telford, 1996), including stroke (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000) (see systematic review 
1.7), this would be expected to affect their self-esteem. Conversely, a change in self-
esteem might be indicative of a change in self-concept. 
1.5.1 Self-Esteem and ABI 
ABI has been shown to impact negatively on survivors’ self-esteem (Curran et al., 
2000; Kravetz et al., 1995). As the body is a relevant resource for self-construction 
(Gubrium & Holstein 2003; Shilling, 2003 cited in Hinojosa et al., 2008) it is 
unsurprising that body image and self-esteem are at risk following critical 
neurological events (Keppel & Crowe, 2000). Young adults’ self-reported body image 
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was significantly negatively affected post-stroke compared with retrospective ratings, 
and this was associated with significantly lowered self-esteem (Keppel & Crowe, 
2000). Later, Howes et al. (2005) found that both body image and self-esteem were 
significantly lower among female ABI survivors when compared with a control group. 
1.5.2 Self-Esteem and Clinical Outcomes in ABI 
Self-esteem is at the centre of psychological theories of depression, the level of self-
esteem being related to the development and course of depression (Grubb et al., 
1993). Low self-esteem has been consistently shown to correlate significantly with 
affective disorders in both acutely (Weir et al., 1995) and chronically (Outland & 
Coonerty, 1995) disabled populations. 
A number of studies showed associations between low self-esteem and increased 
psychological distress following ABI (e.g. Cooper-Evans  et al., 2008; Curran et al., 
2000; Howes et al., 2005; Keppel & Crowe, 2000; Kravetz et al., 1995; Man et al., 
2003). In a series of studies using large samples of stroke survivors, Vickery and 
colleagues (Vickery, 2006; Vickery, Sepehri, Evans et al., 2008; Vickery et al., 2009) 
showed both the level and the stability of self-esteem to be associated with post-
stroke depression, in acute and rehabilitation settings. Also a negative self-concept 
has been found to be related to depression and anxiety (Vickery, 2006).  
Furthermore, high rates of psychological distress among ABI survivors have been 
shown to impact seriously upon long-term rehabilitation outcomes (e.g. Hibbard et 
al., 1998; Morton & Wehman, 1995; Wallace & Bogner, 2000). 
In the next section the self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) will be introduced, 
which provides a model of how the relative congruence or lack of congruence 
between aspects of identity might explain affective distress. This might be a useful 
model in explaining affective distress after brain injury as related to discrepancies 
between pre-injury and post-injury selves as shown by Cantor et al. (2005) in a pilot 
study with TBI survivors (see section 1.6.1.1 below). 
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1.6 THE SELF-DISCREPANCY THEORY (SDT) 
Higgins (1987) proposed the self-discrepancy theory to describe how certain 
conflicting beliefs about the self, termed “self-discrepancies”, relate to emotional 
states such as depression and anxiety.  
According to this model there are three basic domains of the self. The actual self is a 
representation of the attributes one believes to actually possess; the ideal self is a 
representation of the attributes one would ideally like to possess; finally, the ought 
self is a representation of the attributes one thinks they ought to or should possess. 
While the ideal domain is a representation of one’s hopes, aspirations and wishes, 
the ought domain is a representation of one’s sense of duty, obligations and 
responsibilities. 
Furthermore, there are two standpoints on the self, one’s own personal standpoint 
and one’s significant other’s standpoint. Combining one domain of the self (actual; 
ideal; ought) and one standpoint on the self (own; significant other) there result six 
basic types of self-state representations: actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, 
ideal/other, ought/own and ought/other. These are summarised in Table 1.1 below.  
Table 1.1: Self-state representations according to Higgins’ model of self-discrepancy  
  Actual Ideal Ought 
Own Self-concept Self-guide Self-guide 
Other Self-concept Self-guide Self-guide 
   
The first two self-state representations, particularly actual/own, represent what is 
typically referred to by “self-concept” in social psychology, meaning one’s perception 
of themselves and the attributes they possess. The other self-state representations, 
involving the domains of ideal and ought selves, are self-directed or acquired, 
internalised standards for behaviour, termed “self-guides” (Higgins, 1987).  
According to this theory, people are especially motivated to meet either one or both 
of these self-guides. Furthermore, the aim is to reach a condition where the self-
concept matches the personally relevant self-guide(s). Therefore, inconsistencies 
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between one’s self-concept (i.e. actual self) and their self-guides (ideal or ought) are 
thought to lead to emotional discomfort. These incompatible beliefs are cognitive 
constructs and thus they can vary in both their availability and their accessibility. 
Construct availability refers to the particular kinds of constructs that are actually 
present/available in memory to be used to process new information; whereas 
construct accessibility refers to the readiness with which each stored construct is 
used in information processing (Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Higgins et al., 1982). 
Individual differences are thought to arise because people have different constructs 
available and/or because their relative accessibilities are different. 
Furthermore, each type of discrepancy is seen to reflect a particular type of negative 
psychological situation that is associated with specific emotional problems (see 
Figure 1.1 below): 
Figure 1.1: Higgins’s (1987) Self-Discrepancy Theory 
             Self-guides       Affective consequences 
 
 
  Discrepancy 
 
 
 
 
The theory postulates that the psychological consequence of discrepancies between 
perceptions of the actual self and the ideal self is going to be the absence of positive 
outcomes (actual or expected); this is associated with dejection-type emotions such 
as disappointment and dissatisfaction, as the person believes their hopes and 
wishes have not been fulfilled. Thus this leads to depressive states. Consequently, 
according to this theory, discrepancies between actual and ideal self make one 
vulnerable to depression (see Figure 1.1 above). 
Actual 
self 
Ideal self 
Ought self 
 
Dejection-type emotions: 
Depression 
Disappointment 
Dissatisfaction 
Agitation-type emotions: 
Anxiety 
Guilt 
Uneasiness 
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Additionally, the psychological consequence of discrepancies between the actual self 
and the ought self is going to be the presence of negative outcomes (actual or 
expected); this is associated with agitation-type emotions such as guilt, self-
contempt and uneasiness, as the person believes to have contravened a personal 
moral standard. Thus this leads to anxious states. Consequently, according to this 
theory, discrepancies between actual and ideal self make one vulnerable to anxiety 
(see Figure 1.1 above). From this, it also follows that the greater the extent of a self-
discrepancy the more one experiences the emotional distress associated with that 
particular discrepancy.  
In order to measure self-discrepancies, Higgins et al. (1985) devised the Selves 
Questionnaire, which asks participants to list up to 10 traits or attributes for each of a 
number of different self-states. For example, it asks participants to list the attributes 
of the type of person they believe they actually are, the qualities of the person they 
believe they ought to be and the qualities of the person they would ideally like to be. 
It is administered in two sections, one involving the respondent’s own standpoint and 
the other involving the standpoint of a respondent’s significant other (parent, closest 
friend). The attributes were then compared to see how many matched and a 
discrepancy score was calculated by subtracting number of matches from number of 
mismatches. It was considered that spontaneously listing attributes associated to 
self-states increased the likelihood that the elicited attributes would be important and 
accessible. Although the Selves Questionnaire has been commonly adopted by 
researchers (Cornette, 2009; Fairborther & Moretti, 1998; Scott & O’Hara, 1993), 
some criticised it (Rodebaugh & Donahue, 2007; Tangney et al., 1998) suggesting 
that it actually taps into a generalised self-discrepancy that does not demonstrate the 
relations proposed by Higgins (1987), as they found no support for specific 
discrepancy-emotion relations. Others also found this, and they subsequently 
adapted and modified it (e.g. Crane et al., 2008; Strauman et al., 2001). 
1.6.1 Empirical Evidence 
Several studies provide empirical support for the self-discrepancy theory, attesting 
that different types of self-discrepancies are linked to depression and anxiety 
(Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al., 1985; 1986). Furthermore, the extent of the self-
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discrepancy has been shown to predict the level of emotional distress (Higgins et al., 
1985).  
The initial support came from a number of studies on non-clinical populations (e.g. 
Higgins et al., 1985; 1986). Several studies followed applying this model to affective 
distress in clinical samples, both psychological and physical health problems. For 
instance, Fairbrother and Amoretti (1998) and Scott and O’Hara (1993) reported that 
participants with depression had larger actual/ideal self-discrepancies than controls, 
and those with anxiety showed larger actual/ought self-discrepancies.  
Self-discrepancies and emotional distress were shown to be related in individuals 
with chronic lower back pain (Kinderman et al., 2011; Waters et al., 2004), cancer 
(Heidrich, et al., 1994) and brain injury (Cantor et al., 2005). Furthermore, Waters et 
al. (2004) found that the actual/ideal self-discrepancy predicted 14% of the variance 
in depressive symptoms. Self-discrepancies were also correlated with body 
dissatisfaction/disordered eating and emotional distress in female and male 
undergraduates (Strauman et al., 1991).  
However, a large study which addressed several limitations of previous supporting 
research failed to support the distinctiveness of actual/ideal and actual/ought self-
discrepancies relating to particular types of emotional distress (Phillips & Silvia, 
2010). They showed that discrepancies between ideal and actual self seem to 
predict depression but discrepancies between ought and actual self predict both 
anxiety and depression.  
1.6.1.1 SDT and affective distress in ABI 
While the Self-discrepancy theory is a framework designed to explore 
inconsistencies within a person’s self belief system, it is not a theoretical account of 
self-concept change after brain injury. However, the ‘inconsistency’ that occurs 
following ABI between one’s pre-morbid and post-injury sense of self, can be fitted 
into the SDT model.  
Indeed, in a pilot study with community-living individuals with mild to severe TBI, 
Cantor et al. (2005) expanded Higgins’ (1987) theory by introducing the pre-injury 
self and post-injury self, and found that emotional distress following loss of self was 
significantly  related to tensions between pre-injury and post-injury conceptions of 
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self. Their view (Cantor et al., 2005) was that discrepancies between the pre-injury 
self (i.e. former actual self) and the post-injury self (i.e. current actual self) would be 
similar to discrepancies between the actual and the ideal self or the actual and the 
ought self, proposed by the SDT, in that the pre-injury self becomes idealised and 
thus leading to discrepancies with the actual self.  
Cantor et al. (2005) also tested the original SDT model and showed relationships 
between self-discrepancies and affective distress; however, the distinctiveness of 
actual/ideal and actual/ought discrepancies relating to depression and anxiety 
respectively, as would be predicted by the model, was not supported. 
1.6.2 Implications for the Treatment of Affective Disorders 
Higgins et al. (1987) point out that the theory is not proposing that all affective 
distress is associated with self-discrepancies, instead chronic self-discrepancies 
between self-concept and self-guides represent one set of predictors of depression 
and anxiety. This has some implications for clinical treatment, which is seen to 
involve better alignment of self-guides and self-concept. To achieve this, the authors 
envisaged cognitive-behavioural therapy, or a behavioural or environmental 
approach that reduces clients’ exposure to situations associated to their problems 
(Higgins et al., 1987). Later, Strauman (2003) developed self-system therapy, a 
treatment for affective disorders by reducing one’s self-discrepancies, which was 
shown to be more effective than traditional cognitive-behavioural therapy in 
individuals with DSM-IV-defined mood disorders, who had actual/ideal discrepancies 
(Strauman, Vieth, Merrill et al., unpublished observation, 2005 cited in Cantor et al., 
2005). Interpersonal Psychotherapy (Strauman et al., 2001) and Mindfulness Based 
Cognitive Therapy (Crane et al., 2008) were also found to decrease self-
discrepancies in people with depression. 
1.6.3 Critical appraisal  
The SDT is an established model that has been widely tested and supported, and 
has descriptive, explanatory and predictive power. The theory describes three 
distinct domains of the self (actual, ideal and ought) and explains psychological 
distress as resulting from conflicting beliefs about the self, as people compare 
themselves (i.e. their self-concept) to internalised standards (i.e. their self-guides). 
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More specifically, the theory predicts which specific negative emotions (anxiety or 
depression) may be related to certain types of incongruent ideas between 
representations of the self. Furthermore, this also confers the theory intervention 
power as it can have direct implications for clinical treatment of affective disorders, 
since they are seen, at least in part, as the result of discrepancy between self-
concept and self-guides; thus the SDT provides a means to systematically reduce 
negative affect associated with self-discrepancies by reducing the discrepancies, 
either by adjusting the self-concept or the self-guides.  
The SDT has the advantage that its key concepts are operationalisable which has 
enabled their measurement and so the theory could be tested, which led to a great 
deal of empirical evidence, as discussed in section 1.6.1 above. However, the theory 
is only partially supported as some research failed to support the distinctiveness of 
actual/ideal and actual/ought discrepancies relating to particular types of emotional 
distress (Phillips & Silvia, 2010; Tangney et al., 1998). Although the SDT has not 
been applied in stroke populations, it has been tested on a small sample of TBI 
survivors. However, the distinctiveness of actual/ideal and actual/ought 
discrepancies relating to depression and anxiety, respectively, was not supported in 
this case.  
It is recognised that the SDT has not been developed as a model of explaining 
psychological distress in relation to identity change after brain injury, and thus it does 
not address discrepancies between views of the current actual self and pre-injury 
actual self. Although not a theoretical account of self-concept change after brain 
injury either, the RFT-based conceptualisation of three distinct senses of self (self as 
an ongoing verbal process of verbal knowing, self as context and the conceptualised 
self; see section 1.4.4.2.1.2) was proposed by Myles (2004) as a framework for 
understanding and treating loss of sense of self following brain injury. He explained 
identity change as a crisis of the ‘conceptualised self’ due to inconsistencies 
between post-injury functioning and pre-injury conceptualised self. Of the models of 
identity change after brain injury, Myles’ (2004) RFT-based account, is the only one 
that refers to psychological distress as a result of a change in identity; this is seen as 
resulting from the relations between changes in functioning and the negative self-
evaluations of these, as, according to RFT, humans, through language and 
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cognition, readily derive arbitrary relations between events (e.g. Hayes, 1994 cited in 
Myles, 2004).  
The other two RFT-based senses of self represent a therapeutically useful idea, as it 
can help survivors separate their subjective experiences (i.e. ‘self as ongoing 
process of verbal knowing’), which, although painful, are transient, from a more 
enduring sense of self that is not dependent on the nature of the content that 
comprises one’s ongoing flow of psychological experiences (i.e. the viewpoint from 
which the world, including painful experiences, is experienced – ‘self as context’). 
However, this is a philosophical proposition; ‘self as context’ is an abstraction based 
on the idea of transcending the subjective experience with which one identifies one’s 
self. This is conceptual as one can never be an ‘objective’ observer of one’s own 
experience; it is not possible to transcend from this because this is the only filter 
through which one can observe and experience the world. Having said this, the 
concept of ‘self as context’ can be helpful in creating a sense of consistency between 
the pre-injury self and the perceived post-injury self. Thus, it may be pragmatic and 
therapeutically useful, as indeed it has been shown in therapeutic work with people 
with TBI. However, unlike the SDT, it is not something that can be measured or 
tested, and the evidence is coming from case studies from clinical experience.  
Clearly, both theories view sense of self as multifaceted and complex, and both the 
SDT and Myles’ account agree that a discrepancy or inconsistency within the sense 
of self construct can lead to psychological difficulties. However, while Myles only 
discusses one discrepancy (pre- and post-injury), and that this leads to emotional 
distress generally, the SDT has the advantage that it also postulates how 
inconsistencies can lead to distress, and how different types of emotional distress 
are the product of different discrepancies between the self domains. By extending 
the SDT to include a pre-injury self, Cantor et al. (2005) proposed that it may provide 
a useful way of explaining affective distress after ABI as partly due to changes in 
identity. Cantor et al. (2005) hypothesised that the discrepancy between pre-injury 
self and current self would be similar to the discrepancy between actual and ideal, or 
actual and ought, and thus resulting in depression and anxiety. Thus the pre-injury 
self could be now seen as representing the new standards of behaviour or self-
guides. 
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This would be plausible, as the functional consequences of ABI may make it difficult 
for survivors to fulfil their duties and obligations in the same way as before, which 
would contravene the principles constituting their ought self-guide; this would lead to 
discrepancies, and so to the presence of negative outcomes (actual or expected), 
experienced as an impending sense of punishment, and manifested as agitation and 
anxiety. Equally, the consequences of the injury may prevent people achieving their 
hopes and aspirations, which would thus lead to discrepancies with their ideal self-
guide; this is linked to the absence of positive outcomes (actual or expected) as 
people may feel they lost or will never obtain a desired goal, and so will experience 
dejection and disappointment, manifested as depression. Indeed, there is evidence 
that the pre-injury self might be idealised, as TBI survivors rated their pre-injury self 
more positively overall than they rated a typical person of same age and sex 
(Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984); also, a comparison group rated their past self 
significantly lower than a TBI group, yet the ratings of the two groups were not 
significantly different for present or future self (Wright & Telford, 1996) (see 
systematic review), again, suggestive that survivors may idealise their pre-injury self.   
To summarise, compared to models of identity change after ABI, the SDT is 
operationalisable, has explanatory and predictive power, and is supported by 
empirical evidence; not only does it relate inconsistencies between different types of 
self to psychological distress, but by adapting it to include the discrepancy between 
post-injury and pre-injury selves (similar to Myles’ conceptualisation of identity 
change after ABI – the crisis of the conceptualised self), it may also provide a useful 
way of understanding the psychological mechanisms by which distress after ABI 
occurs, as described above.  
1.6.4 Conclusion 
Affective disorders are highly prevalent in stroke, with identity change being a 
possible etiological factor in affective distress, there being some evidence that 
changes in self-concept are related to affective distress (Ellis & Horn, 2000), as 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Consequently, the current study aimed to explore 
this relationship between changes in self-concept and affective distress after stroke 
in a systematic way. Given the rationale provided in this section, and building on 
Cantor et al.’s (2005) pilot study, it was considered that the SDT would be an 
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appropriate model to use and explore further, providing the adaptation proposed by 
Cantor et al. (2005) of including a pre-injury self.  
 
1.7 SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
In this section, a systematic review of the evidence for self-discrepancy following 
ABI, i.e. of difference between pre-injury and post-injury self, will be presented.  
1.7.1 The Aim and Scope of the Current Systematic Review 
The studies that investigated the difference in self-concept/identity or self-esteem* 
following ABI, and met the inclusion and exclusion criteria, were reviewed with 
respect to their aims, the samples included in the studies, methodology, their 
findings, and the strengths and limitations of the research.  
*Studies looking at a change in self-esteem were included as it was considered that 
a change in self-esteem after ABI would be indicative of a change in self-concept/ 
identity. 
1.7.2 Systematic Review Question 
Do survivors perceive/experience a difference in their self-concept/identity after ABI? 
And if so, is there a relationship between this difference/change and affective 
distress?  
1.7.3 Method 
1.7.3.1 Systematic review strategy 
To locate relevant studies, the following electronic bibliographic databases were 
searched Cardiff University Full Text Journals, AMED, Embase, MEDLINE, 
PsycINFO, PsycArticles, up until 6th May 2014. 
1.7.3.2 Search terms 
The following search terms were used in each of the above databases. 
Search terms for ABI included ‘brain injury’ and the following specific search terms 
for stroke: stroke, CVA, cerebral vascular accident, cerebrovascular accident, 
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cerebral haemorrhage, cerebral infarct, brain haemorrhage, brain ischemia, 
intracranial haemorrhage, intra-cranial haemorrhage. The search terms for stroke 
were then combined using Boolean operator ‘OR’ to give overall topic results for: 
Stroke (Topic). 
Search terms for identity included: identity, self-concept, self concept, sense of self, 
self-discrepancy, self discrepancy, self-image, self image, self-esteem, self esteem, 
(personality AND change). These were then combined using Boolean operator ‘OR’ 
to give overall topic results for: Identity (Topic). 
Identity (Topic) was then combined with Stroke (Topic) and with ‘brain injury’, 
respectively, using Boolean operator ‘AND’. The results are detailed in Table 1.2 
below. 
Table 1.2: Systematic literature search results 
 
Search Terms 
Articles 
Retrieved 
 
Articles 
Reviewed 
1) (stroke  OR CVA OR "cerebral vascular accident" OR 
"cerebrovascular accident" OR "cerebral haemorrhage" OR "cerebral 
infarct" OR "brain haemorrhage" OR "brain ischemia" OR "intracranial 
haemorrhage" OR “intra-cranial haemorrhage”).ti. 
170750  
2) brain injury.ti. 52652  
3)  (identity OR self-concept OR "self concept" OR "sense of 
self" OR self-discrepancy OR “self discrepancy” OR self-image OR "self 
image" OR self-esteem OR self esteem).ti. 
75649  
4) (personality AND change*).ti 3176  
5) Combined 3 OR 4 78816  
6) Combined 1 AND 5  96 (39*) 4 
7) Combined 2 AND 5 163 (83*) 3 
*Number of articles left after removing duplicates 
 
1.7.3.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were used to select relevant studies to 
address the review question. 
Inclusion criteria: 
1. Must be an empirical study 
2. Participants must be adults (age 18 and over) 
3. The article must be in English 
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4. The study must be about survivors’ perceived difference in self-
 concept/identity, or self-esteem, post-stroke / ABI compared to pre-stroke / 
 ABI 
6. The study was published in a peer-reviewed journal 
Exclusion criteria: 
1. Review, opinion article, conference abstract or dissertation 
2. The study is not empirical 
3. The study is a case study 
1.7.4 Selection Process 
A total of 259 articles were identified using the search terms and databases outlined 
above. After removing duplicates, 39 articles remained in relation to stroke and 
identity change and 83 articles in relation to other ABI and identity change, resulting 
in a total of 122 articles. These were then reviewed by title and abstract for relevance 
to the topic of a difference in self-concept/identity after stroke / ABI. Any article that 
clearly met one of the exclusion criteria was eliminated from the review at this stage, 
leaving 60 abstracts. These were then examined by the researcher and research 
supervisor in more detail to ascertain eligibility for inclusion in the study. When there 
was disagreement regarding the inclusion of a study, this was discussed in a 
consensus building process until agreement was reached. Of the 60 abstracts 17 full 
text articles were examined in more detail by the researcher and supervisor and 7 
studies were deemed eligible for inclusion. The most frequent reasons to exclude 
articles were that they were not about the survivors’ perceived difference in self-
concept or identity or self-esteem, pre compared to post-injury; they were 
unpublished research such as conference abstracts and dissertations; or they were 
case studies. A breakdown of this process is detailed in Table 1.3 below.  
The bibliographies of all articles that met the inclusion criteria were then examined 
for  relevant  studies,  as  were the reference lists of the review papers and the book 
chapters identified in the search. Four more studies were identified as a result of this 
process.  Consequently,  11  studies  were  eligible  to  be  included in the systematic 
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Table 1.3: Breakdown of selection of studies process  
 
review. However, the literature search was carried out again 14 December 2014 and 
two more, newly published, relevant studies were identified (Levack et al., 2014; 
Pallesen, 2014), and were therefore included in the systematic review; however, as 
these were published after the thesis had been completed, they could not inform the 
rationale and hypotheses of this study. 
 
1.7.5 Results 
1.7.5.1 Overview of the critical review 
The studies that met the inclusion and exclusion criteria were critically reviewed to 
assess their quality. The studies are summarised in Table 1.4 below. As quantitative 
and qualitative studies were included in the review, two different quality frameworks 
were required to assess their quality.  
The qualitative studies in the review (N = 6) were assessed against Critical Appraisal 
Skills Programme (CASP) criteria (2013; see Appendix 1 for the criteria), as the 
checklist has been tested and is recommended for use in the NHS (Campbell et al., 
2011). In order to compare and contrast the quality of the studies these were rated 
with a score between zero and two on each quality indicator. A score of zero 
reflected no reported adherence, a score of one was awarded if the criterion was 
 Titles (122) Abstracts (60) Full texts (17) 
Reason for exclusion Stroke 
39 
Other 
83 
Stroke 
20 
Other 
40 
Stroke 
7 
Other 
10 
review 1 1 0 4 0 0 
conference abstract 4 7 0 0 0 0 
dissertation  5 10 0 0 0 0 
book chapter 1 3 0 0 0 0 
erratum 0 2 0 0 0 0 
duplicate 2 3 0 0 0 0 
not in English 0 2 0 0 0 0 
no info / abstract 1 1 0 0 0 0 
case study 1 5 0 2 0 0 
not with adults 0 5 0 0 0 0 
not about survivor’s perceived difference 4 4 13 17 3 6 
not empirical 0 0 0 7 0 0 
unfinished 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total excluded 19 43 13 30 3 7 
Total included     4 3 
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partially fulfilled, and two if the criterion was met. The evaluation of the qualitative 
studies is presented in Table 1.5 below. 
The quantitative studies included in the review (N = 7) were cross-sectional, 
correlational studies, and therefore their quality was assessed using the quality 
framework developed by Cardiff University’s Support Unit for Research Evidence 
(SURE) specifically for studies implementing this methodology (SURE, Cardiff 
University, personal communication, 13 October 2014; see Appendix 2 for the 
criteria). In order to compare and contrast the quality of the studies, a numerical 
scoring system was added to the existing scoring guidance; thus, ++ (good) was 
scored as 2, + (mixed) was scored as 1 and - (poor) or nr (not reported) was scored 
as 0. The evaluation of the quantitative studies is presented in Table 1.6 below. 
As researchers use their judgement when assessing quality (Chenail, 2011), there is 
still an interpretive element even when applying structured criteria, and there is, for 
instance, evidence of little inter-rater agreement concerning the quality of studies 
when applying CASP criteria (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007). However, it could be 
argued that applying a structured approach would enable the reviewer to be more 
systematic in their evaluation; therefore, using quality frameworks was considered 
appropriate in assessing the quality of the studies included in the review.  In order to 
enhance reliability of scores, studies were rated following discussion with the 
researcher’s research supervisor. Also, a narrative description of the review, 
regarding aims, samples included in the studies, methodology, findings, and the 
strengths and limitations of the research is presented below.  
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Table 1.4: Summary of studies included in the systematic review 
Reference Aim Sample 
characteristics 
Method Findings  
 
 
Conclusions 
Cantor et 
al. (2005), 
USA 
Examine the 
utility of 
Higgins’ 
(1987) self-
discrepancy 
theory in 
explaining 
post-TBI 
anxiety and 
depression. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 21) 
mild (N=11)  
moderate (N=4)  
severe (N=6) 
2 - 33 years since injury (M = 
9)  
 
Gender  
11 Male  
10 Female 
 
Age 
22 - 77 years (M = 55) 
 
 
 
 
Design 
Cross-sectional, within subjects, 
correlational  
 
Recruitment 
Community living TBI survivors, 
involved in other research studies. 
 
Measures  
Selves Interview (SI) and Selves 
Adjective Checklist (SAC) to 
measure current actual, ideal, 
ought, and pre-injury actual self. 
BDI-II 
BAI 
 
Analysis  
Spearman’s correlations between 
self-discrepancy and affective 
distress 
Post-injury self rated more negatively 
than pre-injury self, on both SI and 
SAC. 
Only discrepancy M (SD) reported: 
SI: -17 (13) & SAC: 0.8 (2.1)   
Unclear if there is a significant 
difference between the pre and post-
injury self states. 
 
Significant correlations between BDI-II 
and BAI, respectively, and self-
discrepancy for all the selves 
comparisons using SAC:  
 
Discrepancies between post-injury and 
pre-injury selves associated with 
depression (.82, p < .001) and anxiety 
(.54, p = .012); discrepancies between 
post-injury self and ideal self 
associated with depression (.83, p < 
.001) and also with anxiety (.54, p = 
.011); discrepancies between post-
injury self and ought self associated 
with anxiety (.60, p = .004), and also 
with depression (.82, p < .001). 
 
No significant correlations on self-
discrepancy scores on the SI and BDI-
II and BAI; nor between SAC and SI. 
 
Majority of participants did not have 
clinically significant scores on either 
BDI-II or BAI. 
 
Significant relationships 
between self-discrepancies 
and affective distress. 
 
The discrepancies between 
pre-injury self and post-
injury self, which are seen 
as negative, seem related 
to emotional distress. 
Carroll & 
Coetzer 
(2011 ), 
Investigate 
perceived 
identity 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 29) 
severe (N=18)  
Design 
Cross-sectional, within subjects, 
correlational 
Present-self seen significantly more 
negatively than pre-injury self (t(28) = 
4.61, p < .001). 
Individuals experience 
change in self-concept after 
TBI and the new self is 
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UK change and 
explore 
association 
between 
identity 
change, grief, 
depression, 
self-esteem 
and self- 
awareness. 
moderate (N=2)  
mild (N=9)  
(based on GCS and LOC 
(N=26), self-report (N=3)) 
2.25 - 40 years since injury (M 
= 11.17) 
 
Gender 
21 Male 
8 Female 
 
Age  
22 - 64 years  
(M = 46.3) 
 
Other 
No additional neurological 
problems, concurrent 
difficulties with substance 
misuse or severe psychiatric 
disorder.  
 
Sufficient language and 
communication skills for 
reliable completion of 
questionnaires. 
 
Recruitment 
Community brain injury 
rehabilitation service. 
 
Measures 
HISDS-III (measure past and 
present self) 
RSES 
HADS 
Brain Injury Grief Inventory 
Awareness Questionnaire  
 
Analysis 
T-test to measure difference 
between pre and post-injury selves. 
Pearson’s correlations between 
self-discrepancy and depression, 
grief, self-esteem, awareness; and 
between awareness and self-
esteem, depression. 
Positive associations between change 
in identity and depression (r = .58, p < 
.01), and grief (r = .53, p < .01); and 
between depression and grief (r = 
.753, p < .01).  
 
Negative associations between identity 
change and self-esteem (r = -.365, p < 
.05), adjustment (r = -.354, p < .05). 
 
Awareness (indicated by discrepancy 
scores) negatively associated with 
self-esteem (r = .35, p < .05) and 
positively associated with depression 
(r = - .38, p < .05). No significant 
associations between awareness and 
perceived identity change. 
 
rated negatively compared 
to pre-injury self. 
 
The perceived change in 
identity negatively 
associated with self-esteem 
and positively associated 
with depression and grief.  
Cooper-
Evans et 
al. (2008), 
UK 
Explore 
effects of 
severe ABI 
on self-
esteem. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 19) 
Stroke (N = 1) 
Viral infection (N = 2)  
Severe ABI (based on GCS or 
PTA). 
16 - 348 months since injury 
(M = 122.05)  
 
Gender  
17 Male 
5 Female 
 
Age 
20 - 61 years  
(M = 43)  
Design 
Cross-sectional, within subjects, 
correlational  
 
Recruitment 
Neurobehavioural services 
 
Measures 
RSES (to measure pre and post-
injury self, and at 2 weeks follow-
up). 
HADS 
Behavioural Assessment of 
Dysexecutive Syndrome 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 
Significant lower ratings for post-injury 
compared to pre-injury self-esteem (t 
(21) = -3.43, p < .01). 
 
Level of self-esteem consistent over 
time (r = .86, p < .01). 
 
Post-injury self-esteem significantly 
correlated with depression (r = .65, p < 
.01) and anxiety (r = .71, p< .01). 
 
Level of current self-esteem not 
associated with magnitude of acquired 
cognitive impairment. 
 
 
Self-esteem is negatively 
affected after ABI. 
 
Lower self-esteem tends to 
be associated with higher 
degree of awareness of 
impairment, more intact 
cognitive and / or executive 
functioning as well as with 
higher rates of 
psychological distress. 
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Other 
Data available on cognitive 
functioning. 
 
 
 
 
 
III (from casenotes) 
 
Analysis 
T-test to measure changes in self-
esteem. 
Pearson’s correlations between 
post-injury self-esteem and 
affective distress, level of cognitive 
impairment, awareness.  
 
Those with higher self-esteem had 
less awareness of executive 
difficulties, and greater impairment in 
executive function associated with 
higher self-esteem.  
 
Ellis-Hill et 
al. (2000), 
UK 
Explore 
perceived life 
and identity 
changes 
following a 
single stroke 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
First-time stroke survivors 
(N = 8) 
Survivors interviewed in 
hospital (mean 20 weeks), at 6 
months, and 1 year 
 
Gender 
5 Male 
3 Female 
 
Age  
56 – 82 years (M = 67) 
 
Other 
No cognitive or communication 
difficulties, no previous 
physical disability. 
 
Design 
Qualitative, life narrative interviews 
with survivors and their spouse. 
 
Recruitment  
Identified and first interviewed in 
hospital.  
 
Procedure  
Interviewed participants while in 
hospital, then at 6 months, and a 
year after stroke, resulting in 24 
interviews. 
 
Analysis 
Themes were identified. 
A prominent theme was a changed 
relationship between stroke survivors 
and their body, which was experienced 
as separate and out of control, 
unreliable and perplexing; and even 
rebellious. 
 
The self-body relationship was also a 
dynamic relationship that becomes 
more apparent in social situations 
where the survivors are faced with the 
challenge of having to explain to 
others the change, and feeling “like a 
freak” because of not being like before. 
Stroke seemed to 
challenge the individual’s 
whole being; particularly, 
participants experienced a 
self-body split, which was 
the focus even a year after 
the stroke. 
Ellis-Hill & 
Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Determine 
whether 
stroke 
survivors 
report a 
change in 
identity 
following 
stroke. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
First-time stroke survivors (N = 
26) 
4 – 26 months since injury (M 
= 13.58) 
 
Gender 
17 Male 
10 Female 
 
Age 
50 - 83 years  
(M = 71.4) 
 
Design 
Cross-sectional, within subjects. 
Also used comparison group – 
hospital volunteers matched for 
age, gender, time from which past 
self-concept was considered. 
 
Recruitment 
Stroke survivors discharged directly 
home from the acute hospital. 
 
Measures 
HISD II (pre-stroke and present 
self) 
Stroke respondents rated present self-
concept as similar or more negative 
than past self-concept, many of these 
being significant changes, as was the 
overall change (p = .0003). However, 
there was wide variation in change. 
 
No significant changes in self-concept 
in the control group. 
 
Increased anxiety and depression and 
reduced level of activity in the stroke 
group compared to the control group. 
 
Individuals experience a 
negative change in their 
sense of self after stroke. 
 
Sense of self is stable in a 
nonclinical group.  
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Other 
At the most able end of the 
physical recovery spectrum 
(large proportion could walk 
independently without aids 
when indoors). 
 
Equal proportion of left and 
right weakness. 
 
No history of, or present 
cognitive, or severe 
communication difficulties, no 
previous physical disability. 
 
HADS 
Frenchay Activity Index 
 
Analysis 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test to 
measure changes in self-concept. 
Mann-Whitney test to measure 
differences between stroke group 
and comparison group regarding 
affective distress and activity level. 
Gracey et 
al. (2008) 
How people 
make sense 
of themselves 
after brain 
injury. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 22) 
Haemorrhage (N = 5) 
Encephalitis (N = 2) 
Other (N = 3) 
Severe (N = 16) 
Less than severe (N = 5) 
Not recorded (N = 1) 
Not applicable (N = 10) 
(from casenotes) 
1–10 years post-injury (M = 3) 
 
Gender 
23 Male 
9 Female 
 
Age 
21 – 59 years (M = 38)  
 
Other 
In the average range of pre-
injury intellectual functioning 
on the Speed and Capacity of 
Language Processing “Spot 
the Word” subtest (SCOLP).  
No significant severe mental 
health issues, substance 
misuse. 
Design  
Qualitative, Kelly’s personal 
construct psychology. 
 
Recruitment  
Neurorehabilitation services. 
 
Procedure 
Personal constructs relating to pre-
injury, current (post-injury) and ideal 
(post-injury) selves were elicited in 
structured group discussions with 2-
5 participants. 
 
Analysis 
Themes were identified using the 
inductive phenomenological 
thematic analysis procedure of 
Boyatzis (1998). 
25% of constructs were part of the 
“experience of self in the world” theme 
with the subcategories: belonging, 
independence, activity and 
assertiveness.  
18% of constructs were categorised as 
“basic skills” (cognitive, physical, 
sensory and social ability). 
15% of constructs were related to the 
“experience of self in relation to self” 
theme, referring to self-reflections.  
Other constructs were related to 
emotions, social relating, motivation 
and uncertainty. 
The differences in self-
construing post-injury 
referred particularly to the 
personal meanings and 
feelings associated with 
practical and social activity, 
and also with the 
experienced changes in 
cognitive, physical, sensory 
and social ability, as well 
as, with existential 
concerns. 
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Guise et 
al. (2010), 
UK 
Examine 
construction 
of identity 
and change 
in identity. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
Young stroke survivors 
(suffered stroke under age of 
55 years, unclear if only one 
stroke) 
(N = 12) 
 
Gender 
Not reported 
 
Age  
Under age of 55 years (range 
and mean not reported) 
 
Design 
Qualitative, discourse analytic 
methodology. 
 
Recruitment  
Community support groups. 
 
Procedure  
Focus group interaction between 12 
stroke survivors and five carers. 
 
Analysis  
Discourse was analysed and 
patterns were identified in the data. 
 
While minimising the negative aspects 
of stroke and mitigating its implications 
on their identity, participants were 
sensitive to how these accounts were 
perceived by their carers (i.e. not 
inappropriately positive), who could 
criticise and challenge them, and offer 
potentially negative reformulations of 
these. 
Stroke survivors seemed to 
have acquired a ‘damaged’ 
identity, and it may be 
difficult to maintaining a 
positive sense of self, 
particularly in the presence 
of their others who can play 
a role in maintaining 
damaged identities.  
 
Keppel & 
Crowe 
(2010), 
Australia 
Examine the 
perceived 
effect of 
stroke on 
body image 
and self-
esteem in 
young adults. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
First-time stroke survivors (N = 
33) 
Mean time since injury = 7 
months (no range available) 
 
Gender  
13 Male 
20 Female 
 
Age 
< 60 years 
(no range reported) 
 
Other 
Those with previous history of 
neuropathology, learning 
impairment, psychiatric 
disorder, or global or receptive 
aphasia excluded. 
 
First stroke based on medical 
opinion (supported or 
confirmed by CT and MRI).  
Design 
Cross-sectional, within subjects, 
correlational 
 
Recruitment 
Rehabilitation programmes. 
 
Measures 
RSES 
Tennessee Self-concept Scale 2 - 
only the physical self-concept scale 
(PHY), personal self-concept (PER) 
and total self-concept (TOT).  
Body-Cathexis/Self-Cathexis Scale  
All measures administered pre 
stroke, i.e. two weeks before the 
stroke, and post-stroke, i.e. over the 
last two weeks. 
 
Analysis 
T-test to measure differences in 
self-esteem/self-concept. 
Pearson’s correlations between 
self-esteem and body image. 
 
All measures of self-esteem and self-
concept negatively affected after 
stroke, and no significant gender 
differences 
(PHY: t = -3.59, p = .001; PER: t = -
3.03, p = .005; TOT: t = -2.60, p = 
.014; RSES: t = -3.24, p = .003). 
 
No significant relationship between 
measures of body image, self-esteem, 
and time since stroke. 
 
Prior to stroke only physical self-
esteem and body image were strongly 
correlated. All post-stroke ratings of 
self-esteem correlated positively with 
post-stroke ratings of body image 
(RSES r = .53, p = .001; PHY r = .62, p 
= .000; PER r = .45, p = .004; TOT r = 
.54, p = .001). 
 
Self-esteem changed 
negatively after stroke. 
These changes were 
correlated with negative 
changes in body image. 
Levack et 
al. (2014), 
New 
Develop a 
client-derived 
framework to 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 49) 
Mild to severe (based on self-
Design 
Qualitative, grounded theory. 
 
Themes: 
Central concept of desiring to be or 
having lost a sense of being an 
Reinforces the notion that 
change in self-identity is an 
important aspect of life 
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Zealand underpin 
development 
of a 
measure 
reflecting the 
impact of TBI 
on self-
identity. 
 
reported length of 
unconsciousness). 
6 months - 36 years post injury 
(M = 12.7) 
 
Gender 
34 Male 
15 Female 
 
Age 
21 – 79 years (M = 52.7) 
 
Other 
Ethnically diverse (Maori). 
 
Recruitment  
Local organisations from 8 urban 
and rural communities in 
New Zealand that supported people 
with TBI and their families in the 
community. 
 
Procedure 
8 focus groups (one in each region; 
two Maori only)  
 
Analysis 
Constant comparative methods. 
integrated and valued person  
1. having a coherent, satisfying and 
complete sense of oneself 
2. respect, validation and acceptance 
by others  
3. having a valued place in the world. 
after TBI, and provides 
information on what this 
concept means to people 
with TBI. 
Nochi 
(1998), 
Japan  
Explore how 
TBI survivors 
experience 
themselves. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 10) 
Severity not reported. 
2 -12 years post injury 
 
Gender 
6 Male 
4 Female 
 
Age 
24 – 49 years 
 
Design 
Qualitative, interviews. 
 
Recruitment  
Community support groups. 
 
Procedure 
Face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews, using open-ended 
questions. 
 
Analysis 
Grounded theory. 
 
Themes: 
1. Loss of clear self-knowledge due 
to memory loss. 
2. Loss of self by comparison of pre 
with post-injury self-images 
3. Loss of self in the eyes of others 
due to labels imposed on them by 
others. 
Types of loss of self that 
TBI survivors might 
experience were identified, 
a common theme being a 
comparison between 
current with pre-injury state. 
Pallesen 
(2014), 
Denmark 
Identify, from 
a long-term 
perspective, 
stroke 
survivors’ 
self-identity, 
their views of 
any 
associated 
disabilities 
and how they 
manage their 
lives 
after stroke. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
First-time stroke survivors (N = 
15) 
Severity not reported. 
5 years post injury 
 
Gender 
10 Male 
5 Female 
 
Age 
42 – 88 years (mean not 
reported) 
 
Design 
Qualitative, interviews.  
 
Recruitment  
Based on respondents to a 
previous questionnaire study in a 
geographical area in Denmark. 
 
Procedure 
Face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews, using open-ended 
questions. Supplemented with 
phone, email conversations. 
 
Themes: 
1. Body experiences (unreliable and 
‘forcibly present body’, new bodily 
discomfort, emotional reactions) 
2. Coping (resigning, struggling) 
3. Altered life  
4. Self-identity (view of self in relation 
to stroke, relation to others, view of 
others) 
 
Stroke survivors 
suffered considerable 
ongoing and changing 
difficulties in relation to 
disability, self-perception 
and to coping with a new 
life. 
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Other 
Reasonable variation re 
functional ability, education, 
occupation and marital status. 
Some with a degree of 
aphasia (N=3; assisted). 
 
Analysis 
Phenomenological analysis. 
Interviews encoded using NVivo 8. 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey 
(1984),  
UK 
Explore 
changes in 
self-concept 
arising from 
severe head 
injury. 
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 25) 
Severe TBI (based on LOC 
and PTA).  
2 - 15 months since injury (M = 
7)  
 
Gender 
23 Male 
2 Female 
 
Age 
17 to 32 years  
(M = 22)  
 
Other 
Neuropsychological 
assessment: 
current intellectual level 
compared with estimated pre-
morbid level.  
N=18 suffered some 
generalised intellectual 
impairment (N = 5 severe), 
N=21 exhibited 
memory/learning impairment 
(N = 5 severe), and N=2 
showed marked difficulty in 
visuo-spatial processing. 
Those with severe 
communication disorders 
excluded. 
 
 
 
 
Design 
Cross-sectional, within subjects. 
 
Recruitment 
Neurorehabilitation centres. 
 
Measures 
20 item Semantic Differential Scale 
(to measure past, present and 
future self (1 year on) (N=25), and 
ratings for typical head injured 
person and typical person of own 
age and sex (N=14). 
Leeds Scales of Anxiety and  
Depression (LSAD) 
Litman Physical Disability Self-
Conception Scale 
 
Analysis 
Wilcoxon matched pairs, signed 
ranks test to measure difference 
between different types of self. 
Significant differences between 
present self and past self on all but 3 
of the 20 items. 
 
Significant positive change anticipated, 
with no difference between past and 
future self. 
 
Present self perceived more positively 
than a typically head injured person, 
past self rated more positively overall 
than a typical person of same age and 
sex, and a typical head injured person 
was rated more negatively than a 
typical person. 
 
Significant psychological disturbance 
(64%); 60% clinically depressed; 44% 
clinically anxious. 
 
 
Profound changes in self-
concept following severe 
head injury, but anticipated 
return to pre-morbid self 
within a year. 
 
Psychological distress 
(anxiety and depression) 
was common). 
 
Reduced sense of personal 
worth and self-conscious 
about their disabilities. 
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Wright & 
Telford 
(1996), 
UK 
Examine 
extent of 
psychological 
distress six 
months 
(time1) and 
three years 
(time2) after 
a 
predominant-
ly minor head 
injury.  
 
Describe the 
relationship 
of these 
symptoms to 
the process 
of revision 
and 
rebuilding of 
self-
perceptions 
post-injury.  
ABI (type, severity, time) 
TBI (N = 50 at time1 and N = 
21 at time2), but only 36 
completed HISD at time1 and 
15 at time2. 
Predominantly minor injuries; 
GCS for N = 30: mild (N = 27) 
moderate (N = 2) severe (N = 
1). 
6 months post injury (time1) 
and 3 years post injury (time2) 
 
Gender 
32 Male 
18 Female 
 
Age 
17 - 86 years  
(M = 46)  
 
Other 
Participants not excluded due 
to alcohol consumption before 
accident (26%), previous head 
injury (34%) or history of 
mental health problems (12%). 
 
For some English not first 
language (N = unknown). 
 
Design 
Cross-sectional, within and 
between subjects, longitudinal. 
Control group matched for age, sex, 
socio-economic and marital status, 
and history of mental health 
problems. 
 
Recruitment 
Admitted to one of two district 
general hospitals with a head injury 
over a three-month period. 
 
Measures 
HISD (N=36 at time1; N=15 at 
time2) to measure past, present 
and future selves. 
Interview – Questions regarding 
psychological changes (N=24 at 
time1) 
GHQ-12 (N=42 at time1; N=18 at 
time2) 
Impact of Events Scale (IES; N=39 
at time1; N = 16 at time2) 
 
Analysis 
T-test to measure difference in 
types of self. Correlations 
(correlation test used not reported) 
between emotional distress and 
differences with past-self ratings 
and IES. 
 
Significant difference in the construct 
ratings of past/present self (t(35) = 
4.21, p < .0001) and present/future 
(t(35) = -4.33, p < .0001), but not 
between past/future self. No significant 
differences from time1 to time2. 
 
Negative changes described at time1; 
3 reported a positive change post 
injury. 
 
Control group rated past self 
significantly lower than injured group, 
but was not significantly different for 
present or future self.  
Significantly greater symptoms than 
control group (t = 5.4, p < .01). 
Significant decrease from time1 to 
time2.  
 
Significant correlations between 
emotional distress, GHQ (-0.57, p < 
.001) and IES, and differences with 
past-self ratings, but not for the control 
group. 
 
Discontinuity in the sense 
of self following mild brain 
injury. 
 
Significant relationship 
between changes in sense 
of self and psychological 
symptoms. 
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Table 1.5: Quality review of qualitative studies 
Study Aims 
Was there 
a clear 
statement 
of the 
aims of 
the 
research? 
Methodology 
Is a qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate? 
Design 
Was the 
research design 
appropriate to 
address the 
aims of the 
research? 
 
Recruitment 
Was the 
recruitment 
strategy 
appropriate 
for aims of 
the 
research? 
Data 
collection 
Were data 
collected in 
a way that 
addressed 
the 
research 
issue? 
 
Reflexivity 
Has the 
relationship 
between 
researcher and 
participants 
been adequately 
considered? 
Ethics 
Have ethical 
issues been 
taken into 
consideration? 
Data Analysis 
Was the data 
analysis 
sufficiently 
rigorous? 
Findings 
Is there a clear 
statement of 
findings? 
 
Value of 
research 
How 
valuable is 
the 
research? 
Total 
score 
(0-20) 
E
lli
s
-H
ill
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
0
0
),
 U
K
  Clear aim 
and why 
relevant/ 
important. 
=2 
Qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate. 
=2 
Research 
design 
appropriate and 
justified 
(narrative 
approach). 
=2 
Explained 
how and why 
participants 
were 
recruited. 
=2 
Explained 
how data 
were 
collected 
and 
analysed. 
=2 
Role/influence 
of researcher 
alluded to but no 
critical 
consideration. 
=1 
No reference 
to ethical 
issues. 
=0 
Detailed 
description of 
analysis 
process and 
how themes 
were derived; 
sufficient data 
provided to 
represent 
themes. 
=2 
 
Findings are 
explicit and 
discussed in 
relation to 
research 
question; 
credibility 
discussed. 
=2 
Implications 
discussed 
and  
further 
areas of 
research 
identified. 
=2 
17/20 
G
ra
c
e
y
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
Clear aim 
and why 
relevant/ 
important. 
=2 
Qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate. 
=2 
Research 
design 
appropriate and 
justified 
(personal 
construct 
approach). 
=2 
Explained 
how and why 
participants 
were 
recruited. 
=2 
Detailed 
procedure 
of how data 
were 
collected 
and 
analysed. 
=2 
Role/influence 
of researcher 
not considered. 
=0 
No reference 
to ethical 
issues. 
=0 
Detailed 
description of 
analysis 
process and 
how themes 
were derived; 
sufficient data 
provided to 
represent 
themes. 
=2 
 
Findings are 
explicit and 
discussed in 
relation to 
research 
question; 
credibility 
discussed. 
=2 
Findings 
discussed 
in relation 
to existing 
knowledge; 
some 
implications 
discussed. 
=2 
16/20 
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Study Aims 
Was there 
a clear 
statement 
of the 
aims of 
the 
research? 
Methodology 
Is a qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate? 
Design 
Was the 
research design 
appropriate to 
address the 
aims of the 
research? 
 
Recruitment 
Was the 
recruitment 
strategy 
appropriate 
for aims of 
the 
research? 
Data 
collection 
Were data 
collected in 
a way that 
addressed 
the 
research 
issue? 
 
Reflexivity 
Has the 
relationship 
between 
researcher and 
participants 
been adequately 
considered? 
Ethics 
Have ethical 
issues been 
taken into 
consideration? 
Data Analysis 
Was the data 
analysis 
sufficiently 
rigorous? 
Findings 
Is there a clear 
statement of 
findings? 
 
Value of 
research 
How 
valuable is 
the 
research? 
Total 
score 
(0-20) 
G
u
is
e
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
1
0
),
 U
K
  Clear aim 
and why 
relevant/ 
important. 
=2 
Qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate. 
=2 
Research 
design 
appropriate and 
justified 
(discursive 
analysis). 
=2 
Only stated 
participants 
were 
recruited via 
support 
groups, but 
no detail of 
recruitment 
procedure. 
=1 
 
Explained 
how data 
were 
collected 
and 
analysed. 
=2 
Role/influence 
of researcher 
not considered. 
=0 
Ethical 
considerations 
(approval, 
consent, 
confidentiality) 
discussed. 
=2 
Adequate 
description of 
analysis 
process; 
sufficient data 
provided to 
represent 
themes. 
=2 
Findings are 
explicit and 
discussed in 
relation to 
research 
question; no 
reference to 
credibility. 
=1 
Findings 
discussed 
in relation 
to existing 
knowledge; 
some 
implications 
discussed. 
=2 
16/20 
L
e
v
a
c
k
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
1
4
),
 N
e
w
 Z
e
a
la
n
d
 Clear aim 
and why 
relevant/ 
important. 
=2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate. 
=2 
Research 
design 
appropriate and 
justified 
(grounded 
theory). 
=2 
Explained 
how and why 
participants 
were 
recruited. 
=2 
Explained 
how data 
were 
collected 
and 
analysed. 
=2 
Some 
consideration of 
role/influence of 
researcher. 
=1 
Some ethical 
references 
(consent). 
=1 
Adequate 
description of 
analysis 
process; 
sufficient data 
provided to 
represent 
themes. 
=2 
Findings are 
explicit and 
discussed in 
relation to 
research 
question; 
credibility 
discussed. 
=2 
Findings 
discussed 
in relation 
to existing 
knowledge; 
implications 
discussed. 
=2 
18/20 
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Study Aims 
Was there 
a clear 
statement 
of the 
aims of 
the 
research? 
Methodology 
Is a qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate? 
Design 
Was the 
research design 
appropriate to 
address the 
aims of the 
research? 
 
Recruitment 
Was the 
recruitment 
strategy 
appropriate 
for aims of 
the 
research? 
Data 
collection 
Were data 
collected in 
a way that 
addressed 
the 
research 
issue? 
 
Reflexivity 
Has the 
relationship 
between 
researcher and 
participants 
been adequately 
considered? 
Ethics 
Have ethical 
issues been 
taken into 
consideration? 
Data Analysis 
Was the data 
analysis 
sufficiently 
rigorous? 
Findings 
Is there a clear 
statement of 
findings? 
 
Value of 
research 
How 
valuable is 
the 
research? 
Total 
score 
(0-20) 
N
o
ch
i (
1
9
9
8
),
 J
ap
an
  
Clear aim 
and why 
relevant/ 
important. 
=2 
Qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate  
=2 
Research 
design 
appropriate but 
not justified 
(grounded 
theory). 
=1 
Explained 
how and why 
participants 
were 
recruited. 
=2 
Explained 
how data 
were 
collected 
and 
analysed. 
=2 
Role/influence 
of researcher 
not considered. 
=0 
Some ethical 
references 
(consent). 
=1 
Detailed 
description of 
analysis 
process and 
how themes 
were derived; 
sufficient data 
provided to 
represent 
themes. 
=2 
 
Findings are 
explicit and 
discussed in 
relation to 
research 
question; 
credibility 
discussed. 
=2 
Findings 
discussed 
in relation 
to existing 
knowledge; 
implications 
discussed 
and  
further 
areas of 
research 
identified. 
=2 
 
16/20 
P
al
le
se
n
 (
2
0
1
4
),
 D
en
m
ar
k
 Clear aim 
and why 
relevant / 
important. 
=2 
Qualitative 
methodology 
appropriate  
=2 
Research 
design 
appropriate and 
justified 
(phenomenologi
cal analysis). 
=2 
Explained 
how and why 
participants 
were 
recruited. 
=2 
Explained 
how data 
were 
collected 
and 
analysed. 
=2 
Role/influence 
of researcher 
not considered. 
=0 
Ethical issues 
have been 
taken into 
consideration. 
=2 
Detailed 
description of 
analysis 
process and 
how themes 
were derived; 
sufficient data 
provided to 
represent 
themes. 
=2 
Findings are 
explicit and 
discussed in 
relation to 
research 
question; 
credibility 
discussed. 
=2 
Findings 
discussed 
in relation 
to existing 
knowledge; 
some 
implications 
discussed. 
=2 
18/20 
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Table 1.6: Quality review of quantitative studies 
Criteria 
 
Cantor et al. 
(2005), USA 
Carroll & Coetzer 
(2011 ), UK 
Cooper-Evans et 
al. (2008), UK 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Keppel & Crowe 
(2010), Australia 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984), 
UK 
 
Wright & Telford 
(1996), UK 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Is the source 
population or 
source area well 
described? 
 
TBI survivors 
currently or 
previously 
involved in 
studies on 
community 
integration of 
TBI survivors. 
= 2 
TBI survivors 
from a community 
brain injury 
rehabilitation 
service. 
= 2 
People with non-
progressive 
neurological 
damage from a 
neurobehavioural 
service (mostly 
very severe 
injuries).  
 = 2 
Stroke survivors in 
receipt of 
occupational 
therapy in a county 
hospital. 
= 2 
Stroke survivors 
from rehabilitation 
programmes at two 
teaching hospitals. 
= 2 
Adults with head 
injury attending one 
of two medical 
rehabilitation 
centres specialising 
in treatment of 
neurological 
disorders. 
= 2 
 
All adults (N=82) 
admitted to one of 
two district 
general hospitals 
with a head injury 
over 3 months. 
= 2 
 
Is the eligible 
population or area 
representative of 
the source 
population or area? 
 
Small sample, 
only TBI. 
= 1 
Small sample, 
only TBI. 
= 1 
Small sample, 
mostly TBI. 
= 1 
Small sample, 
first-time stroke 
survivors. 
= 1 
Small sample, first-
time stroke 
survivors, aged 
under 60 years. 
= 1 
Small sample of 
adults with severe 
head injury. 
= 1 
50 consented and 
did not differ 
significantly on 
severity, gender, 
age, employment 
status or social 
class to the 
others 
= 2 
 
Do the selected 
participants or 
areas represent the 
eligible population 
or area? 
 
Mix of severity, 
wide age 
range. 
= 1 
Moderate to 
severe TBI. 
Those with 
additional 
neurological 
problems, current 
substance 
misuse or severe 
psychiatric 
disorder 
excluded. 
= 1  
Those with gross 
language 
impairments 
excluded. 
= 1 
Those who moved 
out of area, had 
previous physical 
disability, were 
discharged to 
rest/nursing home, 
transferred to long-
term elderly care 
excluded. 
= 1 
Those with 
previous history of 
neuropathology, 
learning 
impairment, 
psychiatric 
disorder, global or 
receptive aphasia 
excluded. 
= 1 
Those with severe 
communication 
disorders excluded. 
= 1 
Small sample, 
predominantly 
minor injuries; no 
exclusion due to 
alcohol use 
before accident 
(26%), previous 
head injury (34%) 
or history of 
mental health 
problems (12%). 
=1 
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Criteria 
 
Cantor et al. 
(2005), USA 
Carroll & Coetzer 
(2011 ), UK 
Cooper-Evans et 
al. (2008), UK 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Keppel & Crowe 
(2010), Australia 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984), 
UK 
 
Wright & Telford 
(1996), UK 
M
e
th
o
d
 o
f 
s
e
le
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 (
o
r 
c
o
m
p
a
ri
s
o
n
) 
g
ro
u
p
 
M
e
th
o
d
 o
f 
s
e
le
c
ti
o
n
 o
f 
e
x
p
o
s
u
re
 (
o
r 
c
o
m
p
a
ri
s
o
n
) 
g
ro
u
p
 
Selection of 
exposure (and 
comparison) group. 
How was selection 
bias minimised? 
 
 
Selected from 
pool of TBI 
survivors 
involved in 
other research 
studies. 
= 0 
Selected from 
residents of 
community brain 
injury 
rehabilitation 
service. 
Clinicians 
introduced 
research to those 
on caseload they 
considered met 
criteria.  
= 1 
Selected from 
neurobehavioural 
service for people 
with non-
progressive 
neurological 
damage. 
= 1 
Selected on 
consecutive basis 
from those 
discharged from 
hospital OT 
service over the 2 
previous years. 
Comparison group 
selected from 
hospital volunteers 
matched for age, 
gender, time from 
which past self-
concept was 
considered. 
= 1 
 
Selected from 
rehabilitation wards 
or still involved in 
outpatient 
rehabilitation 
support services. 
= 1 
Selected from 
rehabilitation 
centres for 
treatment of 
neurological 
disorders. 
= 1 
All adults (N=82) 
admitted to 
hospital with head 
injury over 3 
months were 
asked to 
participate but 
only 50 
consented. None 
excluded.  
Control group 
from authors’ 
formal and 
informal network, 
matched for age, 
sex, 
socioeconomic 
and marital 
status, and 
history of mental 
health problems. 
= 1 
 
Was the selection 
of explanatory 
variables based on 
sound theoretical 
basis? 
Yes, variables 
based on 
theoretical 
background / 
previous 
research. 
= 2 
Yes, variables 
based on 
theoretical 
background / 
previous 
research. 
= 2 
Yes, variables 
based on 
theoretical 
background / 
previous 
research. 
= 2 
Yes, variables 
based on 
theoretical 
background / 
previous research. 
= 2 
Yes, variables 
based on 
theoretical 
background / 
previous research. 
= 2 
Yes, variables 
based on 
theoretical 
background / 
previous research. 
= 2 
Yes, variables 
based on 
theoretical 
background / 
previous 
research. 
= 2 
 
Was contamination 
acceptably low? 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Criteria 
 
Cantor et al. 
(2005), USA 
Carroll & Coetzer 
(2011 ), UK 
Cooper-Evans et 
al. (2008), UK 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Keppel & Crowe 
(2010), Australia 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984), 
UK 
 
Wright & Telford 
(1996), UK 
How well were 
likely confounding 
factors identified 
and controlled? 
*most scored 
poorly but in 
community studies 
it is recognised that 
extraneous 
variables inevitably 
exist and it is 
normal to assume 
that they are not 
systematically 
related to the study 
variables. 
 
Reference to 
demographic 
variables, injury 
severity, 
psychiatric 
disorder, 
employment, 
social support, 
coping but not 
investigated. 
= 0 
Impact of 
demographic and 
injury related 
variables tested 
and controlled for 
= 2 
Potential 
confounds related 
to self-esteem 
identified 
(physical 
impairments, 
functional ability, 
age, time in 
rehab) but not 
investigated. 
= 0 
 
No reference to 
possible 
confounding 
factors. 
=0 
Considered 
gender, lesion 
location and body 
image, but not 
other demographic 
variables. 
= 1 
No reference to 
possible 
confounding 
factors. 
=0 
Age, IQ, 
occupational and 
social functioning, 
social support 
identified but not 
investigated. 
= 0 
Were rigorous 
processes used to 
develop the 
questions (e.g. 
were questions 
piloted/validated?) 
(N.B. Here, 
“questions” refers 
to measures of 
self-concept) 
Selves 
Interview 
(version of 
Selves 
Questionnaire) 
and Selves 
Adjective 
Checklist 
(developed by 
authors), not 
validated. 
= 0 
 
HISD-III to 
measure selves. 
= 2 
 
RSES to 
measure self-
esteem. 
= 2 
 
HISD-II to 
measure selves. 
 = 2 
 
RSES, Tennessee 
Self-concept Scale 
2 (only the physical 
self-concept scale 
PHY, personal self-
concept PER and 
total self-concept 
TOT) to measure 
self-esteem / self 
concept.   
= 2 
HISD 
(psychometric 
properties not 
reported)  
= 0 
HISD to measure 
selves, 
questions 
regarding 
psychological 
changes. 
= 2 
 
Is the setting 
applicable to the 
UK? 
 
Yes 
=2  
Yes 
=2 
Yes 
=2 
Yes 
=2 
Yes 
=2 
Yes 
=2 
Yes 
=2 
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Criteria 
 
Cantor et al. 
(2005), USA 
Carroll & Coetzer 
(2011 ), UK 
Cooper-Evans et 
al. (2008), UK 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Keppel & Crowe 
(2010), Australia 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984), 
UK 
 
Wright & Telford 
(1996), UK 
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s
 
Were the outcome 
measures and 
procedures 
reliable? (Here, this 
refers to dependent 
variables) 
BAI & BDI 
= 2 
HADS, RSES, 
Brain Injury Grief 
Inventory and 
Awareness 
Questionnaire  
= 2 
 
DEX-S and DEX-
O (awareness) 
part of BADS  
= 2 
HADS & Frenchay 
Activity Index 
= 2 
Body -Cathexis / 
Self-Cathexis Scale 
= 2 
Psychometric 
properties of used 
measures not 
reported. 
= 0  
 
GHQ-12 
Impact of Events 
Scale (IES) 
= 2 
Were the outcome 
measurements 
complete? 
Not reported  
= 0 
All measures 
completed. 
= 2 
Not reported  
= 0 
All measures 
completed. 
= 2 
Not reported  
= 0 
All (N=25) 
completed present, 
past and future 
self; N=14 
completed typical 
person and typical 
head injured 
person; unclear re 
other measures. 
= 1 
N=42 completed 
GHQ-12 at time 
1and N=18 at 
time 2. N=39 
completed IES at 
time 1 and N=16 
at time 2. N=36 
completed HISD 
at time 1 and 
N=15 at time 2. 
= 1 
 
Were all important 
outcomes 
assessed? 
Psychological 
distress 
assessed. 
= 1 
Psychological 
distress, self-
esteem and grief 
assessed. 
= 1 
Psychological 
distress 
assessed. 
= 1 
Psychological 
distress and 
activity level 
assessed. 
= 1 
Only body image 
and self-esteem 
assessed. 
= 0 
Psychological 
distress assessed. 
= 1 
Psychological 
distress and 
traumatic 
symptoms 
assessed. 
= 1 
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Criteria 
 
Cantor et al. 
(2005), USA 
Carroll & Coetzer 
(2011 ), UK 
Cooper-Evans et 
al. (2008), UK 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Keppel & Crowe 
(2010), Australia 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984), 
UK 
 
Wright & Telford 
(1996), UK 
Was there a similar 
follow-up time in 
exposure & 
comparison 
groups?  
 
No follow-up 
= 0 
No follow-up 
= 0 
Follow up of self-
esteem measure 
(but not the 
others). No 
control group. 
= 1 
No follow-up 
= 0 
No follow-up 
= 0 
No follow-up 
= 0 
Follow-up but 
numbers 
reduced, sample 
considered 
representative. 
Control group not 
followed up. 
= 1 
 
Was follow-up time 
meaningful? 
No follow-up 
= 0 
No follow-up 
= 0 
2 weeks later. 
= 1 
No follow-up 
= 0 
No follow-up 
= 0 
No follow-up 
= 0 
3 years after. 
= 2 
A
n
a
ly
s
e
s
 
Was the study 
sufficiently 
powered to detect 
an effect if one 
exists?  
Small sample 
(N=21), no 
reference to 
power analysis, 
however effects 
found. 
= 1  
Small sample 
(N=29), no 
reference to 
power analysis, 
however effects 
found. 
= 1 
Small sample 
(N=22), no 
reference to 
power analysis, 
however effects 
found. 
= 1 
Small sample 
(N=26), no 
reference to power 
analysis, however 
effects found. 
= 1 
Small sample 
(N=33), no 
reference to power 
analysis, however 
effects found. 
= 1 
Small sample 
(N=24, N=14 for 
some measures), 
no reference to 
power analysis, 
however effects 
found. 
= 1 
Small sample 
(N=36 at time 1 
and 15 at time 2), 
no reference to 
power analysis, 
however effects 
found. 
= 1 
 
Were multiple 
explanatory 
variables 
considered in the 
analyses?  
No 
= 0 
Those identified 
(e.g. employment 
status) controlled 
for. 
= 2 
No 
= 0 
No 
= 0 
Gender, lesion 
location and body 
image considered, 
but other 
demographic 
variables not 
investigated. 
= 1 
 
No 
= 0 
No 
= 0 
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Criteria 
 
Cantor et al. 
(2005), USA 
Carroll & Coetzer 
(2011 ), UK 
Cooper-Evans et 
al. (2008), UK 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Keppel & Crowe 
(2010), Australia 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984), 
UK 
 
Wright & Telford 
(1996), UK 
Were the analytical 
methods 
appropriate?  
Descriptive 
data for 
discrepancy 
scores but not 
demographics. 
Non-parametric 
correlations 
(Spearman’s) 
as variables 
non-normal. 
= 1 
 
Descriptive data. 
Parametric 
statistics used (as 
data normally 
distributed) – 
paired sample t-
test and 
Pearson’s 
correlations. 
= 2 
Descriptive data 
and parametric 
statistics used 
(paired sample t-
test and 
Pearson’s 
correlations) but 
unclear if 
justified. 
= 1 
Descriptive data 
and non-
parametric 
statistics used 
(Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test and 
Mann-Whitney). 
= 2 
Descriptive data 
and parametric 
statistics used 
(paired sample t-
test, Pearson’s 
correlations and 
hierarchical 
regression) but 
unclear if justified. 
= 1 
Descriptive data 
only for intellectual 
level.  Non-
parametric 
statistics used 
(Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test). 
= 1 
Descriptive data 
and parametric 
statistics used 
(paired sample 
and independent  
t-test) but unclear 
if justified. 
Unclear what 
correlation 
coefficient used. 
= 1 
Was the precision 
of association 
given or 
calculable? Is 
association 
meaningful? 
Some statistical 
values reported 
(correlation 
coefficients and 
significance 
level) and 
implications 
discussed. No 
measure of 
difference. 
=1 
 
Statistical values 
reported (t-test 
values, 
correlation 
coefficients and 
significance level) 
and implications 
discussed. 
=2 
Statistical values 
reported (t-test 
values, 
correlation 
coefficients and 
significance level) 
and implications 
discussed. 
=2 
Statistical values 
reported (median, 
range and 
significance level) 
and implications 
discussed. 
=2 
Statistical values 
reported (t-test 
values, correlation 
coefficients and 
significance level) 
and implications 
discussed. 
=2 
Only significance 
level reported for 
self-differences; 
implications 
discussed. 
= 1 
Statistical values 
reported (t-test 
values, 
correlation 
coefficients and 
significance level) 
and implications 
discussed. 
=2 
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Criteria 
 
Cantor et al. 
(2005), USA 
Carroll & Coetzer 
(2011 ), UK 
Cooper-Evans et 
al. (2008), UK 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
(2000), UK 
Keppel & Crowe 
(2010), Australia 
Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984), 
UK 
 
Wright & Telford 
(1996), UK 
S
u
m
m
a
ry
 
Are the study 
results internally 
valid (i.e. 
unbiased)?  
 
Retrospective 
rating of pre-
injury self, 
recall bias, 
possible 
awareness 
bias. 
= 1 
Retrospective 
rating of pre-
injury self, recall 
bias, possible 
awareness bias. 
= 1 
Retrospective 
rating of pre-
injury self-
esteem, recall 
bias, possible 
awareness bias. 
= 1 
Retrospective 
rating of pre-injury 
self, recall bias, 
possible 
awareness bias. 
Control group 
recruited from 
hospital volunteers 
so possibly more 
active/positive 
people.  
= 1 
 
Retrospective 
rating of pre-injury 
self-esteem, recall 
bias, possible 
awareness bias. 
= 1 
Retrospective 
rating of pre-injury 
self, recall bias, 
possible 
awareness bias. 
= 1 
Retrospective 
rating of pre-
injury self, recall 
bias, possible 
awareness bias. 
= 1 
Are the results 
generalizable to the 
source population 
(i.e. externally 
valid)? 
 
Relatively “well” 
participants; 
women over-
represented. 
Some 
generalisability 
to community-
living TBI 
survivors. 
= 1 
Relatively “well” 
participants, 
limiting 
generalisation of 
findings to TBI 
and wider ABI 
population. 
= 1 
 
Relatively “well” 
participants, 
limiting 
generalisation of 
findings to wider 
ABI population. 
= 1 
 
Participants at the 
most able end of 
stroke recovery, 
limiting 
generalisation to 
stroke or wider ABI 
population. 
= 1 
Those with less 
severe stroke not 
included, limiting 
generalisation to 
stroke or wider ABI 
population.  
= 1 
Severe TBI; limited 
generalisibility to 
TBI and wider ABI 
population. 
= 1 
 
Mild TBI; limited 
generalisibility to 
TBI and wider 
ABI population. 
= 1 
 
T
o
ta
l    
16/38 
 
27/38 
 
22/38 
 
23/38 
 
21/38 
 
16/38 
 
25/38 
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1.7.5.2 Aims of the studies reviewed 
Five of the studies in this review involved stroke survivors. Ellis-Hill & Horn (2000), 
Ellis-Hill et al. (2000) and Guise et al. (2010) set out to investigate identity changes 
following stroke, while Pallesen (2014) aimed to identify, from a long-term 
perspective, stroke survivors’ self-identity, as well as their views of any associated 
disabilities and how they manage their lives after stroke. Keppel & Crowe (2010) 
aimed to examine the perceived effect of stroke on body image and self-esteem in 
young adults; however, they also used a measure of self-concept as an indication of 
self-esteem (see section 1.7.5.5.1 below). 
The remaining eight studies in the review involved mostly TBI survivors. Nochi 
(1998), Gracey et al. (2008) and Levack et al. (2014) explored how survivors 
experience and make sense of themselves after brain injury, and investigated their 
experience of change and reconstruction of self-identity.  Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) 
explored the effects of severe ABI on self-esteem; Carroll and Coetzer (2011), and 
Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) investigated perceived identity or self-concept 
change after head injury; Cantor et al., (2005), Wright and Telford (1996), and also 
Carroll and Coetzer (2011) explored the relationship between perceived identity 
change and emotional distress. 
1.7.5.3 Samples included in the studies 
This section will review the target population employed in the studies in terms of 
characteristics of the brain injury (e.g. type of injury, severity and time since injury), 
current level of functioning, number of participants, gender and age; also, the 
matching variables will be reviewed when a control group is used.  
1.7.5.3.1 Characteristics of the brain injury (type, time since injury and severity) 
Four of the seven studies were with first-time stroke survivors (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; 
Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Keppel & Crowe, 2010; Pallesen, 2014). The time since injury 
in Ellis-Hill and Horn’s (2000) study was 4-26 months with a mean of 14, which is a 
strength of this study as it considers a relatively small range of time after the injury. 
The mean time post-stroke in Keppel and Crowe’s (2010) study was 7 months, 
although the range of times is not reported. Ellis-Hill et al. (2000) interviewed stroke 
survivors while in hospital, where they had been from between three weeks to four 
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months (mean 20 weeks), then again at six months, and a year. As Pallesen (2014) 
investigated a long-term perspective, the participants were five years post-stroke. 
Finally, the participants in Guise et al.’s (2010) study suffered stroke at a young age 
but it was not reported if they suffered a single stroke. There was no reported level of 
severity for either of the stroke studies. Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) reported their 
sample had an equal proportion of left and right weaknesses.  
The remaining eight studies were mostly with TBI survivors (Cantor et al., 2005; 
Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Cooper-Evans et al., 2008; Gracey et al. (2008); Levack et 
al. 2014; Nochi, 1998; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Write & Telford, 1996). Although 
Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) and Gracey et al. (2008) employed a mixed ABI sample, 
19 out of the 22 participants were TBI survivors in the former, and 22 out of 32 in the 
latter. It is of note that in the latter study, five participants were classified as 
“haemorrhage”. The mean time since injury varied from 6 months (Wright & Telford, 
1996) to 11 years (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011). However, the range of time post injury 
varied widely in three of the studies, from 2 to 33 years, mean = 9 (Cantor et al., 
2005), 6 months to 26 years, mean 12.7 (Levack et al., 2014) and 2 to 40 years, 
mean = 11 (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011), which could be considered a limitation of these 
studies as there may be other confounding variables at play at different stages post 
injury. 
Most TBI studies reported the severity of the injury, based on either the Glasgow 
Coma Score (GCS), loss of consciousness (LOC) or post-traumatic amnesia period 
(PTA), or a combination of these. Severe injuries were predominant in three of the 
studies, 62% (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011), 86% (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008) and 100% 
(Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). In the other two, mild injuries were predominant, 52% 
(Cantor et al., 2005) and 90% in Wright and Telford’s study (1996). However, for the 
latter study, the percentage was calculated based on the total number of participants 
for whom the GCS was available, i.e. only 30 participants out of 50; furthermore, only 
36 out of the 50 participants completed the self-concept measure and it is unclear for 
how many of these 36 there was data available regarding their GSC, and 
consequently the percentage cited may not be an accurate representation of the 
level of injury severity in the participants who did complete the self-concept measure. 
Gracey et al. (2008) reported half of the participants having a severe injury, based on 
the medical records, but without reporting how this had been established; whereas 
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Levack et al. (2014) reported participants having mild, moderate and severe TBI 
based on self-reported length of unconsciousness. Nochi (1998) did not report 
severity of injury. 
The vast majority of participants across all the reviewed studies were TBI survivors, 
mostly with severe injuries; the mild injuries were fairly represented, whereas injuries 
of moderate severity were poorly represented. This raises the question of how 
generalisable the findings are across levels of severity, and indeed to the wider ABI 
population considering that the majority of cases are mild ABIs, with moderate cases 
accounting for 8-10% and severe cases for less than 10% (Lezak et al., 2004). 
1.7.5.3.2 Current level of functioning 
Most participants were recruited from people living in the community, from support 
groups and organisations (Guise et al., 2010; Levack et al., 2014; Nochi, 1998), or 
who were attending neurorehabilitation services (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Cooper-
Evans et al., 2008; Gracey et al, 2008; Keppel & Crowe, 2010; Tyerman & 
Humphrey, 1984), or who were known from participating in previous research studies 
(Cantor et al., 2005), or who had been discharged directly home from the acute 
hospital (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000). The participants in Wright and Telford’s (1996) 
study had been identified while in a general hospital at the time of the injury, and 
followed up six months and three years after the injury, being unclear at what stage 
in their recovery they were at those times; whereas the participants in Ellis-Hill et 
al.’s (2000) study were first interviewed while in hospital, then again at six months 
and a year. However, the stage of recovery may not be as relevant as Wright and 
Telford (1996) found no significant differences between ratings of self-states over 
time, at six months compared to three years after the injury. 
All participants had to have sufficient language and communication abilities to enable 
them to complete questionnaires or take part in interviews or study related 
activities/discussions, those with severe communication difficulties being excluded. 
Also, most studies seemed to employ participants who were generally at the more 
able end of the spectrum, limiting the generalisibility of findings. However, Pallesen 
(2014) ensured there was reasonable variation regarding functional ability, and also 
included three individuals with a degree of aphasia. 
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The premorbid level of functioning, and indeed the degree of decline may be 
important factors in terms of impact on someone’s sense of self post injury. Only two 
studies, both of which were with severe TBI, considered the pre-morbid level of 
cognitive functioning and the degree of decline. In the Tyerman and Humphrey’s 
(1984) study, 72% suffered generalised intellectual impairment following injury and 
84% exhibited memory/learning impairment (as measured by a battery of cognitive 
tests including WAIS, NART), with a mean of 95.1 for current level of intellectual 
functioning (WAIS). Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) also showed a decline in the 
participants’ level of cognitive functioning, mean WTAR FSIQ was 103.11 and mean 
WAIS-III-R FSIQ was 89.45; however, no significant relationship was found between 
the degree of cognitive decline and level of self-esteem. Gracey et al. (2008) 
reported participants were in the average range of pre-injury intellectual functioning 
on the Speed and Capacity of Language Processing “Spot the Word” subtest 
(SCOLP; Baddeley et al., 1992) but did not report current intellectual level.  
1.7.5.3.3 Sample size 
The total sample sizes in the quantitative studies ranged from 19 (Cooper-Evans et 
al., 2008) to 36 (Write & Telford, 1996). Although the total sample size employed by 
Wright and Telford (1996) was 50, only 36 completed the self-change measure, and 
since this is the focus of this review it was this sample size that was considered 
instead. The mean sample size was 27. Only two studies used a ‘non-injured’ control 
group, with a sample size of 26 (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000) and 36, respectively (Wright 
& Telford, 1996), with a mean sample size of 31. The former control group was only 
matched for age and gender, whereas the latter was also matched for other 
variables such as socio-economic and marital status, and history of mental health 
problems, which could be considered a strength of the latter study. 
All studies thus had relatively small sample sizes. This raises the question of 
whether there was sufficient statistical power, which might weaken the conclusions 
that can be made from the findings.  
In the qualitative studies, there were ten TBI survivors in Nochi’s (1998) study, 49 
TBI survivors in Levack et al.’s (2014) and 32 ABI survivors in Gracey et al.’s (2008); 
Ellis-Hill et al. (2000) interviewed 8 stroke survivors together with their spouse; Guise 
et al.’s (2010) study employed 12 stroke survivors and five people who were carers 
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for some of the survivors; whereas Pallesen (2014) interviewed 15 stroke survivors, 
with a family member taking part in a section of the interview in six of the interviews.  
1.7.5.3.4 Gender 
All studies employed a mixed-gender sample, apart from Guise et al (2010) who did 
not specify the gender of the stroke survivors.  
In five of the eight studies with TBI survivors (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Cooper-Evans 
et al., 2008; Gracey et al., 2008; Levack et al., 2014; Write & Telford, 1996), there 
were more males than females, consistent with the male-female ratio in the TBI 
surviving population where the incidence of TBI is significantly higher in men 
compared to women. Cantor et al., (2005) and Nochi (1998) had an almost equal 
ratio of males and females (11:10 and 6:4 respectively), thus females being 
overrepresented, and another study (Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984) had mostly males 
(23:2), with males being possibly overrepresented.  
In the other studies with stroke survivors, there were more females than males 
(20:13) in Keppel and Crowe’s (2010) and more males than females (16:10) in Ellis-
Hill and Horn’s (2000) and Pallesen (2014; 10:5); in Ellis-Hill et al.’s (2000) 
qualitative study there were 5 male and 3 female. Stroke incidence is approximately 
25% higher in men than in women, but as women generally live longer than men, 
there are more strokes in women (Townsend et al., 2012). It is unclear to what 
degree the samples used in these studies are representative of the general stroke 
population in terms of gender.  
1.7.5.3.5 Age 
The age ranges of participants varied amongst the studies. The studies with TBI 
survivors used a wider age range, from 17 (Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984) to 86 
(Wright & Telford, 1996), with the mean age ranging from 22 (Tyerman & Humphrey, 
1984) to 55 (Cantor et al., 2005). In the studies with stroke survivors, participants 
ranged in age from 42 to 84 (mean not reported; Pallesen, 2014); 50 to 83 (mean 
age of 71; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000) or from 56 to 82 (mean age of 67; Ellis-Hill et al., 
2000). Keppel and Crowe (2010) recruited stroke survivors who were under 60 years 
of age but did not state the mean age, whereas Guise et al. (2010) recruited 
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participants who suffered a stroke before the age of 55 but did not report the age of 
the participants at the time of the study. 
It could be argued that age could have an impact on someone’s sense of self in 
terms of the extent of roles and activities one is engaged in at different stages in their 
life, but also in terms the strength of their sense of identity at various ages. The age 
ranges used in the studies seem representative of the populations investigated, with 
a younger population in the TBI samples, and an older population in some stroke 
samples. Additionally, the younger stroke survivors were the focus of Keppel and 
Crowe’s (2010) and Guise et al.’s (2010) studies, suggesting that the results may be 
generalisable to the wider stroke population. 
1.7.5.3.6 Other sample characteristics 
Some studies reported additional information regarding the sample they employed. 
There were no additional neurological problems, concurrent difficulties with 
substance misuse or severe psychiatric disorder (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Gracey et 
al., 2008), no previous physical disability (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
2000), no history of psychiatric disorder (Keppel & Crowe, 2010), no gross language 
impairments (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008) and no history of neuropathology, cognitive 
difficulties (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Keppel & Crowe, 2010).  
However, Wright and Telford (1996) did include participants with history of mental 
health problems (12%), and participants with a previous head injury (34%), although 
it is unclear what the percentage was amongst those who completed the self-
concept measure. Also, Pallesen (2014) included seven participants with cognitive 
problems in varying degrees such as difficulties with speech processing, overview, 
planning, concentration and memory, and three had moderate aphasia. It could be 
argued that the samples employed in the latter studies were more representative of 
an ordinary community sample. 
On the other hand, having a previous head injury could be a confounding variable as 
could previous physical disability or chronic illness, including mental health, as it 
would be difficult to ascertain the level of distress associated with the brain injury 
itself, as opposed to other factors. On the other hand, the exclusion criteria 
employed by the studies discussed also means that samples are of relatively well 
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participants, which has implications for generalising the results to the wider ABI 
population. 
1.7.5.4 Study design and methodology 
1.7.5.4.1 Quantitative methodology 
The quantitative studies included in this review were cross-sectional; two of the 
studies were also longitudinal as they assessed post-injury self-concept (Wight & 
Telford, 1996) and self-esteem (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008) respectively, at two 
different points in time. All studies employed a within-participants design, comparing 
measures of self-concept or self-esteem (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008; Keppel & 
Crowe, 2010) pre-injury (assessed retrospectively) and post-injury. Ellis-Hill and 
Horn’s (2000) study also included a comparison group to investigate self-concept in 
a non-injured group, and compared the stroke and the non-injured group, but only on 
measures of psychosocial functioning. Also, the comparison group was formed by 
hospital volunteers who were likely to be particularly active or more positive people, 
thus increasing the risk of selection bias. Wright and Telford (1996) also employed a 
control group, and compared the two groups on measures of self-concept, as well as 
on emotional distress. 
Some studies (Cantor et al., 2005; Carroll & Coetzer, 2011; Wright & Telford, 1996) 
also carried out correlational analyses between emotional distress and self-
discrepancies. Wright and Telford (1996) also did this for the non-injured group. 
Although Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) did investigate the association between self-
esteem and mood, it was the current level of self-esteem, rather than the 
discrepancy between pre and post injury ratings, that was considered. 
Cross-sectional studies collect data at one point in time, therefore it could be argued 
that the participants’ view of themselves may vary at different points in time. One of 
the studies (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008) measured self-esteem at two weeks follow-
up as well, which was a strength of this study, showing that self-esteem was stable 
over time. However, it could be argued that the interval between the two measures 
was too short. Another study (Wright & Telford, 1996) assessed self-concept and 
emotional distress at two points in time, six months (time 1) and three years post 
injury (time 2), respectively, and showed no significant differences over time in terms 
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of self-concept ratings. However, the number of participants at time 2 had been 
dramatically reduced compared to time 1; only 41% completed the self-concept 
measure and 43% completed the mood measure at time 2, respectively, meaning 
that this analysis was carried out with only 15 participants.  
Additionally, showing a change in identity does not necessarily mean that this 
change is caused by the brain injury. Therefore, using comparison groups (Ellis-Hill 
& Horn, 2000; Wright & Telford, 1996) constitutes a methodological strength in that it 
clarifies this relationship. Furthermore, using a correlational design, like in the case 
of the studies that investigated the relationship between identity change and 
psychological distress, would not imply a causal relationship between the two 
variables.  
1.7.5.4.2 Qualitative methodology 
Different methodologies were used by the six qualitative studies included in the 
systematic review. One of the earlier studies used the grounded theory method 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin & Strauss, 1990) to discover main themes and 
categories in the experiences of loss of self of TBI survivors (Nochi, 1998). Face-to-
face semi-structured interviews were conducted using open-ended questions about 
life before the injury, rehabilitation experience, present concerns, and future 
expectations. Additional information was also collected through participant 
observations by the researcher while joining in the activities in which the responds 
frequently took part; from the postings of three participants from a TBI support list 
over a period of a year, referring to their thoughts, feelings and experiences 
regarding themselves and their brain injuries; and through personal correspondence. 
This yielded about 50 hours of interviews and observations; concepts relating to self-
image were identified and organised in categories. The findings were confirmed by a 
senior researcher who read researcher’s analytic memos, and by eight TBI survivors, 
including some of the participants, who read a manuscript about the findings. 
Grounded theory was also the methodology used by Levack et al. (2014) as their 
study aimed to develop a framework for the operationalisation of impact of TBI on 
self-identity, being intended as the first step in developing a psychometric measure. 
Data was collected via eight focus groups meetings with four to nine TBI survivors in 
each, which were attended by two researchers. Participants were invited to talk 
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about how TBI and its consequences had influenced their sense of who they were as 
people, and factors that they thought helped them or others regain a positive sense 
of self-identity after TBI. The discussions were digitally recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. Data analysis was carried out using NVivo software (QSR International), 
and occurred concurrently with ongoing data collection, thus data from each focus 
group influenced the refinement of questions in subsequent meetings. Initial coding 
was undertaken independently by two researchers who then compared and debated 
their findings, along with personal reflection, before sharing the initial analysis for 
discussion with the research team. Instances incongruent with the emerging model 
were used to further test and explore the emerging theory, and data collection 
continued until theoretical saturation was reached. 
On the other hand, Ellis-Hill et al. (2000) carried out life narrative interviews with 
eight stroke survivors (and their spouse) while in hospital, and six months and one 
year post-discharge, yielding 24 interviews. Participants were told that the 
researcher was interested in how they felt the stroke related to their overall lives. The 
topics covered in the first interview were life from childhood onwards, the stroke 
event, hospital experiences, and views of the future; second interview covered 
hospital experiences and views of the present and future; last interview explored 
participants’ experience from first having the stroke, including first being at home, 
and their views of the present and future. The texts were analysed by one researcher 
to explore themes relating to the stroke; interviews were compared within 
participants to see if/how the themes changed over one year; and 
similarities/differences between the themes were compared for all the participants. A 
sample of the transcripts was read by two independent assessors and the themes 
identified were compared, discussed and agreement reached. 
In order to aid understanding of self and identity changes post-brain injury, Gracey et 
al. (2008) adopted a constructivist epistemology (Neimeyer & Neimeyer, 1993). 
Representations making up the self-concept were operationalised as dichotomous 
personal constructs, as defined in Kelly’s personal construct psychology, and themes 
were identified using the inductive phenomenological thematic analysis procedure of 
Boyatzis (1998). A personal construct elicitation method (Fransella et al., 2004) was 
used to identify constructs relating to pre-injury, current (post-injury) and ideal (post-
injury) selves in structured group discussions with 2-5 participants. The data 
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collected from a the first sub-sample of 18 participants were analysed first, then the 
data from a second sub-sample, comprising of 14 participants, were used for 
development of initial themes derived from the first sub-sample, and for verification 
and reliability of coding.  
In their study with stroke survivors, Guise et al. (2010) examined the ways in which 
survivors talk about early stroke and its effects on identity, by adopting a social 
constructionist perspective. The data were collected via focus group interaction and 
analysed using a discourse analytic methodology, which focuses on the use of 
language; discourse is seen as a phenomenon in its own right with specific 
properties that impact on people and social interactions, rather than merely a 
medium that facilitates access to people’s inner worlds. Thus the focus was on 
issues of identity as they arose in the talk of stroke 12 survivors and five carers. 
Participants were invited to discuss the question ‘in what ways has your illness 
affected you as a person?’, and recurrent patterns were identified in the data. 
More recently, Pallesen (2014) interviewed participants from a previous 
questionnaire study which had been aimed at isolating characteristics of a stroke 
population 5 years after first stroke, and focusing on functioning and health. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted from a social-phenomenological theoretical 
perspective to explore survivors’ perceptions and interpretations of their own 
experiences; they addressed how the participants experienced their body and their 
self-identity, how their disability influenced daily living and how this had changed 
since the stroke. The interviews were conducted in the stroke survivors’ homes, and 
were sometimes supplemented with telephone conversations and e-mail 
correspondence. In a few cases, a family member also took part in a section of the 
interview, mainly to help with supplementing the stroke survivor’s memories, and 
only if requested by the interviewee; the data from the stroke survivors and family 
members were analysed separately. The analysis and interpretation was inspired by 
Giorgi (1975) and Kvale and Brinkmann (2008), and supported by NVivo 8 computer 
programme. The analytical process involved provisional thematisation of each 
individual interview, then an analytical generalisation of the material was carried out; 
this also involves condensing the expressed views and experiences and thereby 
deriving still more essential meanings (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). A reflective log 
book was also kept. 
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1.7.5.5 The measurement of self-discrepancies and psychological distress 
The tools used in the quantitative studies to measure self-discrepancies and 
psychological distress will be outlined below. 
1.7.5.5.1 Self-discrepancy measures 
In order to measure changes in self-concept in their study, Tyerman and Humphrey 
(1984) devised a 20 item Semantic Differential Scale, which was adapted from 
Osgood et al. (1957, as cited in Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984). This was a self-report 
measure comprising of adjective pairs seen as pertinent to severe head injury (e.g. 
bored-interested, helpless-in control, aggressive-unaggressive), rated on a seven-
point scale. This became known as the Head Injury Semantic Differential (HISD) and 
was later modified following clinical practice, by adding or replacing items. Different 
versions of this, with reported good psychometric properties, were used by other 
three studies in this review, which makes them more comparable. All these studies 
retrospectively measured the past (pre-injured) self, 6 months before injury (Ellis-Hill 
& Horn, 2000; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Wright & Telford, 1996) and the present 
(post injured) self. Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) and Wright and Telford (1996) 
also measured future self. In addition, Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) asked 
participants to rate how they perceived a typical head injured person and a typical 
person of their own age and sex. 
On the other hand, Cantor et al. (2005) used the Selves Interview (SI) and the 
Selves Adjective Checklist (SAC) to measure pre and post injured selves, together 
with ideal and ought selves. The SI was a modified version of Higgins’ (1987) Selves 
Questionnaire (SQ) and involved asking the participant to describe different self-
states by providing at least six brief descriptors for each state, and then rate each 
descriptor on a scale of 1 (slightly true of me) to 5 (extremely true of me). The SAC 
was specifically developed for their study; instead of generating descriptors, 
participants selected from a given list of descriptors, comprising of 38 paired 
antithetical adjectives (e.g. calm-anxious), by choosing the adjective in the pair that 
was most descriptive of the self-state being evaluated. However, the correlations 
between SAC and SI were not statistically significant, raising the question of whether 
they both measure self-discrepancy. Furthermore, the SQ was criticised in the past 
as not distinguishing between the self-discrepancies. Also, it could be argued that 
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generating descriptors may be more difficult for people with ABI due to retrieval or 
executive function difficulties. 
In addition to using psychometric tools, Wright and Telford (1996) also interviewed 
participants in terms of psychological changes since the injury. Unlike the SI where 
participants are asked to provide descriptors, this interview involved inquiries  
relating to motivation, aggression, difficulties with family and social relationships, 
feeling change in self, restriction in social activities and details of return to work. This 
may have helped the participants to describe themselves by providing a framework, 
and without imposing specific descriptors. 
Both studies that investigated a discrepancy between pre and post-injury self-esteem 
(Keppel & Crowe, 2010; Cooper-Evans et al., 2008) used the Rosenberg Self 
Esteem Scale (RSES) (Rosenberg, 1965), which makes it easier to compare these 
studies. RSES represents a global sense of self-worth and consists of 10 items rated 
on a 4-point scale, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The items reflect 
feelings about self and are either positive, “on the whole, I am satisfied with myself” 
or negative, “I certainly feel useless at times”. The measure is widely used, including 
with brain injury populations (Vickery, Sepehri & Evans, 2008), and has high 
reliability and construct validity (Crandall, 1973; Rosenberg, 1965; Wylie, 1974). 
Carroll and Coetzer (2011) also used this measure, however only for rating current 
self-esteem. 
In addition to RSES, Keppel and Crowe (2010) also used the Tennessee Self-
Concept Scale – second edition (TSCS: 2), shown to have high reliability and 
internal consistency (Fitts & Warren, 1996). The scale consists of 82 self-descriptive 
statements, rated on a 5-point scale from ‘always false’ to ‘always true’, that assess 
self-concept on several dimensions: Physical, Moral, Personal, Family, Social and 
Academic/Work. Scores are provided on each dimension, along with a total self-
concept score as a measure of global self-concept. Keppel and Crowe (2010) used 
only three dimensions in the analysis in their study: the physical self-concept scale 
(PHY), the personal self-concept (PER) and the total self-concept (TOT). PHY 
reflects the person’s view of their body, state of health, physical appearance, skills 
and sexuality. This is highly associated with global self-esteem across the lifespan, 
and is pertinent to the physically disabled. PER is a personality factor independent of 
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general self-esteem, seen as a good indication of overall personality integration, 
reflecting the person’s self-worth, feeling of adequacy as a person (Fitts & Warren, 
1996). TOT reflects the person’s overall self-concept and associated levels of self-
esteem, and was found to correlate highly with the HISD Scale (Vickery et al., 2005). 
However, Keppel and Crowe (2010) referred to PHY, PER and TOT as measures of 
self-esteem. 
Finally, probably the greatest limitation of all studies reviewed is that they used 
retrospective appraisals of self-concept or self-esteem, which can be an important 
source of bias; thus, reports may not be reliable, due to memory problems or a 
possible tendency to idealise pre-injury self (Wright & Telford, 1996).  
1.7.5.5.2 Measures of psychological distress 
All but one of the seven quantitative studies included in the review also measured 
psychological distress. As the current study focuses on the relationship between self-
discrepancy and affective distress (namely anxiety and depression), this review will 
consider only the psychometric tools for anxiety and depression that these studies 
employed. 
Three studies (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011; Cooper-Evans et al., 2008; Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
2000) used the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS), which has sound 
psychometric properties (Zigmond & Snaith, 1993). This is a brief, 14-item self-report 
questionnaire that provides a measure of overall psychological distress as well as 
separate scores for anxiety and depression, respectively, which can be compared to 
cut-off scores. It is useful in measuring distress in people with brain injury because of 
emphasis on affective and behavioural aspects while excluding items related to 
physical difficulties. The HADS has also been validated in the brain injury population, 
including stroke (Aben et al., 2002; Johnston et al., 2000). However, it can be argued 
that some items can be the direct result of the brain injury rather than a reflection of 
mood. For instance, the item ‘I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV programme’ 
can be related to language or cognitive impairment and the item ‘I feel as if I am 
slowed down’ can be related to motor or language or cognitive impairment. 
Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) used the Leeds Scales of Anxiety and Depression 
(LSAD) (Snaith et al., 1976), comprising of 15 items describing common symptoms 
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and anxiety and depression. However, no psychometric properties were reported for 
this measure.  
On the other hand, Cantor et al. (2005) used two separate measures for assessing 
depression and anxiety, the Beck Depression Inventory second edition (BDI-II) (Beck 
et al., 1996) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, 1993). They are both 21-
item self-report measures, and widely used with people with TBI (Fleming et al., 
1998; Trahan et al., 2001; Wallace & Bogner, 2000). BDI-II addresses somatic, 
affective and cognitive aspects of depression, used to quantify the level of 
depression. The BAI addresses subjective, somatic and panic-related symptoms 
associated with anxiety. While previous research showed that these measures of 
affective symptoms are consistently correlated with self-discrepancies (Strauman, 
1992), both the BAI and the BDI-II contain somatic items which in the case of people 
with a brain injury may be more related to the injury itself rather than emotional 
distress. 
Although not a measure of anxiety or depression per se, the General Health 
Questionnaire was employed by Wright and Telford (1996) to assess psychological 
distress. This is a self-report measure of current mental health that focuses on two 
major areas – the inability to carry out normal functions and the appearance of new 
and distressing experiences. The 12 item version was used (GHQ12), each item 
being rated on a four-point scale. The GHQ12 has satisfactory reliability and validity 
(Banks, 1983; Goldberg & Williams, 1988). Furthermore, like in the case of the BAI 
and BDI-II, somatic symptoms following brain injury may confound the results, 
resulting in false positives. To adjust this, the researchers raised the cut-off by one 
point. 
1.7.5.6 Key findings 
The studies included in the review examined a change in either self-concept or self-
esteem following ABI, either stroke or TBI. Although other aspects were sometimes 
investigated, this section focuses on the findings related to a perceived difference in 
identity/self-esteem, affective distress (anxiety and depression), and associations 
between self-discrepancies and distress.  
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While the qualitative studies provided rich evidence of the experienced change in 
self-concept following injury, both as subjective and social experience, it can be 
argued that their generalisibility is limited. However, their findings were supported by 
quantitative studies, which are sensitive to assessing and measuring identity change, 
but lack the specificity of the qualitative approaches. It is important, when 
considering the findings described below, to bear in mind the methodological 
limitations of the studies reviewed (see Tables 1.5 and 1.6).  
1.7.5.6.1 Change in self-concept and self-esteem 
All studies showed that individuals experienced a change in self-concept after the 
injury. In his qualitative study with TBI survivors, Nochi (1998) found a common 
theme in their narratives whereby survivors compared a new self-image, developed 
after the trauma, with another self-image maintained from before the injury, a 
common story in their narratives being that whatever they were like before the injury, 
they were not like that after the injury; and the difference between these two self-
images can lead to the experience of loss of self. This was illustrated with a couple 
of examples of a survivor who was suffering from fatigue, stating that since the injury 
they stopped working on “automatic” and everything is done “manually”; and another 
survivor who experienced a difference in the quality of his feelings about his young 
son. Thus the difference resulting from such comparisons can be related to social 
interactions as well as functional status. Two participants in Nochi’s (1998) seemed 
to cope by focusing on negative aspects of their lives before the accidents to 
emphasise positive aspects of their present lives. 
The concept of loss or change in self-identity following TBI was one that clearly 
resonated with the participants in Levack et al.’s (2014) large qualitative study, which 
is a particularly strong study in that provides a sound foundation for the development 
of a measure of self-identity after TBI. Although the extent of the change differed 
from individual to individual, many continued to struggle with this years after physical 
recovery from the initial injury had plateaued. The overarching theme was that of 
desiring to be or having lost a sense of being an integrated, valued person. Many 
participants experienced a profound disruption to their sense of wholeness as a 
person as the abilities and roles based on which personal attributes were previously 
derived were no longer available, a common experience being of feeling as if one’s 
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self-identity had become fragmented, whereas some referred to their ‘self’ prior to 
TBI and their ‘self’ after TBI as two separate identities (e.g. “I’m probably like Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde. There’s two of us.”; “it was literally like I’d stepped into someone 
else’s shoes.”). However, some participants described positive experiences such as 
‘growing’ as an individual after TBI, or feeling like a stronger or better person (i.e. 
being more giving, empathic, friendlier).  
Being somehow fundamentally changed following injury was a recurring theme in 
Ellis-Hill et al.’s (2000) study of the life narratives of stroke survivors up to a year 
following their stroke, with the stroke challenging the individual’s whole being; one 
survivor described being shattered by the stroke and being “only half a person”. On 
the other hand, five years after their stroke, survivors in Pallesen’s (2014) study saw 
themselves as fundamentally the same people as before the stroke, suggesting 
some identity reconciliation further down in the recovery journey; however several 
considered that “they were struck by a bolt out of the blue, whose consequences 
they will always have to live with” (p237).  
Taking a personal construct approach to understanding how ABI survivors make 
sense of themselves, Gracey et al. (2008) identified salient patterns of self-
construing by eliciting bipolar constructs through systematic comparison of pre-
injury, current and ideal selves. Most self-constructs (25%) were categorised into a 
theme relating to the “experience of self in the world”, defined in terms of activity or 
social participation and the perception of self in this context. More specifically, the 
constructs in this theme referred to belonging (e.g. not fitting in - feeling part of 
things), independence (e.g. being able - feeling like a waste of space), activity (e.g. 
engaged – loss of key activities), and assertiveness and confidence (e.g. believing in 
oneself – lacking confidence). The second most frequent self-constructs were 
categorised as “basic skills”, referring to cognitive, physical, sensory and social 
ability (e.g. energetic – tired, rude – polite). This was followed by the “experience of 
self in relation to self” theme, referring to self-reflections (e.g. self-acceptance). 
Finally, survivors also construed themselves in terms of emotional experiences (e.g. 
happy – depressed, stressed – relaxed), lifestyle and motivation. These findings 
suggest that the differences in self-construing post-injury refer particularly to the 
personal meanings and feelings associated with practical and social activity, as 
indicated by the most frequent constructs; and also with the experienced changes in 
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cognitive, physical, sensory and social ability, as well as, with existential concerns. 
The constructs elicited in this study are the product of the interaction between a 
specific group of individuals in a specific context, and possibly narrower than an 
individual’s self-construing due to limitations imposed by using only three elements 
(pre-injury, post-injury and ideal selves), and therefore they are not exhaustive. 
However, Gracey et al.’s (2008) study could be considered a particularly strong 
study as the personal construct approach confers it both sensitivity to the subjectivity 
of the individual, and rigour.  
A change in survivor’s sense of self is also supported by quantitative evidence. All 
studies found an effect despite using relatively small samples, however, apart from 
Carrol and Coetzer’s (2011) study, it is unclear whether using parametric analyses 
was justified (Cantor et al. (2005) and Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) rightly used non-
parametric statistics).  
Furthermore, the post-injury self was perceived as significantly more negatively than 
the pre-injury self, both in the case of stroke and TBI survivors: Carroll and Coetzer 
(2011) reported t(28) = 4.61, p < .001; Wright and Telford (1996) reported t(35) = 
4.21, p < .0001; Keppel and Crowe (2010) showed significant negative changes on 
all three self-concept measures  (PHY: t = -3.59, p = .001; PER: t = -3.03, p = .005; 
TOT: t = -2.60, p = .014). Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) reported a significant difference 
in the summed pre and post-injury self-concept scores (p = .0003); and Tyerman & 
Humphrey (1984) reported only the changes on individual self-concepts, and showed 
significant differences on all apart from three (unfeeling-caring, withdrawn-talkative 
and unfriendly-friendly). Although a relatively weaker study (smallest sample, 
unvalidated measures of self-concept; see Table 1.6), Cantor et al. (2005) also found 
a negative change post-injury; however, it is unclear whether this was statistically 
significant as they reported only the means and standard deviations of the pre-post 
comparisons. Self-esteem ratings were also significantly lower for post-injury 
compared to pre-injury:  Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) reported t(21) = -3.43, p < .01, 
and Keppel and Crowe (2010) reported t = -3.24, p = .003. Additionally, Carroll & 
Coetzer (2011) also found negative associations between identity change and self-
esteem (r = -.365, p < .05).  
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Only a couple of studies assessed self-concept / self-esteem at a later point in time, 
which is a relative strength of these studies; post-injury levels of self-esteem and 
self-concept were shown to be consistent over time, after two weeks (Cooper-Evans 
et al., 2008) and three years (Wright & Telford, 1996). However the number of 
participants in the latter study dropped at follow-up by more than 50%, which might 
have influenced the findings. Nonetheless, this suggests that survivors’ experience 
of change in their sense of self is enduring and thus time since injury may not have 
relevant influence on self-concept. 
A prominent theme in Ellis-Hill et al.’s (2000) study with stroke survivors was a 
changed relationship with their body, experienced as a split between the self and the 
body which are normally seen to be inseparable, a sense of self emerging through 
the relationship of the body with the external world (Leder, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 
1963 both cited in Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). Formerly taken for granted, after the injury 
the body is experienced as separate and out of control, and becomes very much part 
of conscious awareness as it is seen as unreliable and perplexing; furthermore, the 
body is experienced as rebellious - being uncooperative, only allowing the person to 
do what they wanted to do slowly or with great effort, or preventing them from doing 
it altogether. This is echoed in Pallesen’s (2014) study which showed that the body 
was experienced as an inconvenience, at times also as unreliable and forcible 
presence, which then led to an altered life (e.g. more inactive), survivors recounting 
how ordinary, everyday tasks required extra attention and concentration. Thus the 
survivor’s body seems to lie at the centre of their awareness and dependence, with 
the identity of body and self becoming strengthened, since their physical condition 
takes up so much of their concentration and focus.  
Ellis-Hill et al. (2000) found that the self-body relationship was still the focus a year 
after stroke. Furthermore, Pallesen (2014) found that situations that either split the 
identity of the body and the self or demanded a revision of self-perceptions were still 
common, even five years on, however, the self-body relationship was experienced in 
a less distinct way. This has also been shown to be a dynamic relationship that 
becomes more apparent in social situations as bodily experiences take place in 
interaction with their surroundings and in the company of other people. 
Consequently, the survivors are faced with the challenge of having to explain to 
others the change that they do not really understand themselves, and feeling “like a 
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freak” because of not being like before (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). This is congruent with 
another theme identified by Nochi (1998) which is the loss of self in the eyes of 
others whereby the discrepancy between self-images seems more evident when 
being around other people; TBI survivors felt that the message received from others 
was that they were not the person whom they believed to be, and imposing a 
negative label upon them, such as being defined as “crazy”. Pallesen (2014) also 
showed that in addition to loss of continuity in relation to the person they were 
formerly, stroke survivors also described a loss of the image others had of them. And 
for the participants in Levack et al.’s (2014) study, others (partners, family, friends, 
co-workers, health professionals) could strengthen or undermine an individual’s 
sense of self and their perceived status as a ‘person’ in society by how they treated 
the survivors in terms of respect, validation and acceptance.  
Furthermore, analysing the discourse between stroke survivors and carers, Guise et 
al. (2010) found that survivors not only seemed to have acquired a ‘damaged’ 
identity following their stroke, but they displayed sensitivity to the way this was 
expressed in the interaction with their carers; for instance, by describing their 
experiences in a way that minimized the potentially negative inferences that others 
might make about them. For example, a change in self which was related to 
achieving something that the survivor would have done before the stroke, was 
constructed as one of motivation rather than (in)ability in order to maintain a positive 
identity. Also, while minimising the negative aspects of stroke and mitigating its 
implications on their identity, participants were sensitive to how these accounts were 
perceived by their carers (i.e. not inappropriately positive), who could criticise and 
challenge them, and offer potentially negative reformulations of these. This 
suggested some difficulty in maintaining a positive sense of self on the part of the 
stroke survivors, particularly in the presence of their carers who can play a role in 
maintaining damaged identities. These findings further emphasise how identity-
constructions are context-dependent and can be influenced in interactions with 
others. It could be argued that this study used a more appropriate method of 
analysis, given the inter-subjective, relational nature of identity, which is co-
constructed through language, and thus embedded in the realm of social discourse. 
Finally, only a couple of the quantitative studies used a comparison group, which is a 
relative strength of these; Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) found no significant change in 
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self-concept in the non-injured group, suggesting that the change in self-concept is 
related to the injury, in this case, stroke. Additionally, Wright and Telford (1996) 
found that the comparison group rated past self significantly lower than the injured 
group, but not significantly different for present self, or future self. This suggests that 
survivors may idealise their pre-injury self, which supports Tyerman and Humphrey’s 
(1984) findings of survivors rating past self more positively overall than a typical 
person of same age and sex, which may then increase the self-discrepancy. 
1.7.5.6.2 Psychological distress 
There was a mixed picture in terms of level of psychological distress reported by 
participants in the quantitative studies.  
In the Cantor et al.’s (2005) study, the majority of participants did not have clinically 
significant scores on either the depression (BDI-II) or anxiety (BAI) measure. 
Similarly, in Wright and Telford’s study (1996), less than half (48%) of the 
participants in the injured group reported significant distress (as measured by GHQ), 
when the higher cut-off score was used; however, this went up to 60%, when the 
conventional cut-off score was used. Both these studies were with mild TBI. 
However, the majority of the respondents (64%) in the Tyerman and Humphrey’s 
(1984) study, who had severe TBI, showed significant psychological disturbance, 
with 60% scoring as clinically depressed and 44% as clinically anxious (as measured 
by LSAD). 
In the comparison studies, the injured group reported significantly greater symptoms 
than the control group, t = 5.4, p < .01 (Wright & Telford, 1996), and specifically 
increased anxiety (p = .009) and depression (p = .0004) (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000). 
1.7.5.6.3 Identity change and affective distress 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, both organic and psychosocial factors have 
been associated with depression post brain injury. One psychological factor that is 
emerging from this review, which may be contributing to survivors’ distress post 
injury, is a change in their identity. Carroll and Coetzer (2011), which is also possibly 
the strongest of the quantitative studies in terms analysis (see Table 1.6), found that 
survivors’ perceived change in identity was positively associated with depression 
(measured by the HADS depression scale), using Pearson’s correlation (r = .58, p < 
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.01). Furthermore, significant correlations were reported by Wright & Telford (1996) 
between emotional distress (measured by GHQ) and differences between present 
and past-self ratings (-.57, p < .001), however, not for the control group. However, 
the correlation analysis used in this study was not reported.  
Although a weaker study in terms of analysis (see Table 1.6), Cantor et al. (2005) 
investigated the relationship between self-discrepancies and distress in more detail, 
using separate measures of anxiety (BAI) and depression (BDI-II). They found 
significant correlations (Spearman’s rho), between measures of anxiety and 
depression, respectively, and self-discrepancy for all the selves comparisons, but 
only using the SAC. Discrepancies between current actual and pre-injury actual 
selves were associated with depression (.82, p < .001) and anxiety (.54, p = .012). 
Additionally, discrepancies between the current actual and current ideal selves were 
significantly associated with depression (.83, p < .001), and also with anxiety (.54, p 
= .011). At the same time, the discrepancies between current actual and current 
ought selves were significantly associated with anxiety (.60, p = .004) and also with 
depression (.82, p < .001). 
Notwithstanding being based on only three studies the evidence supports the 
hypothesis that post-injury distress might be explained, in part, by a perceived 
change in identity. This relationship merits further investigation. 
1.7.6 Summary 
The systematic review process identified thirteen suitable articles that investigated 
changes in self-concept/identity or self-esteem following ABI. The studies were 
reviewed with respect to their aims, samples used, methodology and findings, and 
their quality was assessed using formal quality frameworks.  
Stroke survivors in the five studies reviewed saw themselves as different, i.e. in a 
negative way, somehow ‘damaged’, following their stroke; the remaining eight 
studies, involving mostly people with TBI, of either severe or mild severity, brain 
injuries of moderate severity being underrepresented, also showed a negative 
change in the sense of self of survivors, following their injury. Notwithstanding the 
various limitations highlighted throughout (particularly, small sample sizes, large 
variability in the samples, the bias of retrospective reporting, limited generalisability 
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of findings) the studies showed a negative change in survivors’ sense of self 
following brain injury, regardless of the injury type. Furthermore, three of the studies 
reviewed, all with TBI survivors, also showed that the change in identity was 
positively associated with affective distress.  
 
1.8 RATIONALE, AIMS AND HYPOTHESES OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
1.8.1 Rationale 
Stroke can be a debilitating event, impacting negatively on the survivors’ quality of 
life due to its physical and psychological consequences. It is well evidenced that 
mood disturbance such as depression and anxiety are common following stroke, and 
can interfere with adjustment and rehabilitation.  
Furthermore, there is a growing body of literature, provided mostly by qualitative 
studies, and supported by wider evidence from ABI, that following stroke, survivors 
experience a challenge to their identity. This was also supported by further evidence 
from quantitative studies, with stroke and TBI, which found significant changes in 
survivors’ sense of self by viewing themselves in more negative terms following, 
compared to prior to the brain injury, regardless of the injury type. These changes 
have been shown to be associated with emotional problems after ABI, which has 
been explained using Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy model.  
This study will extend Cantor et al.’s (2005) pilot study with TBI survivors, aiming to 
examine whether there is a discrepancy between the post-stroke self and the pre-
stroke self, and to explore the relationship between this discrepancy and a person’s 
adjustment and mood.  
1.8.2 Aims 
In summary, this study aims to: 
A1: Explore self-discrepancies in a large sample of stroke survivors: 
i) the discrepancy between the post-stroke self (actual current self or self-concept) 
and the pre-stroke self (actual pre-morbid self). 
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ii) the discrepancy between the post-stroke self (actual current self or self-concept) 
and the ideal self. 
iii) the discrepancy between the post-stroke self (actual current self or self-concept) 
and the ought self. 
A2: Employ a correlational approach to investigate the association between self-
discrepancies and anxiety, depression, self-esteem and quality of life. 
A3: Employ mediation analysis to explore the mediation of the relationship between 
pre-post stroke self-discrepancy and affective distress through self-esteem. 
1.8.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the aims of the study and the literature to date, the following hypotheses 
will be tested:  
H1: There will be a significant discrepancy in stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-
stroke self (actual current self or self-concept) and their pre-stroke self (actual pre-
morbid self), with the post-stroke self being rated more negatively. 
H2: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self (actual 
current self or self-concept) and their pre-stroke self (actual pre-morbid self) will be 
positively associated with affective distress (anxiety and depression). 
H3: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self (actual 
current self or self-concept) and their ideal self will be positively associated with 
depression, as predicted by the self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987). 
H4: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self (actual 
current self or self-concept) and their ought self will be positively associated with 
anxiety, as predicted by the self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987). 
H5: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self (actual 
current self or self-concept) and their pre-stroke self (actual pre-morbid self) will be 
negatively associated with their perceived self-esteem. 
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H6: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self (actual 
current self or self-concept) and their pre-stroke self (actual pre-morbid self) will be 
negatively associated with their perceived quality of life. 
H7: Stroke survivors’ perceived self-esteem will be negatively associated with 
affective distress (anxiety and depression). 
H8: Stroke survivors’ perceived quality of life will be negatively associated with 
affective distress (anxiety and depression). 
H9: Stroke survivors’ perceived self-esteem acts as a mediator in the relationship 
between the discrepancy in stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self and their 
pre-stroke self, and affective distress (anxiety and depression).
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
 
2.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This chapter will describe the method used in this research study, considering the 
design, sample, the procedure for gathering the data, the measures, ethical 
considerations, and methods of analysis. 
 
2.2 DESIGN 
This was a retrospective cross-sectional study that employed a within subjects 
design to compare perceived changes in the self-concept of stroke respondents.  
Correlation analyses were used to determine relationships between self-
discrepancies and psychological distress, quality of life and self-esteem, 
respectively; and the relationship between psychological distress and quality of life 
and self-esteem, respectively. Also mediation analysis, using bootstrapping, was 
employed to determine whether self-esteem is a mediator the relationship between 
self-discrepancies (pre and post-stroke) and psychological distress. 
 
2.3 SAMPLE 
A power analysis was carried out using G Power (Faul et al., 2007). To detect a 
small correlation of .3 with α = .05 and power = 0.8, a total sample size of 67 would 
be required. Therefore, the initial sample comprised of 67 first-time adult stroke 
survivors (over 18 years of age).  
2.3.1 Recruitment 
Stroke survivors were recruited from the following sources (see Table 2.1 below for a 
breakdown of participants recruited from each source):  
1. Voluntary stroke clubs in South Wales 
2. Headway groups in the South-West of England 
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3. Stroke Association groups in Wales (South and West) and the South-
 West of England 
4. Internet adverts placed on the web pages of two nationwide stroke 
charities, Different Strokes and the Stroke Association, and the nationwide 
brain injury charity, Headway. 
 
Table 2.1: Breakdown of participants recruited from each source and data collection                                                     
means 
 Phone Face-to-face Total 
Voluntary groups 0 3 3 
Stroke Association 9 47 56 
Headway 0 3 3 
Internet advert 4 1 5 
Total 13 54 67 
There were a further 29 potential participants who, for reasons detailed below, did 
not complete stage 5 (see Procedure section 2.4).  
 
There were four potential participants who changed their mind about taking part, at 
stage 5 (see Procedure section 2.4). In the case of two other participants, who also 
were at stage 5 (see Procedure section 2.4), data collection was aborted as one of 
them became distressed during the administration of questionnaires, and with 
regards to the other, it became apparent that they lacked understanding of the 
instructions, which questioned their capacity for taking part. 
 
Eighteen potential participants who completed stage 4 (see Procedure section 2.4) 
did not progress to stage 5 as 12 of them were not at the stroke group when the 
researcher attended and 6 of them were attending a group whose coordinator could 
not be reached to organize a visit, despite several attempts. For 5 out of these 18 
potential participants, further information was required to determine eligibility. 
 
All these 24 potential participants were recruited via the Stroke Association. 
As a result of the internet adverts, five extra potential participants expressed an 
interested in talking part; one was deemed not eligible as they were less than six 
months post-stroke (see Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria section 2.3.2) and were not 
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living in the UK at the time, three did not reply after they made the initial contact, and 
one made contact after data collection and analysis process had been completed. 
2.3.2 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion criteria 
1. Experienced stroke after the age of 18 years. 
2. Experienced one stroke; if two or more strokes were experienced, these occurred 
within one month of each other. 
3. At least six months post stroke, but no more than 15 years post stroke (post last 
stroke if more than one experienced). 
4. No severe communication, cognitive or perceptual difficulties to prevent the 
completion of questionnaires.  
5. Be able to communicate well in English. 
6. Have sufficient mental capacity to determine consent to participate in this study. 
Exclusion criteria 
1. Experienced stroke before the age of 18 years. 
2. Less than 6 months post stroke, or more than 15 years post stroke. 
3. More than one stroke, experienced within longer than a month between them. 
4. Cognitive and/or communication difficulties of such magnitude that would 
make it difficult to ensure understanding or the individual's informed consent 
for participation. 
5. Previous severe serious physical disability, learning disability, diagnosis of 
dementia, or Parkinson’s disease. 
This study was carried out in the community and inclusion/exclusion was determined 
by self-report and the knowledge of the stroke club facilitators about individual 
participants. When there was uncertainty about the eligibility of a potential 
participant, the researcher consulted with the stroke group coordinator and the 
individual’s carer (if they were present at the group).  
The time post injury in the samples employed by the quantitative studies that 
investigated discrepancy in the sense of self post ABI varied widely, from four 
months to a maximum of 40 years post injury (see Systematic Review section 1.7). 
Following consultation with the research supervisor, it was decided that at least six 
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months should have passed since the stroke so that participants were past the acute 
phase and had some time to adjust to life after stroke, and a maximum of 15 years 
post stroke. 
It was important to ascertain whether there were cognitive and/or communication 
difficulties of such magnitude that would make it difficult to ensure participants’ 
understanding when completing the questionnaires, and indeed their ability to 
provide informed consent for participation. Although the cognitive functioning of the 
participants was not assessed formally, eligibility was based on consultation with the 
stroke club facilitators, who knew the stroke survivors well, and the researcher’s 
clinical judgement upon meeting and conversing with potential participants.  
Previous severe physical disability was in the exclusion criteria because the 
emphasis of the study was on the transition from no disability to living with disability. 
The participants’ demographic information is outlined in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3, 
section 3.3. 
 
2.4 PROCEDURE  
The stages of the study are described below:  
Stage 1: The study was approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee, 
Cardiff University (see Appendix 3). Approval was also obtained from the regional 
directors of the stroke association, all group facilitators and from the web 
administrators (at Stroke Association, Different Strokes and Headway).  Further 
details about ethical considerations are given in section 2.6.    
Stage 2: Potential participants were alerted to the study via the on-line advert (see 
Appendix 4) or via paper-flyers (see Appendix 4) distributed by their group facilitator.  
Stage 3: Potential participants who indicated interest in taking part in the study, by 
contacting the researcher directly by email, or via their group facilitator, were given a 
questionnaire pack. This was distributed via their group facilitator, email or post, and 
included:  
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1. A Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix 5). This was to provide more 
information about the study to help potential participants to make an informed 
decision as to whether to take part.  
2. A Reply Slip (see Appendix 6). This was to enable contact with potential 
participants and give them the opportunity to indicate if they wished to ask more 
questions about the study before deciding. They could also indicate whether they 
would like a summary of the research findings. 
3. A Demographic Questionnaire (see Appendix 7). This is described in more 
detail in section 2.5. 
4. A Consent Form (see Appendix 8).  
5. A pre-paid envelope for those who wanted to return the Reply Slip, 
Demographic Questionnaire and Consent Form by post.  
The Demographic Questionnaire was sent at this stage as it provided useful 
information for alerting the researcher whether there were questions regarding some 
aspects of eligibility (e.g. time since stroke, number of strokes). 
Stage 4: Participants returned their Reply Slip, Demographic Questionnaire and 
Consent Form, whilst at the group, by email or by post. In the one case where the 
participant chose to email the consent form, they were asked to email confirmation 
that they read the information and that they agreed to sign the consent form, prior to 
completing the questionnaires. In a small number of cases, consent was obtained 
over the telephone, by providing confirmation that they read the information and 
expressed their agreement to sign the consent form, and a note dated and timed of 
this was made separately. 
Stage 5: A battery of questionnaires was administered to the participants who met 
inclusion criteria, and were still interested to take part. The administration was 
carried out in one of the following ways: face-to-face, individually or in a small group 
of participants (maximum 5) at the stroke club, or individually via the telephone. The 
administration was carried out in a one-off session which lasted 45-60 minutes, 
including a 10-15 minute break.  
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The measures (see section 2.5) were administered in the following order: 
- The Head Injury Semantic Differential III to assess pre-stroke self 
- The Barthel Index 
- The Stroke Specific Quality of Life Scale 
- The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
- The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
Break 
- The Head Injury Semantic Differential III to assess post-stroke self 
- The Head Injury Semantic Differential III to assess ideal self 
- The Head Injury Semantic Differential III to assess ought self 
- Open question 
Stage 6: Participants were given or sent a thank you and debriefing letter (see 
Appendix 9).  
Stage 7: Participants who indicated that they wished to receive a summary of the 
results of the study were sent this by October 2014.  
 
2.5 MEASURES 
The questionnaire consisted of a demographic questionnaire and a battery of 
validated questionnaires:  
2.5.1 Demographic Questionnaire (see Appendix 7) 
Participants were asked to complete a demographic survey. The purpose was to 
provide an overview of the sample and an indication of issues of interest. Items were 
identified via the literature search and through consultation with research supervisor, 
who has expertise in stroke. Items included information about age, gender, 
education, marital status, occupational status, length of time since stroke, number of 
strokes, side of stroke, level of communication, history of previous physical disability, 
serious illness, or cognitive difficulties. Participants were also asked if they suffered 
with anxiety or depression before and after the stroke. 
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2.5.2 Self-Concept  
The Head Injury Semantic Differential Scale – III (HISD-III; Tyerman & Humphrey, 
1984) (see Appendix 10) is an updated version of the original HISD, based on the 
semantic differential paradigm that was piloted by Tyerman and Humphrey in 1984. 
For many years semantic differential methodology has been used to measure 
subjective constructs and is thus considered useful in studying self-concept (Ellis-Hill 
& Horn, 2000). The technique was originally developed by Osgood et al. (1957) (for 
a description see Snider & Osgood, 1969 and Warr & Knapper, 1968), and adapted 
by Tyerman and Humphrey (1984). The original HISD comprised 20 adjective pairs 
addressing aspects of personality considered to be pertinent to head injury (e.g. 
bored–interested). The pairs are rated on a 7-point scale (1 = negative pole, 7 = 
positive pole), giving a total possible score of 20–140, with higher scores indicating a 
more positive view of self. The first item is used as an example.   
The scale was later revised following use in clinical practice.  In 1991, two skills-
related items (e.g., clever–stupid) were replaced by items with greater relevance to 
personality (e.g., aggressive–unaggressive) and the wording of three additional 
items was changed. In 1997, two items (caring–unfeeling and cooperative–
uncooperative) were removed, being considered inappropriate for self-rating, and the 
presentation of another item (impatient–patient) was reversed to balance the 
positive–negative ordering of items. The items were thus reduced from 20 to 18 on 
the HISD III, with total score scale ranging from 20-126. A separate relatives’ version 
(HISD-R) was also introduced (Tyerman, personal communication, 19 December 
2012).   
The original scale was shown to have internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha 0.88, split 
half Guttman’s 0.87), based on the ratings of Present Self by 60 persons with very 
severe head injury on admission to rehabilitation. The present-self ratings of the 
updated version HISD II have been reported to have internal reliability (Cronbach 
alpha 0.93, split half Guttman’s 0.93) in a sample of 42 adults with severe head 
injury (Tyerman, personal communication, 19 December 2012).   
This scale has also been used with stroke survivors (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000) and was 
thus considered a valid instrument for the current study. Although three scales are 
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available (past, present and future self), ratings were obtained only for pre-stroke self 
(six months before the stroke) and post-stroke self (over the two weeks prior to 
interview). These forms were kept separate within the questionnaire to discourage 
participants from comparing the ratings.  
According to the HISD-III instructions, as outlined by Tyerman the first item was used 
as an example and the participants were asked to place a mark (X) on the respective 
line to indicate whether they saw themselves in the past (i.e. 6 months prior to injury) 
as being ‘greatly bored, fairly bored, slightly bored, half/half, slightly interested, fairly 
interested, greatly interested’. In order to facilitate rating a small change was made in 
that ‘greatly, fairly, slightly’ were added at the top of the scale (see Appendix 10). 
Ratings were also obtained for actual ideal self and actual ought self. For the former, 
participants were asked to indicate how they would ideally like to be, in terms of their 
hopes, wishes, aspirations. For the latter, participants were asked to indicate how 
they think they ought to be or should be, in relation to their duties, responsibilities, 
obligations. 
2.5.3 Level of Functioning  
The Barthel Index (Mahoney & Barthel, 1965) (see Appendix 11) consists of 10 items 
that measure a person’s functioning on a range of different day-to-day activities or 
‘activities of daily living’ (Collin et al., 1988), centred around personal care and 
mobility. It is a tool that is commonly used to assess the level of independence of 
stroke survivors (Kwakkel et al., 2011) as it is scored on the basis of whether the 
person can do the task independently or with help from others. The items are scored 
using a scale: 0, 5, 10, 15 giving a total score of 0-100 (Mahoney & Barthel, 1965) 
with higher scores indicating increased independence (Kwakkel et al., 2011). 
The measure has been shown to be reliable and valid (see Kwakkel et al., 2011 for a 
review). Although the measure is traditionally administered by a health professional 
who observes the patient, it is also possible to interview the patient or a relative to 
obtain scores (Kwakkel et al., 2011). Self-report, as well as self-report by telephone, 
have also been shown to be reliable (Collin et al., 1988). In this study, the original 
version was used and was scored based on self-report.  
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2.5.4 Quality of Life  
The Stroke Specific Quality Of Life scale (SS-QOL; Williams, Weinberger, Harris, 
Clark et al.,1999) (see Appendix 12) is an outcome measure intended to provide an 
assessment of health-related quality of life specific to individuals with stroke. It is a 
self-report scale, individuals having to respond to each question of the SS-QOL with 
reference to the past week. Scale domains and items were derived from a series of 
interviews with post-stroke patients (Williams, Weinberger, Harris, Clark et al., 1999). 
There are 49 items in 12 domains: mobility, energy, upper extremity function, 
work/productivity, mood, self-care, social roles, family roles, vision, language, 
thinking, and personality. 
Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale and there are three different response sets: 
‘total help’ (1) to ‘no help needed’ (5); ‘couldn't do it at all’ (1) to ‘no trouble at all’ (5); 
‘strongly agree’ (1) to ‘strongly disagree’ (5). Respondents must rate each item using 
the corresponding response set as indicated on the scale (Williams, Weinberger, 
Harris, Clark et al., 1999). For example, the item ‘did you have any trouble doing 
daily work around the house?’ requires the second response set, which ranges from 
‘couldn't do it at all’ to ‘no trouble at all’. Higher scores indicate better functioning. 
The SS-QOL yields both domain scores and an overall SS-QOL summary score. 
The domain scores are unweighted averages of the associated items while the 
summary score is an unweighted average of all twelve domain scores (Williams, 
Weinberger, Harris & Biller 1999). 
Williams, Weinberger, Harris, Clark et al. (1999) examined the internal consistency 
of the SS-QOL in 34 individuals with stroke and found that Cronbach's alpha ranged 
from adequate (alpha = 0.75 for work/productivity subscale) to excellent (alpha = 
0.89 for self-care), suggesting that the SS-QOL has a strong internal consistency. 
Excellent test-retest reliability (r = 0.92) was also shown (Williams et al., 2000). Most 
domains of the SS-QOL correlate with the Barthel Index. The self-care domain was 
adequately correlated with the Barthel Index (r = 0.45); upper extremity function 
showed a positive but poor relationship with the Barthel Index (r = 0.18) (Williams, 
Weinberger, Harris, Clark et al., 1999). The scale can also be administered to 
individuals with stroke reliably over the telephone (Williams et al., 2000).  
87 
 
For the purpose of this study, the scale has been modified by removing the following 
domains: mobility, upper extremity function, self-care, vision and language. This was 
in order to retain those domains that complemented the Barthel Index by providing 
information on more psychological and social aspects of functioning, and to keep the 
overall administration time of the battery as brief as possible.  
2.5.5 Self-Esteem  
The Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965) (see Appendix 13) is a 
measure of global sense of self-worth comprising of 10 items requiring respondents 
to rate feelings about the self on positive (“on the whole, I am satisfied with myself”) 
and negative (“I certainly feel useless at times”) items. The items are scored using a 
4-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree (4) to strongly disagree (1), with 
negative items being reverse scored. Scores below 25 are considered to be 
indicative of clinically significant low self-esteem (Anson & Ponsford, 2006),  
The RSES is a widely used measure with high reliability and construct validity 
(Keppel & Crowe, 2000), high test–retest correlation having been shown at one and 
two week intervals in the general population (Fleming & Courtney, 1984). It has a 
strong research base and has been used with ABI populations, including stroke 
(Cooper-Evans et al., 2008; Keppel & Crowe, 2000; Vickery et al., 2005) and was 
therefore deemed a valid measure to use.  
2.5.6 Level of Distress  
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) (see 
Appendix 14) is a brief, 14 item, self-report questionnaire used to measure 
psychological distress, that yields an overall score as well as separate scores for 
anxiety (HADS-A) and depression (HADS-D) that can be compared to cut-off scores.  
Zigmond and Smith (1983) developed this tool to detect anxiety and depression in 
people with physical health problems, to be used in general medical outpatient 
clinics, and it is now widely used in clinical practice and research (Hermann, 1997). It 
is a useful tool for measuring psychological distress in people with ABI, including 
stroke, because it emphasises affective and behavioural symptoms while excluding 
items related to physical difficulties. The HADS has also been validated on stroke 
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population (Aben et al., 2002). However, it can be argued that some items can be 
the direct result of the stroke rather than a reflection of mood. For instance, the item 
‘I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV programme’ can be related to language or 
cognitive impairment and the item ‘I feel as if I am slowed down’ can be related to 
motor or language or cognitive impairment. 
The questionnaire consists of seven items related to anxiety and seven items related 
to depression. Five of the items assessing depression are markers for anhedonia (an 
inability to experience pleasure), and two concern appearance and feelings of 
slowing down. Two of the anxiety items assess autonomic anxiety (panic and 
butterflies in the stomach) and the remaining five assess tension and restlessness 
(Dunbar et al., 2000).  
Each item is scored on a 0-3 (not at all, from time to time, occasionally, a lot of the 
time and most of the time) scale, giving a total score of 0 - 21 for either anxiety or 
depression, with higher scores indicating higher levels of distress. In stroke, the 
recommended cut-off points range from 4/5 (Sagen et al., 2009) to 7/8 (Aben et al., 
2002) for depression, and from 4/5 (Sagen et al., 2009) to 5/6 (Johnson et al., 1995) 
for anxiety. The HADS total score has been used as a measure of psychological 
distress (Aben et al., 2002; Johnston et al., 2000; Sagen et al., 2009) for detecting 
both anxiety and depression.  
The HADS has been found to be reliable and valid as a screening tool, sensitive to 
change and predictive of psychosocial outcome (Herrmann, 1997). Its construct 
validity and utility with stroke survivors has been shown by demonstrating its 
capacity to differentiate anxiety and depression and its ease of use in populations 
with serious physical illness (Johnston et al., 2000). 
Two studies have examined internal consistency of the HADS in a stroke population. 
Aben et al. (2002) reported excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = 0.85) 
in a study with 200 first-time stroke survivors. In a study with 68 individuals with 
acute stroke Johnston et al. (2000) found adequate internal consistency at one 
month post-stroke (Cronbach's alpha for the HADS-A = 0.76; HADS-D alpha = 0.79, 
and overall HADS alpha = 0.79); and at six months post-stroke, excellent internal 
consistency for the HADS-A and overall HADS (alpha = 0.87; 0.89, respectively), 
and adequate for the HADS-D (alpha = 0.76). Aben et al. (2002) also found the 
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mean correlation between the depression and anxiety subscales of the HADS to be 
excellent (r = 0.67). 
The HADS has also been compared to other scales. A review of 747 identified 
papers that examined the concurrent validity of the HADS in non-stroke populations 
report excellent correlations between the HADS and other commonly used 
questionnaires, ranging between 0.49 to 0.83 (Bjelland et al., 2002).  
The HADS specificity and sensitivity values were found to be satisfactory (Lincoln, 
2012).Three studies with stroke survivors showed that its sensitivity ranged from 0.8 
to 0.92 and its specificity ranged from 0.46 to 0.79 (Aben et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 
1995; O’Rourke et al., 1998). 
The HADS can also be interviewer administered in person or over the telephone for 
clients who may have difficulty with self-administration (Snaith, 2003). However, 
there are no studies that examined the validity of this form of administration in clients 
with stroke. 
2.5.7 Open Question 
At the end, participants were presented with an open question: ‘In a few words, 
please describe yourself as you are today compared to what you were like before the 
stroke.’ This was in order to give participants the opportunity to provide any 
additional information on how they perceived the changes, if any, in themselves post 
stroke. Responses were written down either by participants themselves or 
researcher, depending on participants’ individual motor ability or wish. 
 
2.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.6.1 Capacity for Informed Consent  
It was considered that it was unlikely for potential participants without capacity for 
consent to be nominated by charity workers or family, or for the potential participants 
to refer themselves following the adverts. Furthermore, the researcher applied their 
clinical judgment (based on their clinical experience of working with people with 
severe and enduring mental health problems, people with learning disabilities and 
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people with cognitive impairments) to decide if the potential participant had the 
capacity to give informed consent. This judgement was made during the initial 
conversation the researcher had with the potential participant, and involved an 
evaluation of their understanding and communication using simple questions.  
Only once consent was given, the researcher proceeded with the administration of 
the questionnaire battery. The consent form (see Appendix 7) summarised the main 
points about participating in the study. Before completing the questionnaires with the 
participants, these points were reiterated, as a reminder, and to ascertain whether 
there was any doubt regarding the participants’ capacity to provide consent and 
ensure that participants had made an informed decision.  
If, at any stage, there were concerns that the participant may lack capacity to 
consent, the process came to a halt immediately and they were excluded from the 
study. The reason was explained and the data gathered by that point was destroyed.  
2.6.2 Inducement 
Potential participants were alerted to the study through the on-line advert or their 
group facilitator and only participants who had expressed an interest in the study 
were then contacted by the researcher. It was also emphasised that their 
participation was entirely voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at 
any time and without providing an explanation, both in writing (see Participant 
Information Sheet and Consent Form, Appendices 4 and 7) and orally, before and 
during the battery administration. It was hoped that these measures reduced the 
likelihood of people to feel undue pressure to participate.  
2.6.3. Anonymity and Confidentiality   
Questionnaires were coded and participants were asked not to write their names or 
any personal identifiable information on them. Once the questionnaires were coded 
and completed, they were attached to the demographic questionnaire after removing 
the name of the participant from it. Reply slips were kept only when participants had 
indicated they wanted a summary of the results of the study, otherwise they were 
returned to the participants after the completion of the questionnaires. Reply slips 
and consent forms were kept separately from questionnaires in a locked case. 
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Participants were informed of the confidentiality arrangements on their participant 
information sheet (see Appendix 4), consent form (see Appendix 7) and debriefing 
letter (see Appendix 8), and reminded before completing the questionnaires. 
2.6.4 Demands on Participants  
In order to reduce any potential burden on participants, measures were selected that 
had suitable psychometric properties (see measures section, 2.5), while also being 
relatively quick and straight-forward for participants to complete. Due to time 
constraints and concerns of not being able to recruit the needed number of 
participants, and as the measures had already been used in previous research 
studies with people with brain injuries, it was decided against piloting the 
questionnaires with stroke survivors. However, they were trialled by the researcher 
on herself, allowing for extra time as might be needed when completed by stroke 
survivors, and they were deemed to be comprehensible and sufficiently brief.  
There was some potential for distress to be caused by some questionnaire items as 
it required participants to reflect on the experience of themselves before and after 
the stroke, and on their life post-stroke. Procedures planned to minimise or respond 
to this distress included stopping the administration of the questionnaires 
immediately once a participant became distressed and offering the participants 
debriefing or to have a conversation with the research supervisor who is a 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist in Stroke Care, and whose contact details were on 
the correspondence given to the participants. Participants were also reminded that 
their participation was entirely voluntary and that they had no obligation to continue if 
they changed their mind for any reason. Their wellbeing was monitored throughout 
the administration of the questionnaires. Participants were also advised to contact 
their stroke club facilitator if they found any of the material upsetting.  
2.6.5. Attending a Stroke Group 
By entering a group setting there was the potential for disrupting routine activities 
and dynamics. In order to reduce this, the researcher arranged the visit in advance, 
in collaboration with the group facilitator, at a time that was suitable for the group, 
and to alert both participants and non-participants that the researcher would be 
attending the club. Also, the researcher introduced themselves, and briefly the study, 
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to the whole group. In order to minimise the disruption to the rest of the group, and to 
minimise distraction and ensure confidentiality, the administration of questionnaires 
was carried out in a separate room.  
 
2.7 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 
The methods of analysis were as follows: 
Paired-samples t-test to examine the difference between the means of stroke 
survivors’ ratings of their pre-stroke self and of their post-stroke self.   
 
Pearson’s Product-moment correlation to determine the relationship between self-
discrepancies and affective distress, quality of life, self-esteem; also the relationship 
between psychological distress and quality of life and self-esteem, respectively. 
 
Mediation analysis using bootstrapping to examine the impact of self-esteem (as a 
mediating variable) on the relationship between pre-post stroke self-discrepancy 
(independent variable) and affective distress (dependent variable).  
 
If a variable X (self-discrepancy) is assumed to have an effect on an outcome 
variable Y (affective distress), as modelled in Figure 2:1 below, path c is called the 
total effect. This total effect, interpreted as the amount by which Y changes if X 
changes by one unit, may be the result of both direct and indirect forces. Thus, the 
effect of X on Y may be mediated by a process or intervening variable, called 
mediator (M), and the variable X may still affect Y.  
 
Figure 2.1: Unmediated model 
X                      c                       Y 
 
A simple mediation model (see Figure 2:2 below) would postulate that variable X 
(self-discrepancy) exerts an effect on M (e.g. self-esteem) (path a), which in turn 
affects the outcome variable Y (affective distress) while controlling for self-
discrepancy (path b). The mediation is the product of these two relationships (ab), 
called the indirect effect (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This is 
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interpreted as the amount by which Y changes if X is held constant and M changes 
by the amount it would have changed if X increased by one unit.  Path c' is called the 
direct effect, which is interpreted as the part of the effect of X on Y that is 
independent of the pathway through M (Hayes, 2009). 
 
Figure 2.2: Mediated model 
                       M 
        a                               b 
X                      c’                       Y 
 
If variable X no longer affects Y once M has been controlled, and thus path c' is zero, 
that would mean that the mediation is complete. If the path from X to Y is reduced in 
absolute size but is still different from zero when the mediator is introduced, then the 
mediation would be partial (Kenny, 2014). However, the tests of c and c’ have 
relatively low power, especially in comparison to the indirect effect (ab); thus, caution 
is required about claims of complete mediation based on the non-significance of c’ 
(e.g. Kenny & Judd, 2014). Others (e.g. Hayes, 2013) even argue that one should 
never make any claim of complete or partial mediation, being more appropriate to 
talk about the indirect effect of X on Y through M (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006).  
There are several methods of testing mediation hypotheses, the causal steps 
approach by Baron and Kenny (1986) being the most commonly used; this focuses 
on the individual paths described above, assessing whether certain statistical criteria 
are met. However this has been criticised for being the lowest in power (Fritz & 
MacKinnon, 2007; MacKinnon et al., 2002); the existence of an indirect effect is not 
tested directly, instead it is inferred logically by the outcome of a set of hypothesis 
tests (Hayes, 2009); and the method is prone to violations of the parametric 
assumption of normality (MacKinnon et al., 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2004).  
Alternative methods of analyses, such as the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982; 1986), focus 
on the indirect effects (the product term ab). This uses a standard normal distribution 
for deriving a p value for the indirect effect, thus requiring the assumption that the 
sampling distribution of the indirect effect is normal; however, the sampling 
distribution of ab tends to be highly skewed (Bollen & Stine, 1990; Stone & Sobel, 
94 
 
1990), being normal only in large samples. Thus the test falsely presumes symmetry 
as it uses a normal approximation which presumes a symmetric distribution. 
Consequently this test has very low power.  
 
Bootstrapping, which is a non-parametric resampling procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004; 2008) addresses the weakness of the Sobel test and  is considered one of the 
more valid and powerful methods for testing intervening variable effects (MacKinnon 
et al., 2004; Williams & MacKinnon, 2008). It directly assesses the significance of the 
indirect effect, and does not impose the assumption of normality of the sampling 
distribution; thus it is particularly suitable when data sets are small (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004). Bootstrapping involves k samples of the original size being taken from 
the obtained data (with replacement after each specific selected number) and 
mediation effects are then calculated in each sample (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). In 
this study, parameter estimates will be based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and a 
bias-corrected confidence interval will be provided for the tested mediator; if lower 
and upper bounds do not pass through zero, the indirect effect is significant at the p 
<.05 level.  
 
The mediation analysis is thus more than a correlational analysis as it explores the 
underlying  mechanism  of  a  known  relationship  (between  self-discrepancy  and 
affective distress),  and  the  mediator  (e.g. self-esteem)  would  serve to clarify the 
nature of this relationship. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 
3.1. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In this chapter the results of the current study will be presented. The chapter covers 
preliminary data analysis carried out to ensure that the quality of the data was 
sufficient for the statistical tests used; the descriptive statistics for the sample and 
measures used; and the statistical analysis, where the results will be reported in 
relation to the stated hypotheses. These operations were carried out using Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, Version 20) with additional Custom 
Dialogues for PROCESS to run mediation analyses (Hayes, 2013). The chapter will 
end with a presentation of the themes elicited through inductive thematic analysis 
(Patton, 1990) of the qualitative data that was generated by the open question.   
 
3.2. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
3.2.1. Error Analysis 
Minimum and maximum values for each variable were screened in order to test 
whether data fell within the possible range on an item. Three data points were 
identified as input errors using this method and subsequently corrected after 
referring back to the raw data1.  
3.2.2 Missing Data 
Missing data for continuous variables were relatively low (13 item scores) and 
randomly distributed. The maximum of data missing from any one data set was of 
four scores. The missing data were replaced using the scale mean for that 
participant.   
 
                                                          
1
 One item on the Barthel Index was incorrectly entered as ’55’ instead of ‘5’; one item on the HISD Pre-stroke 
and one on the HISD Ought were incorrectly entered as ‘77’ instead of ‘7’. 
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3.2.3 Assumptions  
3.2.3.1 Normality 
A paired-samples t-test was used to test whether survivors’ ratings of themselves 
before and after the stroke differed. As a t-test assumes data is normal, the 
distribution of HISD scores, pre and post-stroke respectively, was tested for 
normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The test was non-significant for the 
post-stroke scores (D(65) = 0.094, p = .20) thus this assumption was met in this 
case. On the other hand, the pre-stroke scores were found to deviate from the 
normal distribution (skewness of -0.68 (SE = 0.30) and kurtosis of -0.39 (SE = 0.59)). 
However, the t-test is robust against non-normality, unless there are serious outliers 
(see section 3.2.3.4 below), or when sample sizes are small and distributions are far 
from normal (Snijders, 2011). Consequently, it was decided that using a t-test was 
appropriate; as a precaution, a non-parametric analysis, the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, was also carried out. 
Correlational analyses were also conducted to examine associations between self 
discrepancies and emotional distress, self-esteem and quality of life respectively; 
and between emotional distress and self-esteem and quality of life respectively. 
Parametric correlations also require normally distributed scores on variables (Field, 
2009). This was assessed with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for each variable.  
The discrepancy scores between pre and post-stroke selves ratings and the 
discrepancy scores between post-stroke self and ideal self ratings were found to be 
non-significant and therefore normally distributed (D(65) = 0.079, p = .20; D(65) = 
0.10, p = .082, respectively). The scores for self-esteem, quality of life, depression 
(HAD-D) and overall emotional distress (HADS) were also non-significant and 
therefore normally distributed (D(65) = 0.080, p = .20; D(65) = 0.078, p = .20; D(65) = 
0.099, p = .19; D(65) = 0.072, p = .20, respectively). The discrepancy scores 
between post-stroke self and ought self were found to deviate from the normal 
distribution (skewness of 0.78 (SE = 0.30) and kurtosis of -0.002 (SE = 0.59)); as 
were the anxiety scores (HAD-A) (skewness of 0.44 (SE = 0.30) and kurtosis of -0.64 
(SE = 0.59)).  
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The scores for both ideal and ought selves deviated from the normal distribution 
(skewness of -.99 (SE = 0.30) and kurtosis of .23 (SE = 0.59); skewness of -.49 (SE 
= 0.30) and kurtosis of -.73 (SE = 0.59), respectively), as did the functioning scores 
(skewness of -1.001 (SE = 0.30) and kurtosis of .76 (SE = 0.59)).  
As Havlicek and Peterson (1977) have found that Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) 
is a robust measure and that probability statements for r are accurate even when 
there is extreme deviation from normality, it was decided to report on correlations in 
terms of this measure. 
3.2.3.2 Linearity  
Parametric correlations require a linear relationship between variables (Field, 2009). 
Scatter plots of pre-post discrepancy scores against anxiety (HAD-A), depression 
(HAD-D), overall emotional distress (HADS), self-esteem and quality of life 
respectively, were visually inspected to check for linearity. Scatter plots of post-
stroke and ideal selves discrepancy scores, and of post-stroke and ought selves 
discrepancy scores, against depression, anxiety and overall emotional distress, 
respectively, were also inspected. Finally, scatter plots of self-esteem and quality of 
life scores against anxiety, depression and overall emotional distress respectively, 
were investigated. All scatter plots showed a linear distribution.  
3.2.3.3 Homoscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity (or equal scatter) requires similar variance at 
each level of the predictor variable (Field, 2009). Scatter plots as described above 
were visually inspected and appeared homoscedastic.  
3.2.3.4 Outliers  
Parametric tests assume that there are no extreme scores or outliers. Boxplots of 
each variable were inspected and a number of outliers were identified: there were 
two outliers on the pre-stroke self variable, one on the post-stroke self variable, three 
on the self-esteem variable and one on the level of functioning variable. These were 
adjusted to be one unit above/below the next highest/lowest score in the sample 
which was not an extreme score, as recommended by Dancey and Reidy (2004).  
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3.3. DESCRIPTIVES 
Two datasets were excluded. In one case the stroke survivor had suffered the stroke 
over 15 years ago (see exclusion criteria, section 2.3.2). In the other case, the stroke 
survivor had a severe physical disability (see exclusion criteria, section 2.3.2), and 
the way they completed the ideal and ought measures raised questions about their 
understanding of instructions overall, which questioned the validity of that data set. 
The final sample therefore consisted of 65 stroke survivors. 
3.3.1 Demographics of Stroke Survivor 
The age of survivors ranged from 37 to 82, with a mean of 61.6, and standard 
deviation (SD) of 11.4 (see Table 3.1 below). This suggests that at least one survivor 
was as young as 37 years of age and that the majority of survivors were between 50 
and 72 years of age. The mean time since experiencing a stroke was of 5.6 years 
(SD 4.25), range from 6 months to 15 years; six participants were under a year post 
stroke, ranging between 6 – 11 months, and were coded as 1 year since stroke. 
Table 3.1: Stroke survivor age and years since stroke  
 (N)
 
a
 
Mean SD Range 
Age 65 61.6 11.4 37 - 82 
Years since stroke
 
 65 5.57 4.25 1 - 15 
a 
N = number of stroke survivors 
There was a proportionate number of male (44.6%) and female (55.4%) participants; 
most were white British (60%), a quarter identified themselves as being Welsh 
(24.6%), one African-Caribbean, while nine survivors did not report on their ethnicity. 
The majority of the participants were married (60%) and retired (75.4%) or not 
working (12.3%) (see Table 3.2 below). 
Only half of the participants reported on the type of stroke they experienced; 
haemorrhagic (21.5%) or ischemic (27.7%). Half of the participants (49.2%) reported 
the left side of the body was affected following the stroke, and most of the others 
(36.9%) reported the right side being affected, while 3 participants did not report on 
this. Over a quarter of participants (27.7%) reported they suffered with 
anxiety/depression before the stroke, which more than doubled (64.6%) after stroke. 
This, however, was based on their yes/no answer to the question “Did you suffer with 
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anxiety/depression before/after your stroke?” in the Demographic Questionnaire. 
Although the Demographic Questionnaire also contained a question regarding the 
level of education, the data obtained were not codable, and therefore not reported. 
Table 3.2: Stroke survivor demographics a 
  N % 
Gender Male 29 44.6 
Female 36 55.4 
Ethnicity White British 39 60 
Welsh 16 24.6 
Other 1 1.5 
Missing 9 13.8 
Type of stroke Haemorrhage  14 21.5 
Ischemic 18 27.7 
Missing/Don’t know 33 50.8 
Side of body affected Right 24 36.9 
Left 32 49.2 
Both 1 1.5 
Neither 5 7.7 
Missing 3 4.6 
Pre-stroke anxiety/depression Yes 18 27.7 
No 47 72.3 
Post-stroke anxiety/depression Yes 42 64.6 
No 23 35.4 
Marital status Married 39 60 
Separated/divorced 10 15.4 
Single/never 
married 
9 13.8 
Widowed 7 10.8 
Occupational status Retired 49 75.4 
Unemployed 8 12.3 
In employment 7 10.8 
Missing 1 1.5 
a 
N = number of stroke survivors; %=percentage of total sample.  
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics (see Table 3.3 below) 
The participants were at a high level of functioning, as shown by the mean level of 
functioning score of 77.3 for the sample. Mean scores on measures of self-esteem 
and quality of life were M = 25.3, SD = 5.55 and M = 67.8, SD = 20.7 respectively.  
In terms of emotional distress, the mean scores suggested that survivors reported 
similar levels of anxiety and depression (M = 8.31, SD = 4.85; M = 7.27, SD = 3.74 
respectively). Most of survivors met cut-off point for post-stroke anxiety, whether 4/5 
(Sagen et al., 2009) or 5/6 (Johnson et al., 1995); and for post-stroke depression, if 
100 
 
cut-off considered at 4/5 (Sagen et al., 2009), whereas the 7/8 cut-off (Aben et al., 
2002) was met by more than half of survivors. The mean for overall emotional 
distress was 15.6 (SD = 7.61). 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics a 
 
N Mean 
Max. Range 
Possible Actual Range 
Standard 
Deviation 
Level of functioning 65 77.3 0 - 100 20 - 100 20.3 
Self-esteem 65 25.3 10 - 40 13 - 37 5.55 
Quality of Life 65 67.8 25 - 125 35 - 121 20.7 
Anxiety 65 8.31 0 - 21 0 - 20 4.85 
Depression 65 7.27 0 - 21 0 - 14 3.74 
Overall Mood 65 15.6 0 - 42 1 - 29 7.61 
Pre-Stroke Self 65 106 18 - 126 72 - 126 15.1 
Post-Stroke Self 65 86 18 - 126 35 - 126 23.5 
Ideal Self 65 119 18 - 126 98 - 126 7.46 
Ought Self 65 115 18 - 126 95 - 126 8.93 
a 
N = number of survivors 
The means on the pre-stroke and post-stroke self measures, respectively, suggested 
that survivors rated themselves highly, and more positively before the stroke 
compared to after the stroke (M = 106, SD = 13; M = 86, SD = 23.5 respectively). 
Survivors’ ratings for the ideal and ought selves were higher than for pre-stroke self, 
and there seemed to be less difference between participants in terms of both how 
they would like to be and how they think they should be (M = 119, SD = 7.46; M = 
115, SD = 8.93, respectively). Although the scores for both ideal and ought selves 
deviated from the normal distribution (as discussed earlier, see section 3.2.3.1), this 
is not surprising given that participants were asked to rate how they would ideally like 
to be as a person, and how they think they ought to be. 
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3.4 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
3.4.1 Comparison of Means 
A paired-samples t-test was used to test hypothesis H1: There will be a significant 
discrepancy in stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self and their pre-stroke 
self, with the post-stroke self being rated more negatively. 
A paired-samples t-test found that HISD scores for post-stroke self were significantly 
lower than HISD scores for pre-stroke self (mean for difference = 19.7, SD = 24.6; 
t(64) = 6.464, p = .000). As the pre-stroke scores were not normally distributed, a 
related samples Wilcoxon signed rank test was also carried out and showed a 
significant difference between pre and post-stroke selves ratings (p = .000). 
Table 3.4: Changes in the self-concept scores, pre and post-stroke 
HISD item Median  
(interquartile range) 
Pre-stroke 
Median  
(interquartile range) 
Post- stroke 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Interested 7 (1) 6 (4) .000 
Happy 7 (1) 6 (3) .000 
In Control 7 (1) 5 (4) .000 
Relaxed 6 (4) 5 (4) .043 
Satisfied 6 (2) 5 (3) .004 
Hopeful 6 (1) 6 (4) .001 
Self Confident 7 (1) 5 (3) .000 
Stable (emotionally) 7 (1) 6 (3) .001 
Attractive (as a person) 6 (2) 5 (3) .000 
Of Value 6 (1) 6 (1) .000 
Unaggressive 6 (4) 6 (4) .994* 
Calm 6 (2.5) 6 (4) .053* 
Capable 7 (1) 5 (3) .000 
Independent 7 (1) 5 (4) .000 
Active 7 (1) 5 (4) .000 
Talkative 7 (2) 6 (3) .002 
Friendly 7 (1) 6 (1) .000 
Patient 6 (3) 6 (4) .069* 
* p = N.S. 
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Wilcoxon related samples signed rank tests were carried out for each individual 
HISD item and showed that survivors saw themselves as significantly less positively 
post stroke on most dimensions (p < .05). For instance, they saw themselves as less 
interested, happy, in control, self confident, attractive, capable, independent, active 
and of less value (p = .000). However, survivors saw themselves as similarly calm, 
patient, and in terms of level of aggressiveness (see Table 3.4 above).  
This confirms the first hypothesis and it can therefore be concluded that stroke 
survivors in this sample saw themselves significantly in more negative terms than 
before the stroke. 
3.4.2 Correlational Analyses  
Correlational analyses using Pearson’s Product-moment correlation were conducted 
to test hypothesised associations between self-discrepancies and affective distress, 
self-esteem and quality of life respectively, as well as associations between 
emotional distress and self-esteem and quality of life respectively (see H2 to H8, 
section 1.8.3). The results of the correlational analyses are shown in Tables 3.7 and 
3.8 below. All these correlations are given in terms of Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient (r), for which significance was tested at the one-tailed level.   
A Pearson correlation matrix between continuous variables, tested at the two-tailed 
significance level, is also presented in Table 3.5 below. It is acknowledged that 
multiple comparisons increase the chance of Type 1 error across the whole series of 
comparisons (i.e. rejecting the null hypothesis when this is true). This can be 
addressed using a Bonferroni correction which involves adjusting the significance 
level by dividing it by the number of analyses performed on the dependent variable 
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). However, in this case, the purpose of the matrix was not 
multiple hypotheses testing but rather to provide a context for the results and to 
identify other, non-predicted, potential explanatory variables for affective distress. 
The use of Bonferroni is not conventional when using correlation in this way (i.e. 
when not testing multiple hypotheses, but rather using correlations in an exploratory 
manner). Moreover, it is known to be conservative and could obscure potentially 
interesting or confounding relationships when used in an exploratory manner 
(Perneger, 1998; Rothman, 1990). 
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Table 3.5: Pearson correlation matrix of continuous variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Age 
- 
              
2. Years since Stroke 
.271* 
.029 
-              
3. Level of Functioning 
-.261* 
.036 
-.099 
.431 
-             
4. Self-Esteem 
.182 
.147 
.173 
.168 
.195 
.119 
-            
5. Quality of Life 
.154 
.219 
.033 
.795 
.454** 
.000 
.638** 
.000 
-           
6. Pre-Stroke 
.242 
.052 
.250* 
.044 
-.163 
.194 
.310* 
.012 
.180 
.151 
-          
7. Post-Stroke 
.229 
.066 
.211 
.091 
.439** 
.000 
.700** 
.000 
.676** 
.000 
.245* 
.049 
-         
8. Ideal 
-.091 
.471 
-.186 
.138 
.223 
.074 
.266* 
.032 
.337** 
.006 
.114 
.364 
.372** 
.002 
-        
9. Ought 
-.038 
.763 
-.056 
.660 
.095 
.452 
.145 
.249 
.230 
.066 
.186 
.137 
.157 
.211 
.602** 
.000 
-       
10. Anxiety 
-.145 
.248 
-.084 
.508 
-.176 
.162 
-.663** 
.000 
-.635** 
.000 
-.313* 
.011 
-.598** 
.000 
-.223 
.075 
-.075 
.551 
-      
11. Depression 
-.365** 
.003 
-.112 
.373 
-.335** 
.006 
-.649** 
.000 
-.678** 
.000 
-.187 
.135 
-.742** 
.000 
-.270* 
.030 
-.079 
.551 
.565** 
.000 
     
12. Overall Mood 
-.272* 
.028 
-.108 
.390 
-.276* 
.026 
-.741** 
.000 
-.738** 
.000 
-.292* 
.018 
-.745** 
.000 
-.274* 
.027 
-.087 
.492 
.914** 
.000 
.851** 
.000 
    
13. Pre-Post Discrepancy 
-.071 
.576 
-.049 
.700 
-.519** 
.000 
-.479** 
.000 
-.536** 
.000 
.378** 
.002 
-.805** 
.000 
-.285* 
.021 
-.036 
.775 
.379** 
.002 
.594** 
.000 
.533** 
.000 
-   
14. Post-Ideal Discrepancy 
-.278* 
.025 
-.291* 
.019 
-.396** 
.001 
-.662** 
.000 
-.612** 
.000 
-.225 
.072 
-.948** 
.000 
-.058 
.646 
.036 
.774 
.567** 
.000 
.705** 
.000 
.707** 
.000 
.768** 
.000 
-  
15. Post-Ought Discrepancy 
-.241 
.053 
-.230 
.066 
-.398** 
.001 
-.637** 
.000 
-.582 
.000 
-.172 
.170 
-.929** 
.000 
-.141 
.262 
.220 
.078 
.562** 
.000 
.703** 
.000 
.703** 
.000 
.782** 
.000 
.951** 
.000 
- 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
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H2: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self and their 
pre-stroke self will be positively associated with affective distress (anxiety and 
depression). 
The discrepancy scores between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self 
and their pre-stroke self were found to be positively correlated with anxiety (r = .38, p 
< 0.01), depression ( r = .59, p = .000) and overall mood (r = .53, p = .000; see Table 
3.7).  
The correlation matrix between variables (see Table 3.5 above) was investigated for 
significant associations with demographic variables that could have an impact upon 
the relationship between discrepancy and psychological adjustment, by causing 
covariation and therefore producing a correlation between them. The matrix showed 
no significant correlations between time since stroke and affective distress. However, 
there were significant correlations between age and depression and overall mood, 
respectively. Although not a demographic variable per se, it was considered that 
level of functioning, which was an indication of survivors level of physical 
independence, could also potentially interfere with adjustment; the matrix showed 
significant relationships between level of functioning and depression and overall 
mood, respectively. Crucially, both age and level of functioning also correlated with 
aspects of pre-post discrepancy.  
Table 3.6: Measures of association between affective distress and gender and 
premorbid anxiety/depression 
 
Association Eta Standard 
error 
z 
Anxiety * Gender .174 .125 1.39 
Depression * Gender .100 .125 0.80 
Overall mood * Gender .160 .125 1.28 
Anxiety * Premorbid anx/dep .103 .125 0.82 
Depression * Premorbid anx/dep .130 .125 1.04 
Overall mood * Premorbid anx/dep .130 .125 1.04 
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Furthermore, the associations between current affective distress and gender and 
premorbid anxiety/depression respectively, were investigated by inspecting Eta 
values; this showed no significant associations between either gender or premorbid 
anxiety/depression and affective distress scores (see Table 3.6 above).  
Therefore, additional correlational analyses were carried out, namely partial 
correlations, between self-discrepancy and affective distress whilst controlling for 
age and level of functioning. This still showed significant relationships between pre-
post discrepancy and anxiety (rp= .31, p = .014), depression (rp = .47, p = .000) and 
overall mood (rp = .42, p = .001).  
Although self-esteem and quality of life were also significantly associated with 
affective distress and discrepancy, this was not investigated through partial 
correlation. These variables were not pre-existing and relatively stable 
characteristics that could have exerted an historical influence on outcomes. On the 
contrary, they were outcome variables in their own right that could just as plausibly 
be the result of affective distress and self-discrepancy as their cause, and as such 
partialling them out could have obscured an otherwise important functional 
relationship.  
Consequently, these results confirm our hypothesis. They also support the findings 
of Cantor et al. (2005), Wright and Telford (1996), and Carroll and Coetzer (2011). 
H3: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self (actual 
current self or self-concept) and their ideal self will be positively associated with 
depression. 
The discrepancy scores between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self 
and their ideal self were found to be positively correlated with depression (r = .71, p 
= .000), which confirms our hypothesis and supports Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy 
theory. Positive correlations were also found between the post-stroke and ideal 
selves discrepancy and anxiety (r = .57, p = .000), and mood overall (r = .71, p = 
.000; see Table 3.7 below). Higgins (1987) theory does predict that discrepancies 
will be related to both depression and anxiety, but that these relationships are 
strongest between actual/ideal discrepancies and depression and between 
actual/ought discrepancies and anxiety (Higgins et al., 1985). Indeed, the correlation 
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between the post-stroke self / ideal self discrepancy and depression was stronger 
than the correlation between the same self-discrepancy and anxiety (z = 1.66, p = 
.049). 
H4: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self (actual 
current self or self-concept) and their ought self will be positively associated with 
anxiety. 
The discrepancy scores between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self 
and their ought self were found to be positively correlated with anxiety (r = .56, p = 
0.000), which confirms our hypothesis and supports Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy 
theory. Positive correlations were also found between the post-stroke and ought 
selves discrepancy scores and depression (r = .70, p = .000), and mood overall (r = 
.70, p = .000; see Table 3.7 below). However, the correlation between the post-
stroke self / ought self discrepancy and anxiety was weaker than the correlation 
between the same self-discrepancy and depression (z = -1.68, p = .046), which 
would be inconsistent with the theory. 
H5: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self and their 
pre-stroke self will be negatively associated with their perceived self-esteem. 
H6: Discrepancies between stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self and their 
pre-stroke self will be negatively associated with their perceived quality of life.  
Negative correlations were found between the discrepancy scores of pre-post stroke 
selves and survivors’ self-esteem scores (r = -.48, p = .000), as well as their quality 
of life (r = -.54, p = .000; see Table 3.7 below). These findings therefore confirm 
hypotheses H5 and H6. 
H7: Stroke survivors’ perceived self-esteem will be negatively associated with their 
ratings of depression and anxiety. 
Self-esteem scores were found to be negatively correlated with anxiety (r = -.66, p = 
0.000), depression (r = -.65, p = .000) and overall mood (r = -.74, p = .000; see Table 
3.8 below). This confirms our hypothesis. 
Table 3.7 Correlations between self-discrepancies and affective distress,  
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       self-esteem and quality of life 
 
 
Anxiety Depression Overall 
Mood 
Self-
Esteem 
Quality of 
Life 
Pre - Post 
Discrepancy 
r .38* .59** .53** -.48** -.54** 
Sig 
(1 tailed) 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 65 65 65 65 65 
 
Post – Ideal 
Discrepancy 
r .57** .71** .71** 
Sig 
(1 tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 
N 65 65 65 
 
Post – Ought 
Discrepancy 
r .56** .70** .70** 
Sig 
(1 tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 
N 65 65 65 
*p <0.01; ** p<0.001  
 
Table 3.8 Correlations between self-esteem and quality  
      of life respectively, and affective distress  
 Anxiety Depression Overall Mood 
Self-Esteem r -.66* -.65* -.74* 
Sig (1 tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 65 65 65 
 
Quality of Life r -.64* -.68* -.74* 
Sig (1 tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 65 65 65 
*p<0.001  
 
H8: Stroke survivors’ perceived quality of life will be negatively associated with their 
ratings of depression and anxiety. 
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Quality of life scores were also found to be negatively correlated with anxiety (r = -
.64, p = .000), depression (r = -.68, p = .000) and overall mood (r = -.74, p = .000; 
see Table 3.8 above). This confirms our hypothesis. 
3.4.3 Mediation Analyses  
Mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) was used to investigate if the effect of pre-post 
stroke self-discrepancy on affective distress was mediated by self-esteem. Self-
esteem was chosen as a possible mediator based on previous research findings of 
stroke being associated with emotional distress and a decrease in self-esteem, and 
self-esteem being associated with low mood after stroke; furthermore, findings from 
TBI showing positive associations between changes in self-concept and distress and 
negative associations between changes in self-concept and self-esteem (see 
chapter 1).  
Three mediation analyses were carried out. The non-parametric bootstrapping 
approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008) was used, which assesses the 
significance of the indirect (mediating) effect, and is recognised as the best available 
test of mediation. Bootstrapping involves k samples of the original size being taken 
from the obtained data (with replacement after each specific selected number) and 
mediation effects are then calculated in each sample (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). In 
the present analyses, parameter estimates are based on 10,000 bootstrap samples 
and a bias-corrected confidence interval is provided for the tested mediators; if lower 
and upper bounds do not pass through zero, the indirect effect is significant at the p 
<.05 level. This approach is preferred to the Sobel test of mediation (Hayes, 2013). 
H9: Stroke survivors’ perceived self-esteem acts as a mediator in the relationship 
between the discrepancy in stroke survivors’ ratings of their post-stroke self and their 
pre-stroke self and affective distress (anxiety and depression). 
3.4.3.1 Self-esteem as a mediator (M) between the pre-post self-discrepancy (IV) 
and overall mood (DV)  
The mediation analysis produced a significant model, adjusted R2 = .59; F(2,62) = 
44.6; p = .000. The total effect of self-discrepancy gave B = 0.17; SE(B) = 0.033; p = 
.000, and the direct effect, i.e. when controlling for self-esteem, B = 0.072; SE(B) = 
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0.029; p = .015. The indirect effect of self-discrepancy on overall mood through self-
esteem (10,000 bootstrap samples) was 0.094; Boot SE = 0.025; 95% confidence 
interval 0.051 – 0.150. This shows that in this sample of stroke survivors, self-
esteem was a mediator in the relationship between pre-post self-discrepancy and 
overall mood (as measured by the HADS). 
3.4.3.2 Self-esteem as a mediator (M) between the pre-post self-discrepancy (IV) 
and depression (DV)  
The mediation analysis produced a significant model, adjusted R2 = .52; F(2,62) = 
34.2; p = .0000. The total effect of self-discrepancy gave B = 0.090; SE(B) = 0.015; p 
= .000, and the direct effect, i.e. when controlling for self-esteem, B = 0.056; SE(B) = 
0.015; p = .0005. The indirect effect of self-discrepancy on depression through self-
esteem (10,000 bootstrap samples) was 0.035; Boot SE = 0.012; 95% confidence 
interval 0.015 – 0.064. This shows that in this sample of stroke survivors, self-
esteem was a mediator in the relationship between pre-post self-discrepancy and 
depression (as measured by HADS-D). 
3.4.3.3 Self-esteem as a mediator (M) between the pre-post self-discrepancy (IV) 
and anxiety (DV)  
The mediation analysis produced a significant model, adjusted R2 = .44; F(2,62) = 
24.8; p = .0000. The total effect of self-discrepancy gave B = 0.075; SE(B) = 0.023;  
p = .0018, and the direct effect, i.e. when controlling for self-esteem, B = 0.016; 
SE(B) = 0.021; p = 0.4615. The indirect effect of self-discrepancy on anxiety through 
self-esteem (10,000 bootstrap samples) was 0.059; Boot SE = 0.015; 95% 
confidence interval 0.033 – 0.093. This shows that in this sample of stroke survivors, 
self-esteem was a mediator in the relationship between pre-post self-discrepancy 
and anxiety (as measured by HADS-A). As discussed in Chapter Two (see pages 
92-94), it is not advisable to make claims of full mediation based on the non-
significance of the direct effect (Hayes, 2013; Kenny & Judd, 2014), as was the case 
of the direct effect of self-discrepancy on anxiety.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that, in this sample of stroke survivors, there was an 
observed indirect effect of pre-post stroke self-discrepancy on affective distress 
through their perceived self-esteem, confirming our last hypothesis. 
110 
 
 
3.5 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
62 stroke survivors (95.38%) answered the open question which required them to 
describe in a few words how they saw themselves after the stroke compared to 
before the stroke. The qualitative information generated by the open question was 
analysed using inductive thematic analysis (Patton, 1990). Key themes were 
identified by the researcher, which were then reviewed by the researcher’s. The key 
themes of how stroke survivors saw themselves before and following the stroke are 
presented below.  
3.5.1 Before Stroke 
One theme was identified for how survivors described themselves before the stroke: 
Engaged in life  
Stroke survivors described themselves before the stroke as being active, working, 
and being social (“very active and energetic”, “always on the move, cycling, walking, 
swimming”, “I had two jobs, very independent, kept a house”, “enjoyed socialising”, 
“out every night”). 
3.5.2 After Stroke 
Three meta-themes were identified for how survivors described themselves following 
the stroke: psychosocial impact (with three subthemes), efficacy (with two 
subthemes) and positive changes and benefits. 
3.5.2.1 Psychosocial Impact – subthemes: 
Identity disruption and reconstruction 
Survivors described the impact that the stroke had on themselves as a person (“Big 
knock to sense of identity, no longer the fixing person, from physically capable…”, 
“Not the person I was, not as physically fit”, “I do what I can do, not what I want to 
do”, “Before the stroke I felt as if I belonged now I don’t”) and their attempt to make 
sense of and adjust to the stroke (“big blow, I spend fair amount of time putting bits 
of life back together, adapting to it”, “big step, grief and anger to work through, I 
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needed to accept big changes”, “My role in life has changed dramatically, for better, 
for worse? Perhaps just different”). 
Relationships  
Survivors described themselves in terms of how their relationships with friends have 
been affected (“not as talkative because speech is affected which affects 
relationships”, “unable to do certain things with friends”, “unable or no energy / 
enthusiasm to get out and meet others”, “because you are not active your circle of 
friends lose interest and contact with you and you become withdrawn”); as well as 
their relationships with their family (“I rely on my daughter whereas before she relied 
on me”, “I can’t pick up my children, this really hurts me”, “unable to communicate 
with my young grand and great grandchildren”, “I don’t play with grandchildren as 
much as before”). 
Self-esteem 
Survivors described themselves as “greatly aware of my limitations”, “a lot less 
confident”, “incapable of taking on tasks or challenges therefore little self-esteem / 
satisfaction”, “feel absolutely worthless”, “contributing little to others, particularly my 
family”, “sometimes I wonder what use I can be to society”, “helpless, powerless, 
robbed of all the things that made me, not able to work full time, not able to provide 
for my son / family”, “lost my dignity”. 
3.5.2.2 Efficacy - subthemes: 
Loss of physical abilities, independence and meaningful activity 
Stroke survivors described themselves in terms of loss of physical abilities, which 
affects daily life (“physically less capable”, “can’t cook”, “having to plan so not a lot of 
walking”, “can’t go shopping”); loss of independence (“more dependent on others, 
I’m lost”, “initially extremely dependent which I disliked immensely”, “I was good with 
money and bills, now my friend sorts out the bills”); and loss of work or meaningful 
activity (“retired now”, “main concern I have not gone back to work”, “one of the worst 
things for me is the singing, used to be in a choir, but stroke has affected my voice, 
all my life I’ve been in a choir since 14 years old”, “I’d like to return to oil painting and 
sewing”, “I was writing a book which I have no interest in at the moment”). 
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Cognitive and mood changes 
Survivors also described themselves in terms of their cognitive difficulties (“A lot 
slower”, “forgetful”, “I can’t concentrate”, “I need to plan… list to remember”), as well 
as being emotionally different (“frustrated a lot, shorter fuse, agitated more”, 
“Irritable, bad mood, dissatisfied, argumentative”, “I worry about every little thing, 
frightened of things, depression got worse”, “More emotional”, “I don’t get excited, 
not relaxing”). 
3.5.2.3 Positive changes and benefits (this theme permeates across the other 
themes) 
Survivors also described how the stroke changed them for the better, both in 
themselves (“not as shy, and more talkative”, “More confident, I speak my mind”, 
“Laugh more”, “Looking forward to things more, no expectations, relieved”, “Happier 
now”, “Became fairly relaxed, I used to worry about things but now I don’t let things 
bother me”, as well as in relationship with others (“not as selfish”, “Nicer person now 
than before”, “appreciating people more whereas before I took them for granted”, 
“relationship with my wife is closer, before I was not as emotionally honest”). 
3.5.3 Summary of Qualitative Analysis 
The stroke seemed to have been experienced as a major life event that impacted on 
survivors’ sense of who they are as a person, both negatively and positively. The 
stroke survivors in this sample generally described themselves in more negative 
terms following the stroke, in terms of a number of losses (loss of physical ability, 
independence, work), negative mood and cognitive difficulties, a decrease in self-
esteem, as well as a negative shift in their social relationships. It is of note that 
survivors had much more to say about their post-stroke selves than the pre-stroke 
selves. At the same time, some positive outcomes were also identified, where the 
experience of surviving a stroke seemed to have contributed to becoming a better 
person, with a positive effect on survivors’ relationships. 
3.6 RESULTS SUMMARY 
Stroke survivors in the sample used in this study saw themselves in significantly 
more negative terms than before the stroke on most aspects examined, but as 
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similarly calm, patient, and in terms of their level of aggressiveness. For instance, 
they saw themselves as more dependent, less capable, self-confident and in control, 
and less attractive as a person. The qualitative analysis supported the findings of the 
statistical analysis; additionally, it identified some positive descriptions as well. 
Overall, it can be concluded that self-concept was affected negatively after stroke, 
despite some benefits. 
The discrepancy between how survivors saw themselves before and after the stroke 
was positively correlated with affective distress, and negatively correlated with their 
perceived self-esteem and quality of life, respectively. The discrepancies between 
survivors’ perceived post-stroke self (their current actual self) and how they would 
like to be (their ideal self) on one hand, and how they think they should be (their 
ought self), on the other hand, were also positively correlated with affective distress. 
However, the relationships between different discrepancies and affective distress 
were undifferentiated. Discrepancies between post-stroke (current actual) self and 
ideal self were not only related to depression but also to anxiety, with the latter 
association being weaker; and discrepancies between post-stroke (current actual) 
self and ought self were not only related to anxiety but also to depression, with the 
latter association being stronger. 
Survivors’ perceived self-esteem was a mediator in the relationship between the 
discrepancy in how survivors saw themselves before compared to after the stroke 
and their affective distress. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that all stated hypotheses were confirmed.
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In this chapter, after situating the current study in the context of existing literature, 
the main findings will be summarised and then each of the hypotheses will be 
considered in light of the findings; the strengths and weaknesses of the study will 
then be described, followed by a reflection on the theoretical and clinical implications 
of the results; finally, areas of future research will be outlined.  
 
4.2 OVERVIEW 
Stroke is a life changing event, involving a sudden transition from being able-bodied 
to disabled, leaving survivors with a range of physical, psychological and social 
impairments, which impact negatively on the survivors’ quality of life (e.g. Carlsson et 
al., 2003; Edwards et al., 2006).  
Anxiety and depression are common emotional consequences after stroke (e.g. 
Ayerbe et al., 2013; Cambell-Burton et al., 2013; Hackett et al., 2005) and can 
interfere with adjustment and rehabilitation (e.g. Mukherjee et al., 2006; Pohjasvaara 
et al., 2001). The etiology of emotional problems post-stroke appears to be complex, 
partly explained by the neurological changes (e.g. Gainotti et al., 2001; Lezak et al., 
2004; Robinson et al., 1983), and also, by issues related to psychological adjustment 
to a major life event that involves coming to terms with multiple losses (e.g. 
Mukherjee et al., 2006).  
The concept of identity change or loss following brain injury is a growing area in the 
ABI literature, and a commonly reported experience after stroke. The evidence that 
brain injury poses a challenge to survivors’ identity is provided both by qualitative 
and quantitative studies, demonstrating significant changes in survivors’ sense of 
self by viewing themselves in more negative terms following, compared to before the 
injury (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011; Cantor et al., 2005;  Gracey et al., 2008; Tyerman & 
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Humphrey, 1984; Wright & Telford, 1996). However, only few studies have shown 
this in a population of stroke survivors (e.g. Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Keppel & Crowe, 
2010). 
Furthermore, changes in self-concept have been shown to be associated with 
emotional problems by studies with TBI survivors (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011; Cantor et 
al., 2005; Wright & Telford, 1996). This association has been explained by Cantor et 
al. (2005) using Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory. 
The current study extended Cantor et al.’s (2005) study, by examining the 
discrepancy between the post-injury self and the pre-injury self in a large sample of 
stroke survivors, and exploring the relationship between this discrepancy and a 
person’s adjustment and mood.  
 
4.3 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
The main findings of this study suggested that there was a significant discrepancy 
between the post-injury self and the pre-injury self of stroke survivors, by seeing 
themselves in more negative terms following the stroke than before the stroke.   
The discrepancy between how the stroke survivors saw themselves before and after 
the stroke was positively associated with affective distress, and negatively 
associated with their perceived self-esteem and quality of life, respectively. The 
discrepancies between survivors’ perceived post-stroke self and their ideal self and 
ought self, respectively, were also positively correlated with affective distress. 
Survivors’ perceived self-esteem was a mediator in the relationship between the 
discrepancy in how survivors saw themselves before compared to after the stroke 
and their affective distress. 
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4.4 DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES 
4.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Pre-Post Stroke Self-Discrepancy 
Survivors’ perception of their post-stroke self was significantly different, and more 
negative, than their perceived pre-stroke self. Furthermore, it was found that 
survivors saw themselves as significantly less positively post-stroke on all 
dimensions of the HISD apart from aggressiveness, calmness and patience (see 
Table 3.4 in Chapter 3). However, these results were generated by exploratory 
multiple Wilcoxon signed rank tests. 
These results confirmed hypothesis one showing that self-concept underwent 
profound changes following stroke, which is indicative of perceived alterations in 
identity; survivors viewed themselves as substantially different on a wide range of 
constructs, which provides support for ideas of biographical disruption as a result of 
chronic illness (Bury, 1982; Williams, 2000).  
The qualitative data generated by the open question largely supported this, showing 
that the stroke impacted on survivors’ sense of who they are as a person, with 
survivors generally describing themselves in more negative terms following the 
stroke, in terms of a number of losses. However, some positive outcomes were also 
identified, where the experience of surviving a stroke seemed to have contributed to 
becoming a better person, with a positive effect on relationships. This is consistent 
with research on post-traumatic growth, showing that following a traumatic event, 
including stroke (Collicutt McGrath & Linley, 2006), people may also report positive 
psychological changes, some of which are related to the perception of self and 
improved relationships (Linley & Joseph, 2006). Finally, interestingly survivors had 
much more to say about their post-stroke selves rather than the pre-stroke selves, 
which might suggest that survivors were more reflective following the stroke, or it 
may be due to difficulties with memory.  
The current study supports previous work on identity in brain injury (Carroll & 
Coetzer, 2011; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984; Wright & Telford, 1996), including the 
findings of Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) in a sample of stroke survivors; in the latter 
study, stroke survivors saw themselves as more aggressive after the stroke, but 
more caring and just as calm, friendly and hopeful. However, the sample employed 
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in their study was smaller and the low power may have resulted in some changes 
being undetected. At the same time, in Wright and Telford’s (1996) study it was 
shown that the control group rated past self significantly lower than TBI survivors, 
with no significant differences between the two groups in terms of ratings of their 
present self. This might suggest that survivors of brain injury tend to idealise their 
pre-injury selves, thus increasing discrepancies between pre and post-injury selves. 
Nevertheless, the results of the current study add to the body of evidence of changes 
in self-concept after stroke, and also add to the wider evidence of such changes after 
ABI, showing that people view themselves more negatively after brain injury. This 
evidence is ever growing, with two more studies published after this thesis had been 
completed (see systematic review, section 1.7); a large qualitative study showed that 
the central concept derived from the experience of TBI survivors was that of desiring 
to be or having lost a sense of being an integrated and valued person (Levack et al., 
2014), and another qualitative study showed that even five years on, stroke survivors 
continued to deal with changes to their self-identity (Pallesen, 2014).  Therefore, it 
can be argued that the wider evidence supports the view that individuals experience 
change or loss of identity after ABI regardless of the type of injury, time since injury 
or severity.  
4.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Pre-Post Stroke Self-Discrepancy and Affective Distress 
The discrepancies between stroke survivors’ perceived post-stroke and pre-stroke 
selves were significantly positively associated with affective distress (anxiety, 
depression and overall mood). 
The results confirmed hypothesis two, and they also provide support for the findings 
from studies with TBI survivors. Previously, Cantor et al. (2005), Wright and Telford 
(1996) and Carroll and Coetzer (2011) showed that changes in identity following 
brain injury were related to psychological adjustment. However, these studies 
employed small samples; the former study used two measures for assessing self-
concept, different from the one used in the current study, only one of which showed 
a significant relationship between self-discrepancy and emotional distress; the 
second study used a global measure for psychological distress; and the latter study 
only reported a relationship between self-discrepancy and depression.  
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Although Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) found increased anxiety and depression in their 
sample of stroke survivors compared to the control group, no relationship was 
reported between the experienced emotional distress and self-discrepancies.  
In terms of the level of distress reported, most of the stroke survivors in this study 
met cut-off point for anxiety, whether 4/5 (Sagen et al., 2009) or 5/6 (Johnson et al., 
1995); and for depression, if cut-off considered at 4/5 (Sagen et al., 2009), whereas 
the 7/8 cut-off (Aben et al., 2002) was met by more than half of survivors.  
Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) expressed the reported level of distress in their clinical 
sample based on medians, which were 5.5 for anxiety and 5 for depression, whereas 
in the current study the medians were 7 for both anxiety and depression. However, 
the current study employed a larger sample and the mean time since the stroke was 
5.57 years, whereas the participants in Ellis-Hill and Horn’s (2000) study were much 
sooner after their stroke (mean 13.6 months), and thus they may be in different 
stages of adjustment (Kerr, 1977). The level of depression within the present sample 
was similar to that reported by Carroll and Coetzer (2011) among individuals with 
mostly severe TBI (t(45) = 0.75, p = .77) and by Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) among 
individuals with severe ABI (t(30) = 0.034, p = .51); the level of anxiety was similar to 
that reported by Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) (t(35) = 0.367, p = .64). 
It can be concluded that this is the first study to show a relationship between pre-
post-injury self-discrepancy and affective distress in stroke survivors. However, the 
direction or causality of this relationship cannot be inferred from this methodology; 
the discrepancy in how survivors view themselves now compared to before the 
stroke may lead to increased symptoms of anxiety and depression; or it may be that 
the participants who were more depressed or anxious rated their current self in more 
negative terms, hence inflating discrepancy scores. However, depression would also 
affect their recall of self-referent information, meaning they would also rate their pre-
stroke self more negatively (Clark & Beck, 1999). The findings of Tyerman and 
Humphrey (1984) of no difference between TBI survivors’ ratings of past and future 
selves would also contradict the hypothesis that the ratings were influenced by 
depression, as significant positive change was anticipated by survivors, suggesting 
that they possibly expected to return to their pre-morbid self sometime in the future. 
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It is also possible that survivors idealised their pre-morbid self, which would also 
inflate discrepancy scores; Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) showed that TBI 
survivors rated their pre-injury self more positively overall than a typical person of 
same age and sex, which was later supported by Wright and Telford (1996) who 
showed that the comparison group rated past self significantly lower than the TBI 
group, yet the ratings of the two groups were not significantly different for present or 
future self.   
At the same time, it is more likely that self-discrepancy and affective distress are 
bound in a reciprocal and cyclical relationship. Nonetheless, this finding contributes 
to our understanding of the psychological factors underpinning the emotional 
difficulties commonly reported after ABI, including stroke.  
4.4.3 Hypotheses 3 and 4: Post-Stroke Self / Ideal Self and Post-Stroke Self / Ought      
Self Discrepancies and Affective Distress 
As predicted, the discrepancy between survivors’ post-stroke self (current actual self) 
and their ideal self was positively associated with depression, yet also with anxiety 
and mood overall. Similarly, the discrepancy between survivors’ post-stroke self and 
their ought self was positively associated with anxiety as predicted, yet also with 
depression and mood overall.  
These findings still confirm both hypotheses, and they are similar to Cantor et al.’s 
(2005) who also found discrepancies between post-TBI and ideal and ought self, 
respectively, to be related to both depression and anxiety. This adds to previous 
research that also failed to support the distinctiveness of actual/ideal and 
actual/ought self-discrepancies relating to particular types of emotional distress (e.g. 
Phillips & Silvia, 2010; Tangney et al., 1998). 
Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy theory does predict that discrepancies will be related 
to both depression and anxiety, but that these relationships are strongest between 
actual/ideal discrepancies and depression and between actual/ought discrepancies 
and anxiety (Higgins et al., 1985). Indeed, the correlation between the post-stroke 
self (actual self) / ideal self discrepancy and depression was stronger than the 
correlation between the same self-discrepancy and anxiety (see section 3.4.2). 
However, the correlation between the post-stroke self (actual self) / ought self 
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discrepancy and anxiety was weaker than the correlation between the same self-
discrepancy and depression (see section 3.4.2). The lack of differentiation between 
types of discrepancy and types of distress may also be due to the significant 
relationship between the depression and anxiety scores (r = .57, p = .000).  
In conclusion, the findings of the current study are not inconsistent with Higgins’ 
(1987) self-discrepancy theory, and thus they add to the limited evidence for the 
theory in clinical populations, showing a relationship between self-discrepancies and 
emotional distress in a stroke population. 
4.4.4 Hypothesis 5: Pre-Post Stroke Self-Discrepancies and Self-Esteem  
The discrepancies between survivors’ perceptions of their post-stroke self and their 
pre-stroke self were negatively associated with their perceived self-esteem. The 
finding confirmed the hypothesis and supports the results of Carroll and Coetzer 
(2011) who also found negative associations between changes in self-concept and 
self-esteem, but in a sample of TBI survivors. 
While self-concept refers to how one views and experiences themselves (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and self-esteem is the emotional valence resulting from the evaluation 
of the self (Rosenberg, 1965), these concepts are considered to be closely related in 
both general and ABI populations (Kravetz et al., 1995; Man et al., 2003; Vickery et 
al., 2005). Furthermore, self-esteem was shown to be relatively stable during 
adulthood except at times of acute crisis (Trezesniewski et al., 2003).  
Survivors’ more negative view of their post-stroke self, e.g. in terms of being more 
helpless and dependent and less happy and satisfied, is not surprising given the 
multiple challenges they are faced with and the uncertain future, and thus may be 
seen as presenting a threat to self and self-esteem. Reduced self-esteem following 
ABI was proposed by Ford (1976) as part of the secondary personality changes, 
which also included loss of self-assurance and confusion, thought to result from 
repeated failure and frustration, and eventually leading to the disintegration of 
personality. 
If scores below 25 are considered to be indicative of clinically significant low self-
esteem, as proposed by Anson and Ponsford (2006) then 27 (42%) participants in 
the present study reported levels of self-esteem that would be classed as clinically 
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significant low self-esteem. This could also be consequential to the psychosocial 
consequences of disability, including the social stigma and inequality associated with 
physical disability (Earle, 2003), as well as possible financial struggle, limiting access 
to self-esteem enhancing opportunities.  A comparison of means showed that the 
reported level of self-esteem in the current sample was lower (t(56) = 3.44, p = .001) 
than that reported by the sample of stroke survivors in Keppel and Crowe’s (2010) 
study; and higher, yet not significantly, (t(27) = 1.84, p = .96) than that reported by a 
sample of ABI survivors, only one of which was a stroke survivor, most of them being 
TBI survivors (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008). 
However, it is possible that survivors may retain some degree of self-esteem, as 
Tyerman and Humphrey (1984) showed that people with severe brain injuries viewed 
themselves somewhat more positively than a Typical Head Injured Person and not 
dissimilar from a Typical Person. 
4.4.5 Hypothesis 6: Pre-Post Stroke Self Discrepancies and Quality of Life 
The discrepancies between survivors’ perceptions of their post-stroke self and their 
pre-stroke self were negatively associated with their perceived quality of life, 
confirming the hypothesis.  
Ratings of self-concept have been previously found to be correlated with perceived 
quality of life in a small sample of ABI survivors, showing that poorer view of self was 
associated with lower subjective quality of life (Vickery et al., 2005). However, the 
current study is the first to show an association between the discrepancy in how 
survivors viewed themselves post compared to pre-injury and their perceived quality 
of life, in a large sample of stroke survivors. 
The experience of difficulties and failures in everyday situations, which did not 
previously pose any problems, may highlight for survivors the differences between 
the person they used to be, i.e. able to cope, and the person they are now, i.e. 
unable to cope. Consequently, social and task orientated situations are perceived as 
a threat to self and thus they give rise to anxiety, making brain injury survivors likely 
to withdraw or avoid the situation to reduce the anxiety and return to a less 
threatened self (Riley et al., 2004). This may lead to giving up on previously valued 
and meaningful activities, which would then impact on their quality of life. Stroke 
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survivors who reported a high quality of life, despite functional disabilities, were 
shown to focus on activities most salient their identity, even if in a modified form, 
thus maintaining a sense of continuity in their life (Clarke & Black, 2005). At the 
same time, if their quality of life is restricted due to physical impairments, being 
unable to engage with life as they did premorbidly, this might make them more 
reflective on the differences in their abilities, and thus perceive higher discrepancies 
between their current and premorbid selves. 
4.4.6 Hypothesis 7: Self-Esteem and Affective Distress 
Stroke survivors’ perceived self-esteem was negatively associated with their 
reported affective distress, confirming the hypothesis. It is likely that as survivors’ 
self-esteem suffers due to seeing themselves in more negative terms, such as being 
less capable, less in control, more dependent on others, and less attractive as a 
person, they are then less inclined to attempt to engage with the world around them, 
which is perceived as threatening, giving rise to anxiety. Individuals with brain injury 
were shown to make subjective threat appraisals in social situations such as being 
seen as stupid, not fitting in or when doing things (e.g. “when things go wrong it 
reminds me of my injury”) (Riley et al., 2004). Consequently, they may try avoiding 
such situations to avoid failure, criticism or judgement. However, this then offers less 
opportunity for gaining a sense of achievement or pleasure, which might contribute 
to depressive feelings, and maintain anxiety through avoidance; and therefore further 
affecting how they see and feel about themselves. 
This study contributes to the body of evidence of associations between low self-
esteem and increased psychological distress following stroke. This comes mostly 
from a series of American studies with large samples of stroke survivors in acute and 
rehabilitation settings, by Vickery and colleagues (e.g. Vickery, 2006; Vickery, 
Sepehri, Evans et al., 2008; Vickery et al., 2009) who showed that both the level and 
the stability of self-esteem were associated with post-stroke depression. Thus the 
results of the current study extend this evidence by showing an association of lower 
self-esteem ratings with higher levels of general emotional distress in a stroke 
population in the community, in the UK. They also add to the wider evidence of such 
associations following ABI (e.g. Curran et al., 2000; Howes et al., 2005).   
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4.4.7 Hypothesis 8: Quality of Life and Affective Distress 
Stroke survivors’ perceived quality of life was negatively associated with their 
reported affective distress, confirming the hypothesis and suggesting that emotional 
problems following stroke are associated with lower quality of life. The results are 
consistent with previous research, e.g. Bays’ (2001b) findings of depression after 
stroke being associated with lower quality of life ratings, and similar findings in a 
mixed ABI sample (Vickery et al., 2005). 
Emotional problems and low perceived quality of life after stroke are well researched. 
A review of 39 studies of life after stroke (Bays, 2001a) concluded that quality of life 
after stroke declined markedly, and that it was consistently lower than that 
experienced by healthy adults. Although associations between subjective quality of 
life and emotional problems have been established, the direction of effect is not 
straightforward. 
Equally, all the associations established by the current study do not imply causal 
relationships between the variables involved. 
4.4.8 Hypothesis 9: Self-Esteem As A Mediator Between Self-Discrepancy and 
Affective Distress 
Self-esteem was found to be a mediator in the relationship between the 
discrepancies in how survivors perceived themselves pre and post-stroke and 
affective distress. The results, thus, confirmed the last hypothesis, adding to the 
evidence of self-esteem as a mediator of better psychosocial functioning. 
Self-esteem has been seen as acting as a buffer against negative effects when 
confronted with a stressful life situation, such as illness (Gammon & Mulholland, 
1996; Hobfall & Walfisch, 1984; Schroevers et al., 2003). It has been suggested that 
higher self-esteem can increase active coping by employing more adaptive coping 
strategies and enhancing health-promoting behaviours and beliefs, thus enabling 
adjustment to illness, and consequently improving psychosocial functioning and 
quality of life (Anson & Ponsford, 2006; Essex & Klein, 1989; Li & Moore, 1998; 
Conn et al., 1992). Indeed, self-esteem has been previously shown to have a 
mediating role in the relationship between emotional functioning and functional 
status in inpatient stroke survivors (Vickery, Sherer et al., 2008). 
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However, although mediation is more than a correlational relationship, it still does not 
show causation. In the case of the current study, mediation suggests that the 
discrepancy between pre and post-stroke selves influences self-esteem, and in turn, 
self-esteem has an effect on emotional distress, the mediation being the combination 
of these two relationships. Feeling less than the person that used to be before the 
stroke, not being able to engage with the world in quite the same way as prior to 
illness, would pose a threat to self-esteem. This may trigger behaviours aimed to 
protect or enhance self-esteem, which may then interfere with the process of self-
regulation (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003), that is, changing goal selection and affecting 
engagement in goal-relevant behaviours and the monitoring of progress towards 
those goals (Brown, 1998). Furthermore, low self-esteem makes it likely for 
individuals to generalise discrete failures to being representative of overall level of 
competence, which can then diminish motivation to attempt or engage with other 
tasks (Brown & Dutton, 1995). Also, task perseverance may be compromised, 
especially when they are perceived as challenging, and thus individuals may quit the 
task early (McFarlin et al., 1984; Sandelands et al., 1988), or avoid challenges 
altogether (Waschull & Kernis, 1996). Consequently, this would maintain or even 
increase the level of anxiety experienced by stroke survivors; it would also mean that 
there are limited opportunities for individuals to derive a sense of achievement or 
pleasure, which can then lead to developing depressive symptoms. 
Thus it can be argued that the results of the current study provide a possible 
explanation regarding the underlying mechanism of the relationship between the 
discrepancy in the stroke survivors’ sense of self, pre and post-stroke, and the 
experienced affective distress. 
 
4.5 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
This study presents with a number of theoretical and methodological strengths and 
limitations which will be the focus of this section. 
4.5.1 Strengths  
The current study represents one of the very few quantitative studies investigating 
changes in identity following ABI, benefiting from a systematic review of these 
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studies; and it is only the second study to examine a change in the sense of self in a 
sample of stroke survivors, which follows the study carried out by Ellis-Hill and Horn 
(2000). However, a much larger sample (N = 65) was employed in the current study 
than in the previous study, and indeed larger than the samples of all the other 
studies with ABI survivors in the review. Even though the sample size was just under 
what was indicated in the power analysis, it still conferred this study more statistical 
power than that of previous research. It was thus confirmed in this study that 
following stroke, survivors experience profound alterations in their sense of self, 
viewing themselves as having changed considerably, and for the worse, on a wide 
range of constructs. 
Drawing on Cantor et al.’s (2005) pilot study, the current study extended Higgins’ 
(1987) self-discrepancy theory to include pre-stroke and post-stroke selves, being 
the first to show that discrepancies between these two selves are related to 
emotional distress in a large sample of stroke survivors. At the same time, it is the 
first time that discrepancies between actual self and ideal and ought self respectively 
have been investigated in relation to people who suffered stroke. Thus, the study 
also contributes to the evidence base by providing empirical support for Higgins’ 
(1987) self-discrepancy theory in a different clinical population. 
In addition, this study goes further by providing a possible explanation regarding the 
underlying mechanism of the relationship between the perceived discrepancy in the 
stroke survivors’ sense of self, pre and post-stroke, and their experienced affective 
distress, by identifying self-esteem as a mediator of this relationship. 
Furthermore, self-concept was assessed using a well-established measure (HISD); 
Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000), who employed an earlier version of this measure (HISD II) 
in their study of identity change in stroke survivors, and also used a comparison 
group, showed that the ratings for past and present self-concepts did not differ in the 
non-clinical group, thus suggesting that the scale is sensitive to identity changes 
perceived by stroke survivors. Additionally, the quantitative data resulting from the 
use of the self-concept measure was complemented by also eliciting some 
qualitative information from stroke survivors by asking them to describe themselves 
in terms of how they perceive themselves as a person after compared to before the 
stroke, thus enriching the data generated by this study. 
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4.5.2 Limitations  
4.5.2.1 Design 
Retrospective correlational design was employed in this study. A retrospective 
design was essential due to the unpredictable nature of stroke, however, 
retrospective appraisals of pre-injury self can be subject to recall bias. Furthermore, 
the time since stroke varied within the sample of this study between one year post-
stroke and up to 15 years post-stroke. This questions the reliability of evaluating the 
pre-stroke self, due to memory problems, as the longer the post-stroke period, the 
more difficult it may be to think back at the pre-stroke self. However, in their study 
with mild TBI survivors, Wright and Telford (1996) found no significant differences in 
how survivors retrospectively rated their pre-injury self-concept three years after their 
injury, compared to how they rated it only six months after the injury. On the other 
hand, the longer the post-injury period, the further someone may be in their 
adjustment process, which could then distort retrospective appraisals of their pre-
injury self.  
Being a correlational study, the direction of the relationships established cannot be 
clarified and thus there are limitations in drawing conclusions of causality. For 
instance, self-discrepancy was found to be related to affective distress; this could 
mean that the perceived discrepancy between the pre-stroke and post-stroke selves 
may lead to increased symptoms of anxiety and depression; and it could also mean 
that experiencing emotional distress makes stroke survivors more prone to seeing 
themselves in more negative terms than before the stroke, thus enhancing self-
discrepancies. A mediation analysis was also carried out, which is more than a 
correlational relationship as it refers to the processes through which changes are 
hypothesised to occur (Preacher & Hayes, 2008); although the mediation analysis 
provided an explanation for the mechanism underlying the relationship between self-
discrepancies and affective distress, it still does not show causation.  
Additionally, only self-esteem was investigated as a potential mediator in this study. 
The decision of testing self-esteem as a mediator was based on previous research 
findings of stroke being associated with emotional distress and a decrease in self-
esteem, and self-esteem being associated with low mood after stroke; furthermore, 
findings from TBI showing positive associations between changes in self-concept 
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and distress and negative associations between changes in self-concept and self-
esteem (see Chapter 1).  
A longitudinal design would help monitor if and how individual stroke survivors’ 
perceptions of themselves change over time following stroke. Wright and Telford 
(1996) found no significant differences in the self-concept ratings between time 1 (six 
months after the injury) and time 2 (three years after the injury) in their sample of 
mild TBI survivors; this was later supported by Cooper-Evans et al.’s (2008) study 
which found that self-esteem ratings were consistent over time following injury. 
However, the number of participants in the Wright and Telford’s (1996) study had 
been dramatically reduced from time 1 to time 2, and Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) 
reassessed self-esteem only after a two-week period. Wright and Telford (1996) also 
showed that psychological distress was significantly decreased three years after the 
injury, although there was no change in symptomatology based on the concept of 
caseness. Consequently, following a sample of first-time stroke survivors over a 
period of time, by conducting a series of assessments at different points in time after 
the injury would enhance our understanding of the impact of stroke on self-concept 
and its relationship with affective distress. 
Finally, there was no comparison group in this study; by using a control group from 
the general population, matched in terms of demographic variables, including 
functioning level and quality of life, would show whether and to what extent self-
concept also changes in the nonclinical population. Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) 
showed the stability of self-concept in a non-clinical sample, but their sample was 
small and possibly biased. However, there is evidence that self-image is generally 
stable in the absence of severe illness. In a longitudinal study, Mortimer et al (1982, 
as cited in Demo, 1992) found that self-attitudes were stable from late adolescence 
into early adulthood despite several major life changes that occurred during this 
period. Also, self-esteem was shown to be relatively stable during adulthood, except 
at times of acute crisis (Trezesniewski et al., 2003). In view of this evidence of 
stability it seems highly likely that the discrepancies found in this study were 
attributable to the stroke. 
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4.5.2.2 Sample 
This study was with first-time stroke survivors. However, as the participants were 
recruited in the community, through charities, rather than from stroke services, so 
without access to medical records, this was established based on self-report and 
with the aid of group coordinators and carers. Although eligibility was deemed 
appropriate in the case of more than one stroke as long as subsequent strokes 
occurred within a month of each other, it is possible that some participants may have 
suffered more than one stroke with greater time lapse between them. This would 
make it difficult to ascertain the extent of the impact of each stroke on identity; those 
who experienced a previous stroke several months or years ago may report fewer 
changes in self-concept after a subsequent stroke. 
Similarly, while comorbidity was not assessed formally a few participants reported 
comorbid illnesses such as cardiac problems, cancer, diabetes, which are not 
surprising considering this population. However, the findings could have also been 
related to other comorbid disorders or those participants may have reported fewer 
changes in their sense of self following the stroke. Also over a quarter of the 
participants (27%) reported experiencing anxiety and depression before the stroke, 
thus premorbid mental health problems may also have influenced the findings. 
The age range in the sample was fairly wide, which might have different implications 
for self-concept (Erikson, 1959), as was the time since experiencing the stroke, 
which may mean that the participants were at various stages in their adjustment to 
disability, e.g. expectancy of recovery or mourning, or indeed adjustment (Kerr, 
1977); it may be that if individuals are better adjusted they may have integrated the 
changes and thus report less distress. The extended period of time since the stroke, 
in some case, may also mean that other life events may have contributed to changes 
in self-concept. However, there is evidence, as cited above, of stability of self-
concept despite major life changes (Mortimer et al.,1982 cited in Demo, 1992).  
Although the cognitive functioning of the participants was not formally assessed, it 
was apparent that they did not present with severe cognitive or communication 
difficulties and it may be argued that they were a more able group of stroke 
survivors, as shown also by their current level of functioning. This has implications 
for the extent to which the findings can be generalised to the wider stroke population. 
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However, if even those who have made a better recovery report such profound 
changes in identity following stroke, it could be argued that those with severe 
sequelae following stroke may experience even greater changes (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 
2000). For instance, Shadden and Agan (2004) and Shadden (2005) highlighted the 
importance of identity to stroke survivors with aphasia as identity can be influenced 
in interactions with others, which may be affected by aphasia, and thus resulting in a 
need to re-negotiate their identity. On the other hand, as lower self-esteem seems to 
be associated with higher level of awareness of impairment and more intact cognitive 
functioning (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008), it may be that those with severe cognitive 
impairments are less aware of their deficits, and thus may actually report fewer 
changes. 
Finally, this was a convenience sample of stroke survivors who attended stroke 
groups or who responded to the online advert, therefore these may be individuals 
who chose to take part because the research topic was relevant to them, in terms of 
experiencing themselves as somewhat different following the stroke; whereas those 
who did not perceive themselves as different after the stroke may have chosen not to 
respond. Most of the respondents attended stroke groups, which in itself might have 
affected their sense of self, either positively by conferring membership to a group 
(Haslam et al., 2008), with an equally positive effect on their mood as well, or 
negatively, by conferring membership to a group that may be perceived as socially 
disadvantaged. 
In conclusion, although the sample used in this study presents with a number of 
limitations that impact on its representativeness of stroke survivors in general, it 
could be argued that the variation in the sample may render it fairly representative of 
stroke survivors living in the community. On the other hand, considering this very 
variation, and the premorbid medical or psychological problems of some participants, 
some of the findings may not be due solely to stroke.  
4.5.2.3 Measures  
4.5.2.3.1 Self-reporting and brain injury 
Using self-report measures has added challenges with individuals with an acquired 
brain injury. On one hand, this is due to the presence of cognitive deficits, particularly 
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memory, as self-report could vary significantly on different administrations (Man et 
al., 2003). On the other, due to impaired self-awareness or “insight”, that is the ability 
to consciously process information about oneself while maintaining a relatively 
objective view as well as one’s own unique phenomenological experience 
(Prigatano, 1997), which is also commonly affected following ABI (Sherer et al., 
1998). This could then compromise the participants’ ability to provide data on 
changes in their sense of self, as well as reporting on their emotional adjustment, 
and thus resulting in unrealistic self-appraisals.  
For instance, lower levels of awareness were found to be associated with a more 
positive sense of self in a sample of adults with dementia (Naylor & Clare, 2008), 
while higher levels of awareness were found to be associated with poorer self-
esteem following ABI (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008). In terms of self-awareness and 
reported emotional distress, the findings are equivocal. Increased distress has been 
associated with higher levels of awareness (Cooper-Evans et al., 2008; McBrinn et 
al., 2008), and was also identified among individuals with poorer self-awareness 
(Hoofien et al., 2004); at the same time, improvements in awareness did not lead to 
increased emotional distress (Roberts et al., 2006). Moreover, shifts in mood could 
also lead to changes in levels of awareness (Fleminger et al., 2003).  
As a result, the reliability of using self-report measures among individuals with ABI 
has been questionable. On the other hand though, there is also supporting evidence 
that despite severe ABI, people are able to effectively use self-report measures in 
order to identify a wide range of problems (e.g. Giacino & Cicerone, 1998; Gordon et 
al., 2000; Green et al., 2001).  
From the studies investigating change in “self” following ABI included in the 
systematic review, only a couple took into consideration the potential role of self-
awareness underlying such ratings, by including awareness measures. Firstly, 
Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) used the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX), included in 
the BADS battery (Wilson et al., 1996) to determine awareness of executive 
difficulties and found that those with higher levels of self-esteem had less awareness 
of executive difficulties, consistent with previous research. Later, Carroll and Coetzer 
(2011) used the Awareness Questionnaire (Sherer et al., 1998) and also showed 
that lower levels of self-awareness were associated with higher levels of self-esteem, 
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while correlations between self-awareness and depression were weak, and those 
between awareness and perceived change in identity were non-significant.  
Alternatively, in order to ascertain the validity of self-reported self-esteem in their 
study with severe ABI survivors, Cooper-Evans et al. (2008) repeated the measure 
after two weeks and demonstrated the stability of subjective self-esteem despite 
variable levels of cognitive impairment, thus indicating that participants’ view of 
themselves was stable. Indeed, Tyerman & Humphrey (1984) argued that even 
though the accuracy of self-appraisals may be limited by cognitive impairment and 
poor self-awareness, it is the subjective experience that is distressing for people with 
brain injury, and it also influences their psychological adjustment as it provides an 
indication of what is required to help them understand better their reaction to their 
illness (Prigatano, 1997). Consequently, as pointed out by Cooper-Evans et al. 
(2008), the emphasis ought to be on the personal perspective and meaning of 
survivors of brain injury, rather than the reliability of self-report, in order to support 
their adjustment and rehabilitation.  
4.5.2.3.2 Measures of self-concept and affective distress 
Self-concept is considered to be generally stable in the absence of severe illness 
(Mortimer et al., 1982, as cited in Demo, 1992), which is also supported by evidence 
that self-esteem is  relatively stable during adulthood, except at times of acute crisis 
(Trezesniewski et al., 2003). In this study, self-concept was measured using the 
Head Injury Semantic Differential Scale – III (HISD-III; Tyerman & Humphrey, 1984), 
which was designed to measure changes in self-concept in people with TBI, and was 
also employed by previous studies (see Systematic Review). Furthermore, as in 
previous studies, pre-injury self has been measured retrospectively. Thus, when 
considering the results, it is important to consider the test-retest reliability of the 
HISD.  
However, the current study found significant correlations between pre-stroke and 
post-stroke HISD scores (see correlation matrix, Table 3.5) as well as significant 
mean differences between these; furthermore there were significant correlations 
between the pre-stroke and the post-stroke variables, respectively, and other 
variables. This would not occur if the test were highly unreliable. Scores for an 
unreliable test would be affected by random error and would not correlate before and 
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after stroke, and would not be consistently higher or lower before and after stroke; 
consequently, there would be no pre-post difference or correlation. This is because 
an unreliable test has random error in the scores by definition and thus would 
generate large random errors in estimating true scores (Rust & Golombok, 2009). 
The fact that there was a significant correlation between pre-stroke and post-stroke 
HISD ratings also supports using the HISD to assess pre-injury self retrospectively.  
Although in their study with mild TBI survivors, Wright and Telford (1996) found that 
three years after their injury survivors rated their pre-injury self very similarly to how 
they rated it six months after the injury, does not necessarily provide further support 
for the reliability of the HISD, as it was established as a non-significant mean 
difference (which could have resulted from undependable scores due to low test 
reliability) rather than a correlation between ratings. Similarly, in their study with 
stroke survivors and using a control group, Ellis-Hill and Horn (2000) showed the 
stability of self-concept, as measured by the HISD, in the non-clinical sample who 
also rated past self (retrospectively) and present self; but again, this was based on a 
non-significant mean difference rather than a correlation. Conversely, the data from 
the current study supports adequate HISD reliability, as explained above. 
Furthermore, Vickery et al. (2005) used the HISD to evaluate a self-concept group 
intervention for people with brain injury and showed significant overall improvement 
in self-concept, suggesting that HISD scores are reliable and can be used to detect 
systematic change in the context of rehabilitation. However, further psychometric 
analysis is needed regarding both temporal stability and sensitivity to change in the 
context of intervention (Ownsworth, 2014). 
Considering that the current study investigated self-discrepancy and affective 
distress following stroke, it could be argued that the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) may have been more appropriate tools for 
assessing affective distress, as previous research (e.g. Strauman, 1992) showed 
that these measures of affective symptoms are consistently correlated with self-
discrepancies. Indeed, these were the measures employed by Cantor et al. (2005) in 
their study of self-discrepancy and affective distress in TBI survivors. However, the 
BDI and the BAI contain somatic items that may be more attributable to the brain 
injury itself rather than reflect affective symptoms, and they also take longer to 
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complete. The HADS, on the other hand, while being a reliable and valid measure of 
anxiety and depression in the stroke population, also has the advantage of being 
brief and therefore quicker to complete. The HADS was thus deemed a more 
suitable measure to use, especially as it was important to maintain the overall 
administration time as brief as possible in order to reduce the demand on 
participants. Also, this was the measure of choice for affective distress in other 
studies in the systematic review, including Ellis-Hill and Horn’s (2000) study of 
identity change in stroke survivors. 
There were significant negative correlations between pre-stroke self ratings and 
anxiety (r = -.313, p < 0.05) and overall mood (r = -.292, p < 0.05), but not with 
depression; there were also significant negative correlations between post-stroke 
self ratings and anxiety (r = -.598, p < 0.01), depression (r = -.742, p < 0.01) and 
overall mood (r = -.745, p < 0.01). This could be a consequence of a functional 
relationship, or of an overlap between items within the self-concept measure (HISD) 
and the distress measure (HADS). Many constructs, by their very nature, require 
measurement by items that are superficially similar, but nevertheless tap distinct 
psychological processes. In the current study this question could be addressed using 
Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) approach, which 
compares how different measures of separate constructs perform in elucidating and 
differentiating the constructs. The procedure requires investigation of the convergent 
and discriminant validity evidence. However, a full implementation of this approach is 
beyond the scope of this study.  
Nevertheless, a supplementary analysis was carried out. Three items on the HISD 
were considered by researcher and the researcher’s supervisor as potentially 
overlapping with some HADS items (unhappy - happy with HADS item 6, worried-
relaxed with HADS items 5 and 7, and calm – irritable with HADS item 11). An 
analysis of the correlations with the three identified HISD items removed 
demonstrated that the correlations remained large and highly significant2, suggesting 
that item overlap is not the principal reason for the observed association. 
Additionally, the HISD and the HADS were considered appropriate measures to use 
                                                          
2
 Self-discrepancy and anxiety (r = .33, p < 0.01), self-dicrepancy and depression (r = .58, p < 0.01), self-
dicrepancy and overall mood (r = .50, p < 0.01). 
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by Carroll and Coetzer (2011) for investigating the relationship between self-
discrepancy and depression in TBI survivors.  
Finally, it could also be argued that given the administration order of the measures, 
the pre-stroke self ratings might have primed the ratings of psychological distress, 
which then might have primed the post-stroke self ratings. This could have been 
addressed by random administration of measures, although this would not be 
necessary when measures are carefully designed to tap into experientially distinct 
and accessible states that have particular phenomenological salience and identity for 
individuals.  
4.5.2.3.3 Other considerations 
Due to practical considerations, there was variation in the administration of the 
measures i.e. face-to-face, individually or part of a small group, and over the 
telephone, and participants might have responded differently in different 
circumstances; for instance, completing the measures over the telephone may 
confer more of a sense of anonymity. This may have introduced various data 
collection biases. Ideally, there should be consistency in administration across all 
participants. 
It could be argued that the administration of the HISD three times consecutively to 
assess different aspects of self, i.e. post-stroke, ideal and ought selves, may have 
led to interactions between these ratings due to confusion about what was being 
rated, fatigue or boredom. Furthermore, it is possible that the psychometric scales 
may have cued the answers to the open question about differences between pre and 
post-stroke, which was asked at the end of the data collection. Therefore, 
randomising the administration order of the scales might have helped with 
counterbalancing the order effects.  
Indeed, the ratings for ideal and ought selves were highly correlated (r = .60, p = 
0.01); although this might be to be expected, it is questionable to what extent 
participants were able to distinguish between the two concepts. To assess for this, 
there could have been an additional question to ascertain participants’ understanding 
of the concepts of ideal and ought self respectively and the differences between 
them. Cantor et al. (2005) argued that the TBI survivors in their study were able to 
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discern between the different selves; however, this appeared to be based on the fact 
that they were able to provide descriptors for each of the selves in the Selves 
Interview. Even though the differences were explained individually at the point of the 
administration of the HISD, and participants were prompted during the rating as to 
which type of self they were rating, it is still possible that the concepts may have got 
mixed up. For instance, this may have been more likely when the participants would 
complete the measures as part of a group. 
Finally, participants rated their pre-stroke self retrospectively, as was the case with 
all the studies in the systematic review, which is a major source of bias and therefore 
might compromise the accuracy of the data. However, as discussed earlier, 
survivors’ subjective experience would be more relevant in terms of understanding 
their distress. 
4.5.2.4 Generalisibility of findings 
As discussed in the introduction, brain injury, regardless of the cause, can have 
consequences for physical, cognitive, emotional and behavioural domains. This can 
then have implications for the survivor’s occupational performance, their sense of 
self-efficacy, and their relationships, and can result in role changes. While these may 
be common occurrences for brain injury survivors, with implications for their self-
concept and mood, the psychosocial context of people with different types of brain 
injury also needs consideration.  
For instance, stroke survivors tend to be older than TBI survivors, and stroke is 
associated with medical conditions such as hypertension (Lawes et al., 2001) and 
diabetes (The Emerging Risk factors Collaboration, 2010). This means that the 
likelihood of comorbidity with other physical disorders and chronic illnesses is 
increased in the stroke population, and so they may have had previous challenges to 
their self-concept (Charmaz, 2002). Also, the health of stroke survivors could have 
been deteriorating for some time before the occurrence of the stroke and although 
the stroke event itself, like TBI, is sudden, there may be some awareness or 
expectation of deterioration in functioning; this may allow for new narratives about 
the self to be slowly incorporated, which may not lead to a disruption of self 
(Charmaz, 2002).  
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Furthermore, expectations of aging may influence how stroke survivors interpret and 
cope with the deterioration, as they may see it as part of normal aging; thus, there 
may be less of an impact on their self-concept. Additionally, after a stroke, the risk of 
a further one is significant (Mohan et al., 2011), thus, the expectations of recovery 
after stroke versus TBI may be different, which may impact more negatively on the 
mood of stroke survivors.  
The likelihood of depression increases with age, partly due to increased likelihood of 
physical illness, which is associated with increased risk of depression; also, social 
isolation and loneliness, and persistent sleep problems were identified as risk factors 
for depression in older people (Graham et al., 2011). Furthermore, pre-existing 
depression may be amplified following stroke, and inadequate coping skills and 
diminished emotional reserve may further impact on adjustment.  
On the other hand, as TBI survivors tend to be younger men, the injury is likely to 
interfere with their education and career, and also with forming or maintaining long-
term relationships; therefore, it could be argued that the injury may interfere with the 
performance of important social roles and thus may have greater impact on their 
identity. In this sense, it could also be argued that younger stroke survivors may be 
more similar with TBI survivors in terms of psychosocial circumstances.  
Unlike in the case of stroke, where there may be unaddressed health risk factors, 
TBI may be an event over which the person had no control, with implications for their 
perceived locus of control. People with a more internal locus of control may adapt 
better to illness (Partridge & Johnston, 1989); indeed, the externality of locus of 
control predicted distress in non-aphasic stroke survivors (Thomas & Lincoln, 2006), 
and lower externality of locus of control was associated with significantly lower mood 
disturbance in TBI survivors (Moore & Stambrook, 1992). Furthermore, TBI survivors 
may also be involved in stressful insurance, medical and legal processes, with likely 
implications for their mood. 
In conclusion, all factors discussed above may have different implications for a 
survivor’s self-concept and mood. Consequently, generalising results from one 
population of brain injury survivors to another may require caution. 
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4.6 THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS 
4.6.1 Theoretical Implications  
Consistent with Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory, this study showed that in a 
sample of stroke survivors discrepancies between the actual self (i.e. post-stroke 
self) and their ideal self were significantly associated with depression, and 
discrepancies between their actual self and their ought self were significantly 
associated with anxiety. However, discrepancies between actual self (i.e. post-stroke 
self) and ideal self were also significantly associated with anxiety, and discrepancies 
between actual self and ought self were also significantly associated with 
depression. 
Although the theory predicts that both types of discrepancies can individually be 
related to both depression and anxiety, as it was found by the current study, the 
relationships between actual - ideal self- discrepancy and depression, and between 
actual - ought self-discrepancy and anxiety, respectively, should be strongest 
(Higgins et al., 1985). However, in the current study, this was the case for the 
correlation between the post-stroke - ideal self-discrepancy and depression, but not 
for the correlation between post-stroke - ought self-discrepancy and anxiety, thus 
providing only limited support for Higgins’ theory. 
While there may have been sufficient power, due to the size of the sample, to allow 
for differentiation of these relationships, it may be that the HADS, being a screening 
tool, was not an appropriate measure of distress for differentiating between anxiety 
and depression, which would then make it difficult to differentiate between the 
different discrepancy-distress relationships. 
The findings of the current study are consistent with other studies that failed to 
support the distinctiveness of actual - ideal and actual - ought self-discrepancies 
relating to particular types of emotional distress (e.g. Cantor et al.’s, 2005; Phillips & 
Silvia, 2010; Tangney et al., 1998). However, the findings are not inconsistent with 
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory; they provide some support for the theory, 
albeit not unequivocal. Nonetheless, the study adds to the limited evidence for the 
theory in clinical populations, showing a relationship between self-discrepancies and 
emotional distress in a stroke population.  
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Furthermore, by adapting the SDT to include pre-stroke versus post-stroke self 
discrepancies, the theory may provide a useful model for understanding affective 
distress following stroke that could then inform rehabilitation. This was based on 
Cantor et al.’s (2005) view that the pre-injury self may become idealised, which 
would lead to discrepancies with the present self, and thus to affective distress. 
However, Higgins’ theory explores discrepancies between self-states as they are 
perceived currently, and not retrospectively. Consequently, the theory may not hold 
for discrepancies involving retrospective self-state appraisals.  
Additionally, the post-injury self would also reflect the social construction of self in a 
new context that may be disability-averse, fostering negative attitudes toward people 
with disability; these may become internalised and survivors may identify with the 
disabled self, which could also explain the associated affective distress. Survivors 
reported having lost a sense of being an integrated and valued person (Levack et al., 
2014), which is relational, and it is in these social interactions that the post-injury 
changes become more evident (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). As discussed in the 
introduction, others’ (e.g. family, professionals) views and interactions with survivors 
also play an important role in how identity change after ABI is experienced and 
negotiated. For instance, medical discourse can influence how survivors understand 
themselves (Cloute et al., 2008), and carers can play a role in maintaining damaged 
identities (Guise et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the idea of the pre-injury self becoming idealised may not always be 
applicable, or indeed helpful, as it also means that it does not accommodate for the 
possibility of survivors experiencing post-traumatic growth. It has been shown that 
people may also report positive psychological changes after a traumatic event, 
including stroke (Collicutt McGrath & Linley, 2006), and some of these changes refer 
to the perception of self and improved relationships (Linley & Joseph, 2006). Indeed, 
some survivors in this study also identified some positive outcomes in terms of 
having become a better person, which had a positive effect on their relationships. 
This means that in some cases the post-injury self may actually be seen as more 
positive, and so possibly closer to an ideal self, than the pre-injury self. Indeed, 
clinically it would be useful to facilitate the experience of post-traumatic growth. 
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4.6.2 Clinical Implications 
Stroke rehabilitation still seems to centre heavily around restoring physical 
functioning (Guise et al., 2010; Keppel & Crowe, 2010), at the detriment of survivors’ 
interests and experiences, who may be more concerned about their changed roles 
and relationships than recovery of physical function (Kirkevold, 2002). Indeed, 
identity issues may come in the way of physical rehabilitation (Parry, 2004). 
Thus, while regaining physical function is important in order to increase 
independence and thus enable survivors to re-engage with their life and increase 
participation, restoring some quality of life, it is equally important to attend to the 
cognitive and emotional responses to the stroke (Bornstein & Brown, 1991). Williams 
and Evans (2003) also highlighted psychological adjustment to brain injury as central 
to the rehabilitative journey. Indeed, modern neuropsychological rehabilitation 
emphasises a biopsychosocial approach, thus aiming at improving the cognitive, 
emotional, psychosocial and behavioural sequelae of brain injury (Wilson, 2008), and 
has been conceptualised in different ways.  
Prigatano (2008) views neuropsychological rehabilitation as involving three levels, 
with the first two referring to recovery of function and reduction of disability by 
developing compensatory strategies to improve functional outcome. The findings of 
this study have implications at the third level of neuropsychological rehabilitation as 
conceptualised by Prigatano (2008) that is the survivors’ subjective experience of 
their brain damage, which is seen as central to effective rehabilitation.  
These results show the value of self-reported change in self-concept in 
understanding the experience of stroke survivors, and emphasise once again the 
importance of re-establishing a coherent identity. Consequently, a crucial part of the 
rehabilitation process involves supporting stroke survivors to create a continuous 
and positive sense of self.  
Perceived identity change can be taken into account throughout the clinical cycle, 
from the initial assessment, to inform clinical formulation and rehabilitative journey, 
and the provision of therapy. Thus, along with screening for anxiety and depression, 
clinicians can enquire whether survivors experience themselves as somewhat 
different to the person they were before the stroke; clinicians can also formally 
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assess changes in self-concept using the HISD measure, which was used in the 
current study. The identified discrepancies between pre-stroke and post-stroke self 
can form the basis of further conversation with the stroke survivor and their family to 
contextualise the changes, and enhance clinician’s understanding of their client’s 
subjective experience and of the meaning these changes hold for them; increased 
attention could be given to the traits that are most salient to the individual with the 
aim to reduce those particular discrepancies. All this information can then be 
integrated in the individual’s formulation and considered as a possible contributing 
factor to the aetiology of their psychological distress. Yeates et al.’s (2008) 
biopsychosocial framework for considering the neurobiological, psychological and 
psychosocial influences on perceived personality change following brain injury can 
be useful in helping clinicians understand these changes, and then facilitate the 
understanding of survivors and their families. 
Psychotherapy with brain injury survivors focuses on adjusting to changes in 
functioning, to which acceptance is seen as a critical psychological factor, and on 
developing a new self-concept (e.g. Bennett, 1989; Harrell & O’Hara, 1991; Kinney, 
2001; Fraas & Calvert, 2009). Reconciling identity loss and creating a sense of 
coherence and continuity may involve reconciling the pre-stroke with the post-stroke 
self; emphasising the similarities between the two (Stern, 1985) and focusing on 
preserved opportunities and abilities (Wright & Telford, 1996), thus bridging the gap 
between them, integrating aspects of their former identity within a new identity; or 
developing a new identity.  
Interventions that proved useful in reducing self-discrepancies between self-domains 
(e.g. actual self – ideal self), such as Strauman’s (2003) Self-System Therapy, 
Interpersonal Psychotherapy (Strauman et al., 2001) and Mindfulness Based 
Cognitive Therapy (Crane et al., 2008) may also help with reducing discrepancies 
between pre-injury and post-injury selves, if appropriately adapted to be used with 
this clinical population. Other possible interventions that could contribute to re-
constituting identity may include the following:  
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
Myles (2004) proposed Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), which is the 
clinical application of RFT, as a useful approach to re-establish a sense of self after 
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a brain injury. ACT involves working with clients to accept painful private experiences 
that interfere with following their key life values (Hayes et al., 1999). Metaphors and 
experiential exercises (Hayes & Wilson, 1994; Hayes et al., 1999), adapted to suit 
the cognitive needs of the client (Myles, 2004), can be used to facilitate knowing that 
there exists a sense of self that is stable over time, independent from the survivor’s 
ongoing flow of private experiences, however painful (i.e. the self as context). Myles 
(2004) argues that contact with self as context may facilitate acceptance by creating 
a safe place from which the survivor can know and accept the changes in functioning 
and self-concept.  
Narrative approaches 
Clinicians could work with survivors to normalise their experience, allowing time to 
grieve (Fraas & Calvert, 2009) and help them make sense of their new world and 
who they are, by helping them revise their self-narratives. This would involve 
identifying the different strands to their identity, and strengthening those valued 
constructions of self that are preserved (Hinojosa et al., 2008) in order to facilitate 
some continuity of the familiar pre-stroke self. It would also involve developing a 
positive current and future sense of self (Ellis-Hill et al., 2008) by constructing new, 
preferred self-narratives; at the same time, the survivor can be helped to develop a 
“grown self” (Nochi, 2000) narrative by identifying ways in which the injury 
contributed positively to who they are as a person. Developing self-narratives of 
coping would also help with improving their self-image (Nochi, 2000). Rebuilding a 
sense of identity based on new possibilities and capacities, rather than solely 
attempting to restore the pre-injury self (Hill, 1999) may further serve to enhance 
their self-esteem. This may enable survivors to move forward and accept new 
identities. 
However, the reconstruction of coherent self-narratives is facilitated through social 
interaction, through reorganising interpersonal relationships and environments to 
support the newly developing self-narratives (Nochi, 2000). As managing 
relationships with others can be challenging for people with ABI (Gracey & 
Onsworth, 2012) interventions may firstly involve helping them to rebuild their social 
relationships. Additionally, clinicians could work with the survivors’ families and 
carers to enable them to support survivors’ developing positive sense of self rather 
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than inadvertently maintain their ‘damaged’ identities by criticising and challenging 
their accounts (Guise et al., 2010). Furthermore, work would involve tackling the 
medical discourse, both within services and at a wider societal level, that can make 
brain injuries survivors see themselves as sick, passive and dependent (Cloute et 
al., 2008), to make room for alternative constructions. 
Increasing participation in meaningful occupations 
Meaningful engagement in relevant social and life activities seems to play a role in 
the construction of self after injury (e.g. Gracey et al., 2008; Gracey & Onsworth, 
2012; Haslam et al., 2008; Ylvisaker & Feeney, 2000; Ylvisaker et al., 2007). 
Therefore, in the safe therapeutic space, the survivor can be helped to develop an 
understanding of their strengths and difficulties, and then focus on meaningful 
occupations and develop the skills that facilitate goal achievement (Wilson et al., 
2009). Increasing their skills and developing compensatory strategies would help 
with reengagement in valued, goal-directed and identity congruent activities. This 
would facilitate reconstructing a more positive post-stroke identity that is closer to the 
pre-stroke self (Broomfield et al., 2010), but in a new context. Furthermore, those 
people who engaged in activities that were particularly salient to their identity also 
reported higher quality of life post-stroke (Clarke and Black, 2005). These ideas 
consistent with Gracey, Evans et al.’s (2009) Y-shaped model of rehabilitation, which 
is based on the approach advocated by Wilson et al. (2009). 
 
4.7 FUTURE RESEARCH  
The current study provided evidence that following stroke there is a dramatic 
negative change in the sense of self of survivors, and that the perceived discrepancy 
between pre and post selves is strongly related to reported psychological distress, 
with self-esteem as the mediator of this relationship. In light of the above discussion, 
there are several ideas regarding future research. 
Firstly, comorbidity with other physical illnesses, common in the stroke population, 
would need to be considered due to potential implications for both mood and self-
concept, as well as survivors’ premorbid anxiety and depression. Replicating this 
study with a larger sample would allow multivariate modelling in order to investigate 
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the relevance of different variables in understanding perceived identity change after 
stroke by grouping participants according to variables and comparing different 
groups. For instance, a lower sense of loss of self was experienced by TBI survivors 
who were in employment (Carroll & Coetzer, 2011). Also, lesion location was not 
included in the analysis in this study; stroke survivors with anterior lesions seemed to 
report a more positive view of self (Keppel & Crowe, 2010).Thus, the extent of the 
role that variables such as engagement in meaningful activities, relationship status, 
age, level of functioning, time since injury, location and size of lesion might play in 
pre-post stroke self-discrepancy would be worth investigating to help identify those 
who are at increased risk of experiencing self-discrepancies. These variables might 
be moderators of the relationship between self-discrepancies and affective distress.  
Only self-esteem was tested as a mediator of the relationship between self-
discrepancies and affective distress in this study. It would be interesting to explore 
which of the self-descriptor discrepancies correlated the strongest with self-esteem. 
Other possible mediating factors of this relationship could also be investigated, such 
as premorbid personality traits, different coping styles with the perceived change, 
and perceived locus of control. Those with a more internal locus of control may adapt 
better to illness having a better overall health outcome (Partridge & Johnston, 1989). 
Lower externality of locus of control and using coping strategies such as self-
controlling and positive reappraisal were associated with significantly lower mood 
disturbance in TBI survivors (Moore & Stambrook, 1992). The externality of locus of 
control was also found to be predictive of distress in non-aphasic stroke survivors, 
and locus of control was found to mediate the relationship between coping style and 
distress (Thomas & Lincoln, 2006). 
In their study investigating identity change in stroke survivors, Ellis-Hill and Horn 
(2000) also used a matched comparison group and found no significant changes in 
self-concept in the control group. However, this was a small sample. Another 
relevant area for further research would be to carry out a study with a large 
comparable group of people without stroke to assess the stability of perceived self-
concept in a non-clinical population. 
According to Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory, there are two standpoints on 
the self, one’s own personal standpoint, considered in this study, and one’s 
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significant other’s standpoint. It would be interesting to investigate discrepancies 
between the post-stroke self, that is how survivors perceive themselves, and their 
ideal and ought selves from the standpoint of a significant other; that is survivors’ 
beliefs about a significant other’s hopes, wishes, or aspirations on one hand (ideal 
self) and duties and responsibilities, on the other (ought self). And also investigate 
how these discrepancies might relate to experienced distress. This might help 
identify unhelpful expectations that survivors perceive others to have for them, as 
being unable to live up to perceived expectations may also contribute to their 
distress. Indeed, comparing stroke survivors’ perceptions with their significant other’s 
or carer’s perceptions of their post-stroke self might also be helpful. 
Other further studies might investigate changes in self-concept in stroke survivors 
with more severe cognitive impairments and awareness; or, compare relationships 
between self-discrepancies and affective distress in both stroke survivors with and 
without clinically significant anxiety and depression. Furthermore, a longitudinal 
study to monitor changes in self-concept over a period of time, during different 
stages of recovery would help identify crucial points of intervention.  
 
4.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The concept of identity loss or change following brain injury, including stroke, has 
been supported mostly by qualitative studies, and there is also emerging quantitative 
evidence demonstrating significant negative changes in survivors’ sense of self 
following injury (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011; Cantor et al., 2005;  Tyerman & Humphrey, 
1984; Wright & Telford, 1996). However, only two studies have shown this in a 
population of stroke survivors (Ellis-Hill & Horn, 2000; Keppel & Crowe, 2010).  
Furthermore, studies with TBI survivors showed that changes in self-concept were 
associated with emotional distress (Carrol & Coetzer, 2011; Cantor et al., 2005; 
Wright & Telford, 1996), which was explained using Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy 
theory by expanding it to include pre-injury self (Cantor et al., 2005). 
The current study is the first to investigate changes in self-concept in a large sample 
of stroke survivors, and to employ Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory in order to 
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explore the relationship between perceived changes and a person’s psychological 
adjustment.  
This study has shown a significant discrepancy between the post-stroke self and the 
pre-stroke self, with survivors viewing themselves in more negative terms following 
the stroke, which is supporting previous research. Furthermore, these changes in 
self-concept were positively associated with affective distress, and negatively 
associated with perceived self-esteem and quality of life, respectively. Discrepancies 
between survivors’ perceived post-stroke self and their ideal self and ought self, 
respectively, were also positively correlated with affective distress; this provides only 
partial support for the self-discrepancy theory, as the respective relationships were 
not differentiated. Additionally, survivors’ perceived self-esteem was a mediator in 
the relationship between the discrepancy in how survivors saw themselves before 
compared to after the stroke and their affective distress. 
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed earlier in this chapter, the findings of this 
study provide an understanding of the psychological factors underlying the common 
difficulties concerning emotional adjustment to stroke, and indeed individuals with 
acquired brain injury; this has significant implications in terms of rehabilitation, 
restating the importance of creating a continuous and positive sense of self after 
brain injury at the centre of the rehabilitative process, which highlighted the need for 
developing interventions to help with the re-establishing of a coherent identity. 
Additional research would need to clarify further the relationship between self-
discrepancies and affective distress and investigate changes in self-concept in 
survivors with different degrees of severity of impairments. 
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Appendix 1 CASP Qualitative Research Checklist 
 
 
 
10 questions to help you make sense of qualitative research 
 
How to use this appraisal tool 
 
Three broad issues need to be considered when appraising the report of a qualitative 
research: 
 
• Are the results of the review valid? 
• What are the results? 
• Will the results help locally? 
 
The 10 questions on the following pages are designed to help you think about these 
issues systematically. The first two questions are screening questions and can be 
answered quickly. If the answer to both is “yes”, it is worth proceeding with the 
remaining questions. 
 
There is some degree of overlap between the questions, you are asked to record a 
“yes”, “no” or “can’t tell” to most of the questions. A number of prompts are given 
after each question. These are designed to remind you why the question is 
important. Record your reasons for your answers in the spaces provided. 
 
©CASP This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution - 
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, 
visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/. www.casp-uk.net 
 
Screening Questions 
 
 
 
HINT: Consider 
• What was the goal of the research? 
• Why it was thought important? 
• Its relevance 
 
 
 
HINT: Consider 
 
• If the research seeks to interpret or illuminate the actions and/or subjective 
experiences of research participants 
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• Is qualitative research the right methodology for addressing the research goal? 
 
Detailed questions 
 
3. Was the research design appropriate to address the aims of the research? 
 
 
HINT: Consider 
• If the researcher has justified the research design (e.g. have they discussed how 
they decided which method to use)? 
 
4. Was the recruitment strategy appropriate to the aims of the research? 
 
 
HINT: Consider 
 
• If the researcher has explained how the participants were selected 
• If they explained why the participants they selected were the most appropriate to 
provide access to the type of knowledge sought by the study 
• If there are any discussions around recruitment (e.g. why some people chose not to 
take part) 
 
5. Was the data collected in a way that addressed the research issue? 
 
 
HINT: Consider 
 
• If the setting for data collection was justified 
• If it is clear how data were collected (e.g. focus group, semi-structured interview 
etc.) 
• If the researcher has justified the methods chosen 
• If the researcher has made the methods explicit (e.g. for interview method, is there 
an indication of how interviews were conducted, or did they use a topic guide)? 
• If methods were modified during the study. If so, has the researcher explained how 
and why? 
• If the form of data is clear (e.g. tape recordings, video material, notes etc) 
• If the researcher has discussed saturation of data 
 
6. Has the relationship between researcher and been adequately considered? 
 
 
HINT: Consider 
 
• If the researcher critically examined their own role, potential bias and influence 
during 
(a) Formulation of the research questions 
(b) Data collection, including sample recruitment and choice of location 
• How the researcher responded to events during the study and whether they 
considered the implications of any changes in the research design 
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HINT: Consider 
 
• If there are sufficient details of how the research was explained to participants for 
the reader to assess whether ethical standards were maintained 
• If the researcher has discussed issues raised by the study (e.g. issues around 
informed consent or confidentiality or how they have handled the effects of the study 
on the participants during and after the study) 
• If approval has been sought from the ethics committee 
 
8. Was the data analy  
 
HINT: Consider 
 
• If there is an in-depth description of the analysis process 
• If thematic analysis is used. If so, is it clear how the categories/themes were 
derived from the data? 
• Whether the researcher explains how the data presented were selected from the 
original sample to demonstrate the analysis process 
• If sufficient data are presented to support the findings 
• To what extent contradictory data are taken into account 
• Whether the researcher critically examined their own role, potential bias and 
influence during analysis and selection of data for presentation 
 
 
 
HINT: Consider 
 
• If the findings are explicit 
• If there is adequate discussion of the evidence both for and against the researchers 
arguments 
• If the researcher has discussed the credibility of their findings (e.g. triangulation, 
respondent validation, more than one analyst) 
• If the findings are discussed in relation to the original research question 
 
10. How valuable is the research? 
HINT: Consider 
 
• If the researcher discusses the contribution the study makes to existing knowledge 
or understanding e.g. do they consider the findings in relation to current practice or 
policy?, or relevant research-based literature? 
• If they identify new areas where research is necessary 
• If the researchers have discussed whether or how the findings can be transferred to 
other populations or considered other ways the research may be used 
 
 
 
©Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) Qualitative Research Checklist 
31.05.13 
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Appendix 2 Quality Appraisal of Correlation Studies or Cross-sectional Surveys 
                   ++ = good, + = mixed,   -  = poor,   nr = not reported, na = not applicable 
                 
  
Cells are colour-coded to demonstrate the relationship with the summary  
questions below. 
                 
  Study identification                              
(include full citation details) 
  
                
++ 
  Study design: Other 
                
+ 
  Evaluation criteria  
Quality 
++ + -  
nr na 
Guidance topic:  
                
- 
Assessed by:    
               
nr 
P
o
p
u
la
tio
n
 
Section 1: Population     
                
na 
1.1 Is the source population or source area well 
described?     
                 1.2 Is the eligible population or area 
representative of the source population or 
area? 
    
                 1.3 Do the selected participants or areas 
represent the eligible population or area?     
                       
 
                 
E
x
p
o
s
u
re
 (&
 C
o
m
p
a
ris
o
n
) 
Section 2: Method of selection of exposure (or comparison) group 
                 2.1 CS: Selection of exposure (and 
comparison) group. How was selection bias 
minimised?   
  
                 2.2 CS: Was the selection of explanatory 
variables based on sound theoretical basis?   
  
                 2.3 CS: Was the contamination acceptably low? 
 
  
                 2.4 How well were likely confounding factors 
identified and controlled?   
  
                 2.5 XSS: Were rigorous processes used to 
develop the questions (e.g. were the questions 
piloted / validated?) 
    
                 2.6 Is the setting applicable to the UK?     
                                      
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s 
Section 3: Outcomes 
                 3.1 Were the outcome measures and 
procedures reliable?     
                 3.2 Were the outcome measurement complete?     
                 3.3 Were all important outcomes assessed?     
                 T
im
e 
3.4 CS: Was there a similar follow-up time in 
exposure & comparison groups?  
  
                 3.5 CS: Was follow-up time meaningful? 
 
  
                         
                 
R
e
s
u
lts
  
Section 4: Analyses 
                 4.1 CS: Was the study sufficiently powered to 
detect an effect if one exists?  
  
                 4.2  CS: Were multiple explanatory variables 
considered in the analyses?  
  
                 
2 
 
4.3 Were the analytical methods appropriate?     
                 4.4 Was the precision of association given or 
calculable? Is association meaningful?     
                         
                 S
u
m
m
a
ry
 
Section 5: Summary 
                 5.1  Are the study results internally valid (i.e 
unbiased)?     
                 5.2  Are the results generalisable to the 
source population (i.e externally valid)?     
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Appendix 3 Ethics Approval (received via email) 
 
Ethics Feedback - EC.13.02.06.3404R 
 
On Monday, 4 March 2013, 9:10, psychethics <psychethics@Cardiff.ac.uk> wrote: 
 
Dear Irina, 
 
The Ethics Committee has considered your revised postgraduate project proposal: 
Self-discrepancy 
and affective distress after stroke (EC.13.02.06.3404R). 
 
The project has now been approved. 
 
Please note that if any further changes are made to the above project then you must 
notify the 
Ethics Committee. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Natalie Moran 
 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
Tower Building 
Park Place 
CARDIFF 
CF10 3AT 
 
Ffôn /Telephone: +44 (0) 29 2087 0360                           
Ffacs/Fax: +44 (0) 29 2087 4858   
 
http://psych.cf.ac.uk/aboutus/ethics.html 
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Appendix 4 Electronic/Flyer Recruitment Advert 
Self-discrepancy and affective distress after stroke 
Volunteer stroke survivors needed for research exploring the relationship between 
change in the sense of self before and after stroke (who I was before and who I am now) 
and the way that this affects adjustment and mood  
Who can take part? 
To take part you must have had a stroke (or a series of strokes), which must have occurred 
after the age of 18 years. Also, at least 6 months must have passed since the last stroke, but 
no more than 15 years. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Research suggests that acquired brain injury, such as stroke, can impact on one’s sense of 
self, which can lead to significant discomfort and can interfere with successful rehabilitation. 
It has also been shown that anxiety and depression are commonly experienced after stroke. 
This study looks at whether there is a difference in the stroke survivors' sense of who they 
are now compared to who they were before the stroke. It also explores whether there is a 
relationship between the experienced difference in the stroke survivors' sense of self and 
how they feel emotionally, and what might affect this relationship. This will help to inform 
and improve psychosocial rehabilitation following stroke. 
What does it involve? 
Stroke survivors will be asked to complete some questionnaires that last approximately 45-
60 minutes, including a 10 minute break. The questionnaires can be completed face-to-face, 
while attending the stroke club, or over the telephone. In certain circumstances, the 
researcher may be able to come to the participant’s home to complete the questionnaires. 
The answers to the questionnaires will be anonymised and kept confidentially.  
How can you take part? 
If interested or for further information about the study, please contact Irina Lapadatu 
(Trainee Clinical Psychologist) on 029 208 70582 or at  lapadatuil@cardiff.ac.uk, or by post 
at the address above. 
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 Appendix 5 Participant Information Sheet  
Self-discrepancy and affective distress after stroke  
 Dear Stroke Survivor,  
You are invited to take part in a research study which is being carried out by Irina Lapadatu, 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist, under the supervision of Professor Reg Morris, Consultant 
Clinical Psychologist, South Wales Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology. The results of 
the research will be written up as a dissertation and submitted as part of the researcher’s 
examinations towards a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. It may also be published as a 
journal article, but no participants will be identified in either published work. Before you 
decide whether you would like to take part, please read this information sheet which 
explains the purpose of the research and how you can help with it. Please feel free to 
discuss this with others or contact the researcher (details below) to ask any questions if 
there is anything you are not sure about, or if you would like more information.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Research suggests that acquired brain injury, such as stroke, can impact on one’s sense of 
self, which can lead to significant discomfort and can interfere with successful rehabilitation. 
It has also been shown that anxiety and depression are commonly experienced after stroke. 
This study looks at whether there is a difference in the stroke survivors' sense of who they 
are now compared to who they were before the stroke. It also explores whether there is a 
relationship between the experienced difference in the stroke survivors' sense of self and 
how they feel emotionally, and what might facilitate this relationship. This will help to 
inform and improve psychosocial rehabilitation following stroke. 
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Do I have to take part? 
You are free to decide whether or not you would like to take part, as participation in this 
research study is entirely voluntary.  
If you decide to take part, please return the completed reply slip, demographic 
questionnaire and the signed consent form in the way that you have already agreed with 
the researcher, Irina Lapadatu.  
If you decide to take part you are free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.   
 
What is involved if I do agree to take part? 
If you decide to partake in the research and you are eligible for participating in the study we 
will ask you to fill in a set of questionnaires. These should take no longer than 60 minutes to 
complete, including a break. 
If you agree to partake in the study the researcher, Irina Lapadatu, will contact you to 
arrange to meet you at the stroke club to complete the questionnaires. This may happen on 
an individual basis or in a small group of participants. Alternatively, you will be asked to 
complete the questionnaires over the telephone at a time that is convenient for you. In 
certain circumstances, the researcher may be able to visit you at home to complete the 
questionnaires. 
 
What are the possible advantages of taking part? 
Your participation will contribute to increasing understanding of the impact of stroke upon 
one’s sense of self and mood.  Addressing the loss and reconstruction of identity of stroke 
survivors may prove a crucial component for successful rehabilitation. 
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
 
This study is a psychological study and there are no known risks involved in taking part. 
However, if at any point during the interview you feel that you would like to withdraw from 
the study you will be free to do so.  
 
If you feel concerned by any issues that arise as part of completing the questionnaires you 
would be able to contact Professor Reg Morris on 029 208 70582 or by email at 
reg.morris@wales.nhs.uk to discuss this with him. 
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Will my participation in this study be confidential? 
Your participation in the research and your answers to the questionnaires will be made 
anonymous by removing your name once they are received and collated for analysis by the 
researcher. Once this is done you will not be able to be identified by anyone. The 
questionnaires that you complete will be seen only by the researcher (Irina Lapadatu) and 
Research Supervisor (Reg Morris) and will be kept in a locked filing cabinet.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of the research will be written up as a dissertation and submitted as part of the 
researcher’s Doctorate in Clinical Psychology and may be published in a research article. All 
data will be anonymised and so will any information that could allow the participants to be 
identified.  You may ask to see all the anonymous data at any time. You also have the right 
to withdraw your data without explanation up to the point that it is made anonymous, after 
which, it will not be traceable back to you individually.  
  
If you would like a summary of the findings (available Oct 2014) please tick the appropriate 
box on the reply slip.  
 
What if I have a problem with the study or want to make a complaint? 
If you have questions and/or concerns about any aspect of this study, please contact the 
researcher (contact details below) who will do her best to answer your questions. If you 
remain unhappy and wish to complain formally you will be given contact details of the 
Cardiff University School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee who may be able to 
respond to your concerns.  
 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All research is looked at by a Research Ethics Committee in order to protect your safety, 
rights, wellbeing and dignity. This study has been reviewed and approved by the Cardiff 
University School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee. 
Further information 
If you have any further questions about taking part in the study or need any more 
information please do not hesitate to contact the researcher (Irina Lapadatu) at the South 
Wales Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology on 029 208 70582, email 
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(lapadatuil@cardiff.ac.uk) or return the contact slip to the address below, and you will be 
contacted as soon as possible.  
If you do not wish to take part, you do not have to do anything more and you will not be 
contacted again. 
Thank you very much for taking the time to read this information sheet, your help is greatly 
appreciated. 
 
Irina Lapadatu     Professor Reg Morris 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist   Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
                                                                         Programme Director
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Appendix 6 Reply Slip Self-discrepancy and affective distress after stroke  
Please tick all that apply: 
 I am interested in taking part in the research. 
 I would like more information before I decide whether or not to take part. 
 I would be comfortable completing the questionnaires as part of a group of people. 
 I would like a summary of the findings and my email or postal address is: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
The following information is to enable contact; it will not be used in the study. 
Name:   ______________________________ 
Email Address (if available): ________________________ 
Telephone number:  ____________________ 
Can a message be left at this telephone number (please tick)? 
 Yes      
 No 
 
If you would like to take part in the research, please return this reply slip together with the 
completed demographic questionnaire and consent form to Irina Lapadatu, Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist, in the way that you have already agreed. 
Thank you. 
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Appendix 7 Demographic Questionnaire 
 ID number (to be completed by the researcher): _________ 
Self-discrepancy and affective distress after stroke   
 
This information will be used anonymously in the study. Please answer as many questions as possible. 
However, you DO NOT have to answer anything you do not want to. Thank you for your time. 
Sex (tick one):               Male     Year of Birth: _____________ 
                                        Female 
 
 
Marital Status (tick one)                   Married                     Single – never married 
                                                      Separated/divorced                       Widowed 
Ethnic origin: ________________________________________________________________ 
Highest level of education obtained: _____________________________________________ 
Retired (please tick):      Yes      No  If no: 
Current occupation: __________________________________________________________ 
Occupation prior to retirement or stroke (if different): _______________________________    
Date of stroke: ____/____/_____Type of stroke, if known (e.g. haemorrhagic, infarct):_____ 
Have you suffered more than one stroke (please tick)          Yes      No 
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Side(s) of body affected (please tick)          Right                Both             Left               Neither                
 
Is your speech affected following the stroke?  (please tick)                                  Yes           No      
            
If yes, please briefly describe how your speech is affected: 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Is your comprehension affected following the stroke?  (please tick)                    Yes          No      
         
If yes, please briefly describe how your comprehension is affected: 
__________________________________________ _________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Other effects of stroke (e.g. loss of balance or vision):________________________________ 
 
Is there previous history of (please tick):  
 Serious illness        Learning disability       Physical disability 
 Serious head injury           Diagnostic of dementia or Parkinson’s  
 
 
Did you suffer with anxiety/depression before your stroke? (please tick)     Yes     No 
 
Have you suffered with anxiety/depression since your stroke? (please tick)   Yes   No                    
 
 
Name (block capitals): ...........................................................................Date:.................................. 
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 Appendix 8 Participant Consent Form  
Self-discrepancy and affective distress after stroke-  
I understand that my participation in this study will involve completing a set of 
questionnaires, face-to-face (individually or as part of a small group) while at the 
stroke club, or over the phone. This will require approximately 45-60 minutes of my 
time, including a break. 
I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can 
withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a reason. 
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. I am free to discuss any 
concerns with Professor Reg Morris, Consultant Clinical Psychologist and Programme 
Director on the South Wales Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology. 
 I understand that the information provided by me will be held confidentially. All my 
answers to the questionnaires will be made anonymous when the data are collated. 
After this point data cannot be withdrawn from the study because it will not be 
traceable back to me individually anymore. All information will be retained for up to 
5 years when it will be destroyed. 
I understand that at the end of the study I can be provided with additional 
information and feedback about the purpose and results of the study. 
 
I, ___________________________________(NAME) consent to participate in the study conducted by Irina 
Lapadatu, South Wales Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology, Cardiff University with the supervision of 
Professor Reg Morris 
               Signed (participant):       Date:   
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Appendix 9 Participant Debrief Sheet  
Self-discrepancy and affective distress after stroke 
Dear Stroke Survivor, 
Thank you for taking part in the research, your time and input is very much appreciated. 
The aim of the research is to explore whether there is a difference in the stroke survivors' sense of 
who they are after the stroke compared to who they were before the stroke. It also explores 
whether there is a relationship between the experienced difference in the stroke survivors' sense of 
self and how they feel emotionally, and what might affect this relationship. 
You have completed some questionnaires that explored one’s sense of self, self-esteem, mood and 
adjustment after stroke.  
This information you provided will be put together with the information from all the other 
participants in this research project and analysed statistically. The results will help to increase 
understanding of the impact of stroke upon one’s sense of self and mood.  This will then be helpful 
in informing psychosocial rehabilitation. 
 
The information you have provided is being held anonymously. Your answers to all the 
questionnaires were made anonymous when your data were collated. All information will be 
retained for up to 5 years when it will be destroyed. You may ask to see all the anonymous data at 
any time. You also have the right to withdraw your data without explanation up to the point it is 
made anonymous, after which it will not be traceable back to you individually anymore.  
 
If you would like to make any comments and/or complaints, please contact Professor Reg Morris. 
Many thanks, 
Irina Lapadatu                 Professor Reg Morris 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist                                                 Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
        Programme Director
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The following appendices have been removed for copyright reasons: 
 
Appendix 10 Head Injury Semantic Differential III 
Appendix 11 The Barthel Index  
Appendix 12 Stroke Specific Quality of Life Scale (SS-QOL) 
Appendix 13 The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
Appendix 14 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
 
